Comparison of British and German APC and HE shell, and
British CPC.
12in Mark XIII guns were in the Agincourt only, and Mark X
in the Bellerophon and Invincible classes, the
Indefatigable and New Zealand.
The German 12in mountings allowed 16° elevation in the
Prinzregent Luitpold, and 13'/2° in other ships.
11 in SKL/50 guns were in the Seydlitz (16° elevation),
and Moltke (13'/2°), while the Nassau class and the von
der Tann had 11 in SKL/45s and the pre-dreadnoughts l 1in
SKL/40s.
German heavy guns were built up from shrunk on tubes and
hoops, while British guns were in addition strengthened
circumferentially by wire-winding. German heavy guns had
the Krupp horizontal wedge breech, and very much smaller
chambers than their British equivalents, which also
differed in using the Welin steppedscrew breech block.
The German propellant was of tubular grain, and at least
partly contained in a heavy brass case, while the British
propellant
of cord form grain, was in silk bags. Further details on
the propellant charges are given subsequently in the
section dealing with ammunition fires and explosions. The
British 12in were not particularly accurate, but the
larger guns could make very good shooting, and were at
least equal to German guns in this respect.
At Jutland all heavy guns were mounted in twin turrets,
though triples had been introduced in the Italian,
Austrian, Russian and United States navies, and ships with
quadruple turrets had been laid down in France. In British
ships training, elevation and run-out of the guns, hoists,
breeches and loading rammers were operated by hydraulic
power provided by steam driven pumps and piped to the
various turrets. The Invincible had originally been fitted
with electrically powered turrets but these had been
replaced. Except in the Agincourt, loading could be
carried out at any angle of elevation, as the chain rammer
was fitted on the end of the gun slide. However, in many
of the
British heavy guns
earlier British dreadnoughts and battlecruisers there was
insufficient hydraulic power available and, as the run-out
of the guns took about 11 seconds at maximum elevation, it
was quicker to run-out and load with the gun at a small
angle of elevation and then re-elevate.
German turrets varied far more in their details than did
British, but the guns were always run-out by compressed
air, loading was at a small fixed angle of elevation, and
in all 11 in guns the breeches and loading rammers were
hand worked. Otherwise the 11 in SKL/40 mountings were
hydraulically powered, and the 11 in SKL/45 ones electric,
but for the llin SKL/50s elevation was hydraulic with
electrically driven pump for each turret, and the same was
the case in all 12in mountings, where the breeches and
rammers were also hydraulically worked, while in the 15in
the hoists were hydraulic in addition.
Details of the ammunition supply are given subsequently
when considering ammunition fires and explosions.
The maximum rate of fire in the German 11 in and 12in
dreadnoughts and battlecruisers approached three rounds
per gun per minute, while in the British ships, where the
hoists were usually slower, it was nearer two rounds per
gun.
Two salvos, or one round per gun per minute, was seldom
exceeded by either side in the battle so that the maximum
possible rate of fire was of little significance.
British dreadnoughts and battlecruisers generally carried
about 100 rounds for each heavy gun, and German ships 80
to 90. The principal types of shell in British ships were
capped armour piercing (APC), capped pointed common (CPC)
and nose fuzed high explosive (HE). All three were carried
in most ships, but the 15in ships had no HE, the Canada no
CPC, and the Agincourt APC and a special TNT filled CPC
only. About 60% of the outfit was APC for 13 .Sin and 15in
guns, and rather less for 12in.
The German types of shell were APC and a base fuzed HE,
which approximated to an uncapped semi-armour piercing
(SAP), and was not carried in 11 in dreadnoughts and
battlecruisers, while for 12in guns about 70% of the
outfit was APC.
The heads of the heavy shells in use at Jutland were of
somewhat diverse form, but approximated to a radius of
four calibres, except for the 5291b 11 in which was nearer
two calibres. Armour piercing shell was usually made in
both navies from a steel containing about 0.7% Carbon, 3%
Nickel and 2.5% Chromium. The shell heads were hardened, a
mild steel cap was used, and the bursting charge amounted
to c3% of the total weight in most instances. German
shells were not hardened to the same extent as British
ones, which proved to be too brittle, and a bursting
charge of TNT desensitized by the addition of beeswax was
used with a gaine and delay action fuze, while the head of
the cavity was filled by a wood block. British shells had
a lyddite (picric acid) bursting charge, which did not
require a gaine, and did not have a delay action fuze.
Their behaviour was far from satisfactory as shown on a
later page.
CPC shell had a hardened point with a mild steel cap, and
the bursting charge which consisted of a mixture of pebble
and fine grain black powder, amounted to about 6%-91/2% of
the total weight, being least in the 15in. German SAP had
a TNT burster of about 61/2%, and British HE a lyddite, or
in some a TNT, burster which generally amounted to about
13 or 14% of the total weight. As usual there are slight
discrepancies in the figures for expenditure of heavy gun
ammunition, but the following table is believed to be as
accurate as possible.
British heavy calibre ammunition expenditure
The very small expenditure by the 1st Division of the
battlefleet should be noted.
The type of shell fired is not known for the Royal Oak,
Warspite, Malaya, Princess- Royal, Tiger and the three
lost battlecruisers, though it is believed that the Queen
Mary fired only APC, and the Princess Royal and Tiger
mainly this type. Figures which in some cases have been
slightly adjusted to agree with the total expenditure are
given for other ships:
15in - Revenge all APC. Barham 136 APC, 201 CPC. Valiant
278 APC, 10 CPC. 14in - Canada all APC.
13.5in/ 1400 - King George Vall CPC, Ajax all CPC,
Centurion all APC, Iron Duke all CPC, Benbow all APC,
Marlborough 138 APC, 24 CPC.
13.Sin/1250 - Orion all APC, Monarch all APC, Conqueror
16APC, 41 CPC, Thunderer all CPC, Lion all APC.
German heavy calibre ammunition expenditure
12in - Superb 16 CPC, 38 HE, Bellerophon 41 APC, 21 CPC,
Temeraire all HE, Vanguard 15 CPC, 65 HE, Colossus 81 APC,
12 CPC, Collingwood 52 APC, 32 HE, Neptune 27 CPC, 21 HE,
St Vincent 90 APC, 8 CPC, Hercules 4 APC, 12 CPC, 82 HE,
Agincourt all TNT filled CPC, New Zealand 172 APC, 76 CPC,
172 HE, Inflexible 10 APC, 59 CPC, 19 HE, Indomitable 99
APC, 10 CPC, 66 HE.
The amount of HE fired by 12in gun ships is noteworthy as
this type of shell was of little use against heavily
armoured German vessels. HE was also carried in 13.5in
ships but it is unlikely that any was fired by the
Princess Royal, Tiger or Queen Mary.
Of the total of c3597 heavy shells, 3160 were APC and 437
SAP. Figures giving the individual expenditure of SAP in
12in ships have survived in a few instances, but the
Liitzow probably expended most, if not all, of her outfit
of 200, the Derfflinger fired 87, Markgraf 20, Prinzregent
Luitpold 10, Kaiserin 2, and Oldenburg and Helgoland none.
A fair number were also fired by the Kronprinz but no
figure appears to be extant.
Hits on British capital ships
The number of hits scored by heavy shells in each phase of
the battle have been given previously, but for convenience
they are repeated below.
It is doubtful if some of the British figures are as high
as they would have been if the assessment had been made on
German lines. Detailed repair drawings still exist for the
Tiger, and in this ship, all hits have been enumerated.
In the Liitzow, the total number of heavy hits cannot be
determined with certainty. The preliminary estimate was 24
hits by heavy and 1 by medium shells. A reconstructed
diagram shows thirty-one hits, of which one on the
starboard wing propeller shaft housing was from fragments,
giving a total of thirty, but such reconstructions are
liable to overestimate the number of hits, and some were
probably by medium or light projectiles. It is therefore
considered better to adhere to the figure
Hits on German capital ships and 2nd Squadron
The total number of hits by heavy shells, given above for
the surviving German ships, is as certain as such matters
can ever be.
of twenty-four heavy hits. The six additional hits given
by the diagram are listed, with explanations which must be
taken as highly speculative:
I From port side. Battery roof deck by `B' barbette - ?
6in or additional effect of c1819 hit from Lion that burst
just abaft `B'. 2 From port side. Near No 2-S.9in - ? 6in.
Not mentioned in the Lutzow's account of 5.9in troubles.
3 From starboard side. Side armour near `A' and `B' -
Maybe confused with c1915 hit below `B'.
4 From starboard side. Apparently on upper deck near `B' -
? 4in.
5 From starboard side. On side near aftermost barbette.
May be confused with 1615 hit on armour.
6 From starboard side. Near No 3 - 5.9in. May be confused
with c1915 hit on armour of No 4 - 5.9m.
To calculate the percentage of hits to rounds fired, it is
necessary to deduct the number of heavy shells fired at
light and armoured cruisers and destroyers, or to add the
hits obtained on these ships. Unfortunately the number of
heavy shells fired at targets other than capital ships
cannot be estimated with reliability, and the second
alternative must be adopted, though some of the figures
are doubtful.
One of the following tables lists hits by heavy shells
which are considered to have been made on cruisers and
destroyers:
Heavy shell hits on cruisers and destroyers
The 11 in hit on the Spitfire from the Nassau when they
collided, is not counted.
It may be thought that the inclusion of the Black Prince
unduly favours the German figures, and if this ship is
excluded they become - c3570 heavy shells, 110 hits,
3.08%.
It is possible in many cases to calculate percentage
figures for
of 5.00, but she had on the whole, better visibility
conditions than the Barham and Valiant. For a shorter
period, the Moltke's shooting at the beginning of the
action was outstanding.
The German battleships and battlecruisers expended far
more ammunition from their secondary batteries, and a
considerable proportion of this was at capital ships,
while it is believed that none of the twelve British
battleships with 6in guns, or the Tiger, employed their
secondary batteries at such targets. The Westfalen which
took the greatest part of any of the German ships in the
night fighting against destroyers, was only seventh in the
amount of 5.9in ammunition expended. There is no record of
the total number of medium calibre hits on British capital
ships, except that there were three on the Tiger, and as
far as is known, only one such hit, which disabled a 15in
gun in the
Warspite, was of any importance.
Secondary guns were all in hand-worked pedestal, or in the
German navy centre pivot mountings, except that 4 - 6.7m
in the Hessen were in single turrets with electric
training and elevation. The most important guns, the 6in
and 5.9in, could fire at 7 rounds or more per minute, and
in many German ships, where it was the usual practice to
provide an ammunition hoist for each 5.9in gun, this could
be maintained, but British ships had fewer or slower 6in
hoists, and apart from ready ammunition, the supply was in
some instances only capable of providing about 3 rounds
per gun per minute, though in the Canada the maximum rate
was 51/2. The ammunition allowance was usually about 150
rounds per gun with extreme figures of 100 and 200, and in
British ships nose fuzed HE and common shell were carried
for 6in and
4in guns, though the Agincourt had no common shell
originally and the Canada TNT filled SAP instead. The
German 6.7in had AP and nose fuzed HE, and the 5.9in base
fuzed and nose fuzed HE.
The actual bore of the 6.7in gun was 6.795in, and of the
5.9in, 5.87in. The secondary armament ammunition returns
were as follows. Ships which apparently expended no rounds
are omitted from the British list.
The German figures include star shells of which the Nassau
fired 15.9in, Ostfriesland 1- 3.Sin, Thuringen 2 - 3.5in
and Posen 3 - 3.5in. The large number of 3.5in fired by
the Westfalen is interesting, and indicates that such
light anti-destroyer guns still had their uses at night,
though the British 4in returns show that they were of
little value in daylight fighting.
Against oil fired destroyers nose fuzed HE was the
accepted German 5.9in shell, but the Helgoland at least
reported firing nose and base fuzed 5.9in HE alternately
at night, in case a more resistant target appeared. For
four ships, the numbers of each type of 5.9in HE fired,
have survived: Markgraf 128 nose fuzed, 86 base fuzed,
Kaiserin 21 nose fuzed, 114 base fuzed, Derfflinger 118
nose fuzed, 117 base fuzed, Moltke 171 nose fuzed, 75 base
fuzed. The Schleswig-Holstein's 6.7in fired HE and no AP.
The only figures found for British secondary guns are: the
Marlborough 55-6in HE, 5-6in CPC, the Valiant 83-6in HE,
8-6in CPC, the Agincourt 11 1-6m HE, the Vanguard 5-4in
HE, 5-4in Common,
In cruisers 6m and lesser calibres were in pedestal, or in
German ships centre pivot mountings, hand-worked except
that in the Falmouth class self-contained hydraulic
training and elevation gear for each
Light Cruiser Ammunition Expenditure
mounting had been ordered in March 1914, but it is
doubtful whether this was fitted at Jutland. The use of
power-worked 5.9m mountings had been considered for the
later German capital ships, but trials showed that the
minimum training rate of 1/32° per second could not be
held with sufficient accuracy. The 9.2in and 7.Sin were in
turrets, twin for the 9.2in in the Defence class and
otherwise single, with hydraulic training and elevation,
and in the twin 9.2in, hydraulic loading rammers.
Individual hoists for each gun were not possible in light
cruisers, and apart from ready ammunition, the rate of
supply for 6in and 5.9in was about three to five rounds
per gun per minute, and usually nearer
the lower figure, at least in British ships. The
ammunition allowances were 128 per 5.9in and 150 per 4.1
in in German light cruisers, as against 150-200 per bin
and 150-250 per 4in in British ships. The 9.2in had 125
and the 7.5in 125-180 per gun.
In the armoured cruisers, AP, Common and nose fuzed HE
were carried for 9.2in, 7.5in and 6in, but AP was omitted
in British light cruisers, while the German had base fuzed
and nose fuzed HE for 5.9m, and three types of HE for 4.1
in with internal, nose and time and percussion fuzes.
Anti-aircraft fire was of little importance at Jutland.
Most German dreadnoughts and battlecruisers, and the light
cruisers of the 2nd SG, had 2-, or in some ships 4 - 3.5in
AA guns firing a 221b shell at 2460fs, while the majority
of British capital ships and older light cruisers had
1-3in AA firing a 121/21b shell at 2600fs. Most British
capital ships and light cruisers also carried some time
fuzed shrapnel for their heavy 6m and 4in guns.
The light cruiser ammunition returns are given below. The
Minotaur, Cochrane and Shannon fired no 9.2in or 7.5in,
and there are no figures for the other armoured cruisers,
except that the Duke of Edinburgh expended 20 - 9.2in, and
there are also none for the Wiesbaden and Frauenlob.
It will be noted that nine German light cruisers fired
more rounds than twenty-six British, which might indicate
that a number of the latter were under-employed in the
battle.
There are few figures for the different types of shell
fired. The Frankfurt's 5.9in returns give an expenditure
of 96 AP and 2 83 HE, but it is believed that this should
read base fuzed and nose fuzed HE respectively. The
Miinchen's 4.l in fired 91 internal fuze, 57 nose fuze and
11 time and percussion fuze shells, and the Hamburg's 49,
3 7 and 6 respectively. The Canterbury's 6in and 4in only
fired HE, as did the Royalist's, while the Comus only used
Common shell.
The ammunition allowance was generally 120 rounds per gun
in British destroyers, Common shell and nose fuzed HE
being carried, while German destroyers had 80 rounds per
4.1 in and 100 per 3.5m, both calibres having internal and
nose fuzed HE.
It is thought that the total number of rounds actually
fired by the British destroyers was about 1700, and by the
German 2400.
There were probably some unrecorded 5.9in hits on capital
ships, and no estimates can be made for the ships sunk,
apart from the Warrior.
No estimates can be made for the ships sunk apart from
Elbing, Rostock and the V27. An accurate estimate of the
number of 9.2in
Recorded hits by British medium and light shells
Recorded hits by German medium and light shells
7.5in hits on the Wiesbaden is also impossible, but it is
thought that the total was about 6.
Damage to the armament of capital ships has been mentioned
in the detailed descriptions of hits, and serious
breakdowns have also been noted if their time was known.
In addition the Vanguard had trouble with the lock
mechanism of her one 12 in that had a Holmstrom breech,
and one 12in in the New Zealand had a badly choked vent
which entailed
the mushroom head being shifted. In the Tiger the cordite
flash door of the right gun loading cage in `B' turret had
to be pinned up, and in the same turret a shell sliding
forward caused the right waiting position flashdoor to be
unshipped.
In the Seydlitz a back-flash occurred in `A' turret which
went down the shell hoists to the working chamber and
slightly burnt two men, while three others suffered from
gas. A pencilled note in her report
states that the force of this was a new experience. One
lower shell hoist was put out of action by an electrical
failure in this ship, but the other supplied the turret -
apparently `A' - with transfer in the working chamber, and
vibration from hits also caused many hoist fuzes to blow.
In the Moltke a large number of instances of temporary
propellant gas poisoning occurred among the turret crews.
Smoke and gas were always a problem in German turrets as
the cartridge case was extracted into the turret, but it
may be that the Moltke's smoke suction gear was inadequate
and/or that the routine for getting rid of spent cartridge
cases was not observed.
At the end of the daylight fighting eight heavy guns were
out of action in surviving British ships, one in the
Warspite, two in the Lion and two in the Princess Royal as
a result of hits, and three from other causes,
one in the Marlborough from a premature, one in the
Princess Royal from a breech mechanism failure, and one in
the Tiger from the fracture of a valve box and plunger. Of
these three, the Princess Royal's gun, and possibly the
Tiger's were serviceable again on the morning of I
June.
The equivalent German figure was ten, four in the
Derfflinger, four in the Seydlitz and two in the von der
Tann, while there were also two in the Lutzow. All twelve
were as a result of hits. In addition four
heavy guns in the von der Tann had been out of action for
a considerable time during the battle from failure to
run-out properly, and the remaining two in this ship were
on hand training as the result of a hit. In
the Seydlitz the power training of one turret broke down
at the start of the battle, shortly before the turret was
disabled by a hit, and by the end of the day the main
training gear for the aftermost turret in the Seydlitz,
and also in the Lutzow, had failed as power cables,
unwisely run above the armour deck, had been cut. The main
training gear of the Seydlitz's fore turret failed after
cables had been under water for about 8 hours.
It is often stated that the British rate of fire was
slower than the German, and this was probably true for
some ships, but the Lion's first five salvos were fired in
21/2 minutes, while the Lutzow's took 3 minutes.
The Lutzow however fired her first thirty-one salvos in
19 minutes, giving an average interval of 38 seconds
between salvos, and obtained six hits on the Lion, whereas
the latter fired her first twenty salvos in
141/2 minutes (interval 46 seconds), and obtained only
two hits. There appears to be no record of the number of
salvos fired by the Moltke in this opening period, but the
Derfflinger subsequently fired six salvos at the Queen
Mary in 2 minutes 25 seconds which gives an average
interval of 29 seconds. Of British ships the Marlborough
fired fourteen salvos in 6 minutes at the Grosser Kurfurst
and the Iron Duke nine salvos in 4 minutes 50 seconds at
the Konig. The average intervals between salvos were 28
and 36 seconds, and three and seven hits were respectively
obtained. The Lion also attained the same rate of firing
as the Marlborough in the 2020 action, but both average
range and success in hitting were less.
The above rates of fire for the Marlborough and Iron Duke
were achieved at shorter ranges and times of flight than
those for the Derfflinger and Lutzow, which would favour
them to some extent. The approximate times of flight were:
Marlborough 15 seconds, Iron Duke 17/18 seconds,
Derfflinger 21 seconds, Lutzow 21 to 29 seconds.
The British system of main armament fire control was more
advanced than the German. The Director enabled the guns to
be trained, laid and fired from a single position, usually
the fore-top, as the training angle of the Director and
the elevation angle of the Director sight were transmitted
electrically to pointers in each turret which were matched
with dials driven respectively off the main training arc
of the turret and the gun slides. The German
Director-pointer, located in the gunnery control tower,
gave the correct training angle to the turrets in a
similar manner, but the guns were laid and fired
individually. There was no range plotting in German ships,
whereas the British used the Dreyer table. In this a range
clock drove a pencil on moving paper, and readings of as
many range-finders as possible were plotted, so that the
clock could be kept in step with the mean range by visual
inspection.
Otherwise the rate of change of range was determined by
mechanical course and speed resolvers such as the
Dumaresq, which required an estimate of the target's
initial course and speed, and by spotting corrections of
the salvos fired. In the German system the rate was
determined by these last two methods combined with
estimates from the range- finder 'readings.
The British main armament Director proved its value in the
battle, and little accurate firing could have been
achieved without it. Only the Erin and Agincourt still
lacked Directors, and the former did not fire a shot from
her heavy guns, while the Agincourt's shooting was not
among the best of that from the battleships.
In the Indomitable whose shooting was at times good,
training was usually by Director, but it was preferred to
lay the guns individually as in German ships. The Iron
Duke's Director had an early type of Henderson gyro
fitting which fired the guns at the correct instant in the
ship's roll, but the gyro adjusting screw gave out just
before opening fire, and the telescope supplied was not
good enough optically, so that the Henderson fitting was
not used. The 15in ships and the Canada each had two
Directors, aloft and in an armoured shield on the CT
crown, and in the Barham the aloft position was used until
some defects developed from vibration caused by her own
gunfire. This apparently occurred during the `Run to the
South', and her report considered that it would have been
better to have reverted to gunlayer firing in this part of
the action, as it was difficult to keep up rapid fire with
the armoured Director on account of the very small motion
of the ship. In the Malaya the armoured Director was used
initially and the aloft position when it was necessary to
use 'super-elevation' fittings, which were only provided
for this Director.
In several ships fire was opened before a single
range-finder reading had been obtained and the British 9ft
RF's were in general inadequate, though the Iron Duke
reported very good results. The 1 Sft instruments, which
were only in 15in gun ships except for one in the Orion,
seem to have been better, and the Valiant reported that a
good plot was obtained at the beginning of the action,
though after the first half hour only isolated groups of
ranges were available. The Barham also obtained good
ranges on occasion during the `Run to the North', though
the fall of shot could not be seen. Conditions in the
battle were as a rule unfavourable for Dreyer table
plotting, and this part of the British fire-control system
did not give the results that would have been expected in
clear visibility and with longer spells of firing at a
particular target. It may be mentioned that the Lion and
New Zealand made range plots, and the former a bearing
plot, which appeared to be very good, but in neither case
was this reflected in the percentage of hits obtained.
Opinion varied as to whether the control officer should be
in the fore-top or in the gunnery control tower. In the
Valiant conditions were found to be better from the latter
position, and the gunnery control tower was also favoured
in the Iron Duke. The Benbow's report, in particular,
complained of the difficulty of getting the Director layer
on to the right target, and of getting the spotter on to
the same target as the Director, though spotting glass
indicators were fitted. Similar difficulties were noted in
the Valiant whose report stated that some means of direct
connection between the Director layer and the Control
officer's glasses was urgently needed. In the Vanguard a
Kilroy `aid to spotter', by which the spotting glasses
could be mechanically connected to the Director, had
recently been fitted, and was found to be most valuable,
but capital ship targets were not engaged. The New
Zealand, too, reported good results from an `aid to
spotter' with a bearing receiver from the Director tower
and a bearing arc on the spotting glasses, though her
shooting was among the worst.
Difficulties were experienced in estimating the
inclination of the target, and it was also considered that
the `bracket' method of ranging, in which each salvo was
spotted before the next was fired, was too slow, and that
a `ladder' method, as later adopted, should be tried. In
this two salvos separated by a known amount, were fired in
quick succession and spotted as a pair, and the process
continued until first the deflexion and then the range
were determined.
The exceptionally small spread of the 15in salvos from the
5th BS was noted by'several German ships, and the G38 also
reported the very small spread of a long range salvo from
the Orion.
The more primitive German fire-control system seems to
have worked well, but was inferior to the British.
Relatively little could have been accomplished without the
Director-pointer, and the principal criticism of this
equipment was that the old pattern telescopes, still
fitted in many ships, were far from meeting requirements,
though the new type telescopes fitted in the Derfflinger,
gave excellent results, provided the protective glasses
were wiped after each salvo from the fore turrets. Other
points raised in the Seydlitz's report were the inadequacy
of the auxiliary eyepiece provided for the Gunnery Control
Officer, the need for power working of the Director
transmitter and the advantage of a simple gyro fitting
which would allow the target to be found again after rapid
alterations of own ship's course, perhaps made in smoke.
The Westfalen, Rheinland and the pre-dreadnoughts were
without Director-pointers.
The German stereoscopic range-finders were probably better
than the British coincidence instruments in the conditions
of the battle, though a larger size than l Oft would have
been valuable. No range plot was used and in the Seydlitz
at least, the range clock was only of value in the earlier
part of the action, and firing was continued on readings
from the range-finder in the gunnery control tower.
Additional communications between the various
range-finders and the main control stations were needed,
and a range-finder required in the foretop, though this
might entail some reconstruction of the mast.
Control was carried out from the forward gunnery control
tower, but the after control was used when visibility was
impaired from the forward position. The Invincible was
sunk when the Liitzow's after control was in use.
Difficulties were experienced in getting the spotter in
the fore-top on to the correct target and in the
Seydlitz's report, the fitting of training pedestals
reciprocally connected to the Directorpointer transmitter
was demanded. In theory the control officer was able to
check the Director target through the auxiliary eyepiece,
but in the Seydlitz this was so little use, that the
control officer had to operate the Director-pointer
himself. In the Derfflinger the spotter's glasses in the
fore-top were linked to the Director by
'follow-the-pointer' gear, but the spotter could not
transmit in this way to the Director. In the latter part
of the battle, the British hulls could be made out from
the top when only gun-flashes were visible from the GCT,
but by then communications with the fore-top had been cut
by splinters. Better protection for these, and reciprocal
transmission between the Director and spotting glasses
were demanded, though the ideal was to site the Director
aloft with a tripod mast as in British ships.
The German time of flight clocks were not very reliable,
and in the Lutzow three units of a newly installed
Petravik gyro-sight system ('Abfeuerungs Gerat') were
broken by the effect of her own gunfire, but this
equipment had not been used in the battle.
The control equipment for the 5.9in guns of German capital
ships and light cruisers was well in advance of that for
the British 6m, as Director-pointers were used, while
there were no Directors so employed in the British navy at
that time, though the Westfalen, which inflicted most
damage on the British destroyers, had no Directorpointer.
German searchlights were better handled, star shells were
entirely lacking in British ships, and there was also no
equivalent to the German night identification system using
coloured lights, or to the very effective artificial fog,
which was well supplemented by the use of oil fuel smoke.
The events leading to the loss of five large British ships
from magazine explosions have been previously described in
so far as they are known. The Invincible's 7in turret
armour would be pierced easily by German 12in APC at c
10,500yds, as would the Defence's Tin or 8in at a shorter
range, while the Black Prince with 71/2in-6in, was
virtually unprotected at only 750-1500yds, quite apart
from other weaknesses in the two latter ships' armouring.
In the Indefatigable an 11 in shell at c 15,500-1 6,000yds
from the von der Tann, going through the 7/16in side
plating below the upper deck, could well have pierced the
1 in main deck and then the 3in armour of `X' barbette
which extended almost to main deck level. The Tin barbette
armour between the main and upper decks, would probably
not have been pierced by the von der Tann's guns at the
above range, but it might have been holed and hot armour
fragments driven in, which could have caused the
explosion.
The Queen Mary was sunk at 14,400yds and German 12in APC
might pierce 9in armour up to cl6,000yds or to cI 7,000yds
in the case of a turret face plate where impact would be
closer to the normal. easiest path for a shell causing the
explosion of `A' or `B' magazines would have been to
pierce the 9in face plate of either turret, or else
through the 5/8in or 3/4in side plating between the
forecastle and upper decks, then the 1 in upper deck, and
finally the 3 in barbette base between the upper and main
decks, `A' being more likely in this instance as the
barbette was nearer the ship's side (16ft at upper deck
level from side to barbette armour). Various other paths
are possible quite apart from a shell entering through one
of the turret gun ports, or hot fragments from a hit that
failed to pierce, causing the disaster.
Though these losses could thus in a sense be attributed to
inadequate thickness of armour, there was little that
could be done to remedy this in completed ships apart from
thickening the turret crowns and additional deck plating
in vulnerable positions, and it must be noted that all the
British battleships were liable to similar disasters if
their turret or barbette armour were holed. Of the 136
barbettes in the four battle squadrons at Jutland, only
four, the wing barbettes in the Colossus and Hercules, had
more than 10in max and this thickness of armour might be
pierced by German 12in shells up to about 14,000yds. Only
the six ships with 15in guns, and the Agincourt, had more
than 11 in on their turret faces. The real cause of the
disasters was that the precautions for preventing flash of
ignited propellant reaching a magazine were not matched to
the behaviour of British charges, though if the British
ships had had German charges it is very unlikely that they
would have blown up. This was not, however, clear at the
time.
It was realised before 1914 that there were two dangers,
the first that decomposition of the nitro-cellulose could
initiate a spontaneous explosion, and the second that the
effect of enemy shells, torpedoes or mines might blow up
the ship. The first required that the magazine cases of
the charges, and the magazines, should be able to vent to
air before a dangerous pressure built up from the ignition
of the charge or charges in the case affected, and the
second that the magazines should be protected from enemy
weapons. Such pre-1914 evidence as there was indicated
that the first danger was greater than that of enemy
shells causing a magazine explosion, and was best avoided
by a strict time limit on the service life of the charges,
not exposing them to excessive heat or damp, and great
care in manufacture so that certain impurities in the
nitrocellulose, notably traces of sulphate, often derived
from pyritic coal dust or cinders, were avoided. The
pre-war records of the British and German navies were good
in this respect, and though there were spontaneous
explosions of 6in charges in the pre-dreadnought Revenge
in 1899 and in the cruiser Fox in 1906, and of 5.9in
charges in the German cruiser Vineta in 1903, none of
these caused a major disaster to the ship. The Germans
learnt much from the Vineta incident, and by 1914 had
developed a far more advanced propellant than the British.
Other navies had suffered serious losses from spontaneous
propellant explosions, the principal incidents prior to
1914 leading to the loss or total wrecking of the
following ships - Maine (USA) 1898, Mikasa (Japan) 1905,
Aquidaban (Brazil) 1906, lena (France) 1907, Matsushima
(Japan) 1908, Liberte (France) 1911.
Further disasters occurred between 1914 and the date of
Jutland. In the British navy the pre-dreadnought Bulwark
was blown to pieces in the Medway in November 1914, though
it appears that gross carelessness in the treatment of
exposed 6in charges and HE shells with live fuzes may have
been the reason and not decomposing propellant. The
armoured cruiser Natal was sunk in December 1915 at
Cromarty, and this ship had much dubious cordite on board.
In the German navy, the light cruiser Karlsruhe was lost
350 miles east of Trinidad from an internal explosion in
November 1914. The Karlsruhe was extremely unsuited to the
tropics as temperatures as high as 76°C had been recorded,
and the German Official History remarks that the explosion
may have been due to a quantity of lubricating oil thinned
with petroleum for use as fuel.
In other navies, an explosion in the old Chilean
battleship Capitan Prat, which had some very bad cordite
in her magazines, was not disastrous to the ship, as the
gases of the explosion had an easy vent to air, while the
loss of the Italian pre-dreadnought Benedetto Brin is said
to have been due to a bomb placed in the after magazine.
As far as the effect of enemy shells was concerned, the
evidence from the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-5 seemed to
show that this danger was not so great. The Russian
pre-dreadnought Borodino had been sunk at Tsushima by a
final magazine explosion after a number of serious
ammunition fires, the worst of which broke out as a result
of 2-12in hits near the mainmast, about 10 minutes before
the final explosion, which occurred after a 12in hit near
the foremost beam turret of the 6in secondary armament.
Serious ammunition fires or explosions had however
occurred at Tsushima in the Russian pre-dreadnoughts Kniaz
Suvarov, Orel and Sissoi Veliki without involving a
magazine, and previously in another Russian
pre-dreadnought, the Poltava, a hit by an I 1 in howitzer
shell at Port Arthur had caused a serious fire in a 6m
magazine, apparently involving some 12in charges also, but
it had been possible to flood the magazines before
disaster occurred.
On the Japanese side a violent ammunition explosion from a
hit by an 8in shell destroyed a 6in casemate in the
armoured cruiser Iwate at the battle of Ulsan. Flames
passed down a hoist, but apparently got no further and no
magazine was involved. Later at Tsushima in the
predreadnought Fuji, a 12 in shell pierced the shield of
the after barbette and burst inside, setting fire to
3-12in charges. A large part of the shield was blown away
by the shell burst, and water shooting out of the cut
hydraulic pressure pipe to one of the loading rams was of
great use in quenching the fire. The Fuji's 12 in guns had
charges of British type, and it is important to notice the
value of a high pressure water source at the site of a
propellant fire, and also of free venting to air, both
accidentally provided by the shell burst. The Iwate's 6in
guns also used British type propellant, but in brass
cartridge cases, which would help in limiting the spread
of a violent ammunition fire.
Much data is lacking on the fires and explosions in the
Russian ships at Tsushima, but the largest fire in the
Kniaz Suvarov, that in the .Orel and also in the Sissoi
Veliki appear to have concerned the 6in ammunition where
the nitro-cellulose propellant charges were in brass
cartridge cases, as were those for the Poltava's 6in guns.
The method of ammunition supply to the heavy guns in
British capital ships appeared to be reasonably safe in
1914, but no large scale trials with up-to-date turrets
had been carried out, and this was the important and
blameworthy omission. The magazines were above the shell
rooms in all ships, and in the dreadnoughts the magazine
crowns were one deck below the armour deck, or two decks
below in the Royal Sovereigns, where the armour deck rose
to main deck level. The crowns of `Q' magazines in the
13.Sin battlecruisers were also one deck below the armour
deck, but in the other turrets in these ships, and in all
turrets in the 12in battlecruisers, the magazine crowns
were at armour deck level, and slightly above 1wl.
The magazine doors gave access to the handing room where
the charges were placed in the lower hoists which were
located in a trunk fixed to the rotating part of the
turret. These hoists brought the shells and charges for
each gun to the working chamber, where they were
transferred to the gun loading cage of the respective
upper hoist. Waiting positions for two charges were
provided in the working chamber, and for two more in the
handing room, and in action there would thus be eight
charges in a turret between magazines and guns Flash doors
were fitted to the trunk and the cages of the hoists, and
the propellant was in more or less closed compartments in
all stages of its passage from handing room to gun loading
cage.
Unfortunately it was not realised how violently British
charges would ignite in a turret fire, and the above flash
doors were inadequate, the magazine doors were not flash
tight under pressure, and flash had a free path to the
handing room via the space between the fixed and rotating
turret structures, and possibly via other routes. Also
there were no magazine scuttles for passing charges, in
fact, the magazine doors would be continuously open in
action, and many more charges removed from their magazine
cases, or in opened cases, than there should have been.
There is a revealing remark, too, in the Invincible's
reports on the Battle of the Falklands, stating that the
flash doors on the gun loading cages in `P' turret had
been previously removed as the charges occasionally jammed
in the cages, and it was easier to clear the jam if the
doors were removed. Nevertheless none of this would have
been fatal to the ship if British charges had behaved like
German ones.
German capital ships varied far more in their
arrangements, and in some instances considerable
differences existed between the turrets of a single ship.
In the 12in dreadnoughts the magazines were below the
shell rooms, and the same was the case in the centre-line
turrets of the Nassau and Westfalen, but in the wing
turrets of these ships and in all turrets in the Rheinland
and Posen, the magazines were above the shell rooms, as
they were in the Seydlitz and Moltke, in three of the von
der Tann's turrets and in the aftermost turret of the
Derfflinger and Lutzow. In the other turrets of the two
latter ships and in the von der Tann's stern turret, the
magazines were below the shell rooms. The crowns of the
uppermost ammunition space, whether shell room or
magazine, were usually at armour deck level, but they were
one deck lower in the wing turrets of all four Nassaus,
the Seydlitz, Moltke and von der Tann and in the Moltke's
foremost turret.
As a rule German handing rooms were considerably larger
than British ones, and in some ships appear to have served
as part of the magazine stowage space, while the openings
between magazines and handing rooms were not flash tight.
In most capital ships' turrets, there was a rotating
trunk, and the lower hoists led to the working chamber,
but there were separate upper shell and cartridge hoists
for each gun, and while the shell hoists delivered the
projectiles near the loading trays in rear of and between
the guns, the cartridge hoists came up on the outside of
the gun cradle trunnions, and the charges slid down open
troughs to the loading trays. In the aftermost turret of
the Derfflinger and Lutzow the shell hoists ran direct to
the gunhouse without a break in the working chamber,
though the cartridge hoists were still as described above.
The turrets in the Nassau and Westfalen, and the wing
turrets in the Rheinland and Posen, differed in having
fixed hoists and working chambers from which an upper
hoist for each gun conveyed both shells and charges to
waiting racks between and in rear of the guns, and thence
to the loading trays. In the I 1 in pre-dreadnoughts the
tubular pusher hoists ran direct to each gun from the
ammunition handing rooms and supplied shells and charges
alternately.
In the last of the 12 in battlecruisers, the Hindenburg,
arrangements for all four turrets resembled those in the
aftermost turret of the Derfflinger and Lutzow, while in
the 15in turrets in the Bayern, a single hoist for each
gun ran direct from the shell rooms and the handing rooms
of the magazines (which were above the shell rooms with
crowns at armour deck level) to a position between the
guns, and shells and charges were transferred to the left
or right ammunition car, which ran on rails across the
gun-house, and from which the guns were loaded.
As will be seen less care was generally taken of German
charges than British, and there were no noteworthy flash
precautions, and it was the practice in 1914 to have
supplies of ready charges in gun-house and working
chamber.
Experience of major calibre ammunition fires from the
effect of enemy shells between 1914 and Jutland was
limited to the Dogger Bank action, when there was a very
large fire in the Seydlitz. In both the Lion and Tiger, a
turret had also been hit during this battle, but no
ammunition fire occurred.
In the Seydlitz a 13.5in shell struck the aftermost
barbette, and burst in holing the 9in armour, driving in
red hot armour fragments. These ignited 1 Iin main and
fore charges on the transfer rails in the working chamber.
The flash shot up into the gun house and ignited the
charges there, and down the lower hoists, setting fire to
charges in them and in the handing room as well as to some
in the magazine. The ignition of the charges was at first
comparatively slow, as when the fumes of the burning
charges in the working chamber began to penetrate to the
handing room one deck below, the crew of the latter opened
the bulkhead door, which opened towards the stern, to
escape into the handing room of the after superfiring
turret. At this moment the charges in the handing room
ignited, and flash blew open the connecting door to the
after superfiring turret, which opened towards the bows,
and passing into this turret ignited charges in the
handing room and some in the magazine, and the fire spread
to the working chamber and gunhouse.
In both handing rooms the main and fore charges ignited
except for some in unopened magazine cases. In the
magazines the fore charges in process of transport did so,
but apparently not the main charges, even when in opened
magazine cases. Altogether sixty-two complete (main and
fore) charges totalling over six tons of propellant were
destroyed. The main fear seems to have been that the heat
of the fire, which melted some of the zinc magazine cases,
would explode the shells in the shell rooms below, and not
that the magazines would explode, but it was possible to
flood the ammunition spaces and bring the fire under
control before this occurred.
It is an often repeated error to state that as a result of
this fire the Germans introduced flash precautions before
Jutland. Actually the principal step taken was drastically
to limit the number of charges out of their magazine cases
or in opened cases, though too many were still present at
Jutland in the Derfflinger's two turrets in which fires
occurred. As previously noted, some flash doors were
fitted in the Lutzow, but this was not done in the
Seydlitz or Derfflinger where flash reached the handing
rooms, and the hinged flaps on the magazine scuttles were
not flash tight in the British sense of the term. It may
be noted that at the end of the war, the German 1 Sin
turrets were not flash tight by the then British
standards.
If the Seydlitz had had British charges at the Dogger Bank
she would unquestionably have blown up.
The risk to medium calibre charges in armoured ships
caused more concern in the British navy between 1914 and
Jutland than did the safety of those of the heavy guns. In
the 9.2in and 7.Sin turrets of the armoured cruisers there
were no working chambers, and the cartridge hoists ran
direct to the guns, charges for the amidships turrets
being first conveyed via ammunition passages to the
hoists. For the 6in guns some ships, such as the Tiger and
the Black Prince class, had a hoist to each gun from the
ammunition passages, but in others including the Queen
Elizabeth and Royal Sovereign classes the hoists (four in
number but a total of eight in the Canada) ran direct from
the 6in shell rooms and magazines to the batteries. There
were no 6in handing rooms and no particular flash
precautions. The arrangements in the Queen Elizabeths are
of most concern to events at Jutland, and in these ships
the 6in magazines and shell rooms were between those of B'
turret and the foremost boiler room. The four hoists ran
from the shell rooms to the battery (upper) deck, and the
charges were passed to the shell rooms from the magazines
above via open scuttles.
It was the practice to have twelve ready charges per gun
in magazine cases which held four each, but at the Dogger
Bank battle, the Tiger started with twenty ready charges
per gun in cases, and a further twenty in the ammunition
passages, and this amount was not greatly reduced during
the action in which the Tiger fired 268-6in shells. In
German capital ships each 5.9in gun was in a casemate with
an individual hoist, and usually an individual ammunition
room containing both shells and charges, though sometimes
one ammunition room supplied two hoists and guns. The
5.9in ammunition rooms were located amdiships inboard of
the torpedo bulkhead, and usually on two deck levels. No
particular flash precautions were taken, and ready
charges, apparently sixteen, were stowed in each casemate.
The methods of British 6in ammunition supply would
probably not have been dangerous to the ships if brass
cartridge cases had still been in use; it was a different
matter with charges in silk bags.
At the battle of Coronel there had been ammunition fires
and explosions in the armoured cruisers Good Hope and
Monmouth, and it was believed that the former had finally
been blown in two. At the Falklands the armoured cruiser
Kent had had a very narrow escape. A 4.1 in shell struck
the gun port of a 6in casemate and burst just outside,
only flash and small fragments entering the casemate where
two or three charges were ignited. The flash of these went
down the hoist to the ammunition passage, and but for
prompt and gallant action by one of the crew (Sergeant
Mayes RMLI), charges in the passage would probably have
ignited and the flash of these reached the magazine and
blown up the ship.
As a result of this, ships were ordered in early 1915 to
report what measures were considered necessary against the
ignition of charges in batteries and casemates and along
ammunition passages. The danger was only appreciated in a
few ships, particularly the King Edwards of the 3rd BS
where it was possible to look some way up the forward 6in
hoist from the magazine. Steel flash covers for the tops
of the dredger hoists in all 6in casemates were already
being fitted in this class, and were later approved for
the Black Prince class. Proposals for improvements in the
Emperor of India were vetoed by the Admiral of the 4th BS
(Sturdee), and comments from the Defence, where 7.5in
turrets were supplied from ammunition passages, have a
melancholy interest: `In this ship the comparative safety
of the passages makes the danger less than in many other
cases, and with the number of guns to be supplied it is
better to accept some risk rather than reduce the rate of
supply, which anything of real use in this line must do.'
Serious medium calibre ammunition fires had occurred in
German ships. In November 1914, when the battlecruiser
Goeben was in action with the Russian Black Sea Fleet, a
12in shell struck the 6in armour of a 5.9in casemate and
burst on impact or in holing the armour. Heavy fragments
of the latter detonated three HE and broke up two AP
shells, and this fired 16-5.9in ready charges. Flames
entered the magazine which supplied both the above
casemate and one adjoining, but did not ignite any
charges.
Worse fires occurred in the armoured cruiser Blucher at
the Dogger Bank battle. This ship had a main armament of
12-8.3 in guns in six twin turrets, which in general
principles were similar to the 11 in turrets in the
Nassasu. Of the Blucher's turrets four were supplied from
ammunition rooms containing shells and charges and located
below the turret, but the two forward beam turrets were
fed from the ammunition rooms of the two after beam
turrets via ammunition rails running lengthwise amidships.
A 13.5in shell pierced the armour deck and 35 to 40-8.3in
charges (each 77'/2lb) on the ammunition rails ignited in
succession. Flash entered both the forward beam turrets
via the hoists, and ignited the charges in the working
chambers and elsewhere, and very great damage was done,
but although a further ammunition fire occurred in the
foremost turret, the Blucher proved very hard to sink by
gunfire and was eventually torpedoed. With British charges
she would certainly have blown up.
The Blucher was the only ship of her class, but as a
result of the fire in the Goeben, anti-flash flaps were
fitted to the tops of the 5.9in hoists in German ships,
and the amount of ready ammunition in the casemates
restricted, while further improvements to the hoists were
made in some instances.
The need for better magazine flooding arrangements in both
navies was shown at Jutland, and in the Konig in
particular, as well as in the Seydlitz and Tiger other
magazines or shell rooms than those intended were wholly
or partially flooded. In the Warspite magazine flooding
cabinets on the main deck were wrecked, and were described
as useless, handing rooms being recommended for the
principal flooding position, while in the von der Tann the
flooding valves for the aftermost magazines were buried
under wreckage. Access to the flooding valves from the
weather deck was apparently not provided in either fleet.
Flooding of magazines was very slow in British ships as it
was considered that a time not exceeding 30 minutes was
satisfactory, and the quickest in any ship was 15 minutes.
Sprays which increased the efficiency of the flooding
water were fitted in German ships, but not in British,
though it was known that Vickers had provided them in the
magazines and shell rooms of the Russian armoured cruiser
Rurik which they launched in 1906. It is exceedingly
doubtful however if any improvement in flooding
arrangements would have saved the ships that blew up at
Jutland.
After the disasters in the battle of Jutland, measures
were taken in British ships to ensure that the flash from
charges of the existing type, ignited anywhere in the
turret structure, did not reach the magazines, and
corresponding precautions were taken for the secondary
armament. A description of these measures falls outside
the scope of this book, but it may be noted that no work
seems to have been done on the different behaviour of
British and German charges until about 1920; it was then
handicapped by lack of German charges for comparison and
ignorance of the exact method of containing the propellant
in the charge.
The British propellant in use at Jutland was MD Cordite
composed of 30% nitroglycerine, 65% nitrocellulose (c
13%N) and 5% petroleum jelly. This was in cylindrical cord
form and for heavy guns the diameter of the finished cord
was 0.34in. The German propellant was of long tubular
grain form, and at the beginning of the war most ships
were using RPC/06 of typical composition 23.5%
nitroglycerine, 70.5% nitrocellulose, 5% petroleum jelly,
l % sodium bicarbonate. By the time of Jutland, however,
this had largely been replaced by RPC/ 12, the first of
the 'solventless' propellants, which did not require the
removal of previously added nitrocellulose solvents, and
could be made to better dimensional accuracy, as well as
being more adequately stabilised. The composition varied
slightly being higher in nitroglycerine for smaller
calibres, and the nitroglycerine/nitrocellulose
(11.7-12.1% N) ratio was adjusted between about 112.2 and
1/2.7 with 4-7% Centralite (symmetrical diphenyl diethyl
urea), 0.25% Stabilit and 0.25% magnesia. For the 12 in
gun the external diameter of the tubular grains was 0.71
in and the internal 0.315in, which gave a smaller initial
surface area per unit weight of propellant than the
British 0.34in diameter cord. As far as the safety of the
ship in action was concerned the most important
differences between British and German charges were as
follows.
In the German 12in SKL/50 and llin SKL/45 and 50 guns,
about 75%, and in the I 1 in SKL/40 all of the charge was
in a stout brass cartridge case (1 2in weight 1191b) which
covered the base and nearly all the side of the above part
of the charge. The rest of the side and the top were
covered by a relatively thin brass cap (12in weight
2.651b) which volatilised, or was blown out of the gun on
firing. The igniter, which contained 7oz coarse grained
powder, was at the base of the charge and well protected
by the cartridge case.
The remainder of the charge for the 12in and 11 in SKL/45
and 50 guns, known as the `fore charge', had no igniter
and was contained in an inner and outer silk bag, which
were sewn at the top onto a brass cap. The latter behaved
like the main charge cover cap on firing, as did other
thin brass parts, present inside the 2 silk bags to give
additional mechanical strength.
In contrast to the above, British guns from 12in to 15in
had the charge in four equal parts, each of which was in a
single silk bag, and each of which had a 16oz fine grain
black powder igniter. This last was in a shalloon bag
which undoubtedly leaked powder dust over the charge in
handling, and at the time of Jutland, the mill-board
disks, intended to protect the igniters, were removed in
the handing room when using power loading. British 9.2 in
and 7.5in charges were in two equal parts, and otherwise
as the heavy gun charges, except that the igniters
contained 8 and 6oz respectively. The 6in guns had the
charge in one part with a 2oz igniter at each end, while
the German 5.9in had brass cartridge cases, similar to
those for heavy gun main charges, with a 13/4oz igniter.
German charges were by no means flash proof when out of
their magazine cases, but their ignition was delayed and
they burnt relatively slowly, and no dangerous pressure
rise occurred from a number of charges violently igniting
at nearly the same instant, as occurred with British
charges. Thus even in the Seydlitz at the Dogger Bank
battle, when 62 complete l Iin charges were involved in
the fire in her after turrets, there was no explosion.
There is no doubt that far too great a number of exposed
charges were present in many British ships at Jutland, but
this was at most only a contributory cause of the
disasters that occurred. In the Lion's 'Q turret the
ignition of 8-13.5in charges between magazines and guns,
all of which were in hoist cages or authorised waiting
positions, would have blown up the ship if `Q' magazines
had not been closed, and very probably would have done so
anyway if they had not been flooded, though the total
weight of propellant that ignited was only about a sixth
of that in the Seydlitz's fire.
The loss of the Pommern from explosions following a
torpedo hit appears to resemble that of the armoured
cruiser Prinz Adalbert in the Baltic in October 1915. The
latter was hit by an 18in torpedo from the E8, which is
thought to have caused the middle 5.9in ammunition room to
explode, and this was followed by the ship blowing up, it
would seem more violently than the Pommern. None of the
German armoured ships of the pre-dreadnought era had
torpedo bulkheads, and their underwater protection was far
inferior to that of the German dreadnoughts and
battlecruisers. They were known to be liable to such
disasters but the considerable alterations necessary to
the secondary armament ammunition stowage and supply were
not carried out, though wood filling outboard of the
magazines gave some slight additional protection.
In point of fact magazine explosions of extreme violence
as a result of a torpedo or mine were rare. The only one
in an armoured ship in either the Russo-Japanese War or
World War I prior to Jutland comparable in violence to
that in the Prinz Adalbert, was when the Russian armoured
cruiser Pallada was torpedoed by the U26 in October 1914.
Magazine explosions occurred in three or perhaps four
predreadnoughts in the above period as a result of
striking mines - the Petropavlovsk and Hatsuse in the
Russo-Japanese War, possibly the Bouvet at the Dardanelles
in March 1915 and the Russell in April 1916 off Malta, but
though all four were lost, none of the explosions was of
extreme violence, and this was probably due to the rush of
sea water through the large hole caused by the mine,
limiting the amount of explosive involved.
Considering next the damage to capital ships that survived
the battle, the following hits were made by heavy shells
on the turrets and barbettes of British ships:
Turret face: I (Lion `Q)
Turret roof: 2 (Malaya `X', Tiger `Q)
Barbette above hull: 3 (Princess Royal `X', Tiger `X', New
Zealand `X') Barbette between forecastle and upper decks:
I (Tiger 'A')
In addition a shell is known to have struck `Q' turret in
the Queen Mary c5 minutes before she blew up. This was
either on the turret face or forward part of the turret
side.
In each case the armour was holed or displaced but in only
two hits (Lion `Q' and Tiger `X') did the shell enter, and
only in Lion `Q' did it burst properly. This was also the
only hit to cause a turret ammunition fire, though this
did not occur until a considerable time after the hit, and
would have been prevented if the fire party had done their
work thoroughly, or if the charges between magazine and
gun-house had been returned to the magazine.
The thinner armour on the lower part of barbettes was
damaged by the hits on Princess Royal `X', Tiger `X' and
possibly to a slight extent `A', while it was struck by
fragments in Barham `B' and Warspite `X', but in no case
with serious results. There were two hits on gun barrels
(Princess Royal `Q, and Warspite `Y' by a 5.9in) but
neither affected the turrets.
For surviving German capital ships and the Lutzow, the
figures were:
Turret face: 2 (Konig `A', Seydlitz starboard wing) Turret
side: I (Lutzow `B')
Turret rear: I (Seydlitz `X')
Turret roof: 2 (Derfflinger `Y' Seydlitz `Y')
Barbette above hull: 5 (2 on Derfflinger `A', Derfflinger
`X', Seydlitz `X', von der Tann `A')
Barbette between forecastle and upper decks: I (Grosser
Kurfurst `A': the shell burst close to the barbette before
hitting).
The two hits on Derfflinger `A' and that on Konig `A' were
glancing and the armour was only slightly damaged, as was
the armour of Grosser Kurfurst `A'. The roof of Seydlitz
`Y' was bowed inwards, and in the other seven hits the
armour was holed, but in only two (Derfflinger `X' and
`Y') did the shell pierce, bursting in both instances and
causing serious propellant fires, the magnitude of which
was due at least in part, to there being too many charges
in transit between magazine and gun. Less serious fires
were caused by each hit on Seydlitz `X' and by that on
Lutzow `B'. Neither the Derfflinger nor the Seydlitz had
any particular anti-flash fittings, but flash doors
limited the fire in Lutzow `B' to one fore charge.
In one case (von der Tann `X') the thin barbette base was
seriously damaged but no propellant was ignited though
practice targets stowed below the turret were set on fire.
Gun barrels were hit twice (Seydlitz port wing and Lutzow
`A') with some damage to the turret from the shock of
impact and small splinters respectively.
If British propellant charges had been used in the German
ships, the Derfflinger would certainly have blown up as
would in all probability the Seydlitz, and possibly the
von der Tann.
Of secondary armament ammunition fires that in the
Malaya's starboard battery came near to causing the loss
of the ship, and less serious fires occurred in the
Barham, Warspite, Tiger, Colossus, Lion and Princess
Royal. In the Konig three hits caused such fires, and
there were others in the Seydlitz, Moltke and
Schleswig-Holstein. The hit on the Konig below the water
line, which completely destroyed one 5.9in magazine and
damaged a second, would have caused the ship to blow up
with British charges.
The hulls of surviving British capital ships suffered far
less damage than the German, and in only three was the
water-tight integrity much affected. These were the
Marlborough from a torpedo hit, the Warspite from a shell
through the upper edge of the main belt and from three
others aft, of which one was on armour, and the Malaya
from three shells below the water line. In German ships,
considering first that part of the hull from the fore
barbette to the stern, significant flooding occurred in
the Ostfriesland from a mine, in the Seydlitz from a
torpedo, in the Konig from a shell below the water line,
in the Grosser Kurfurst from two shell hits on the side
armour, in the Moltke from one hit on the inside of the
armour aft and two hits on the main belt, and in the von
der Tann from a hit aft.
The most serious damage to German ships was, however, from
shells forward of the fore barbette, and in the projected
German postJutland designs for capital ships, the heavy
side armour was taken closer to the ends of the hull, and
the forward broadside torpedo flat removed. Of the
seventy-eight heavy hits on surviving German dreadnoughts
and battlecruisers, fifteen or sixteen had their main
effect forward of `A' barbette, and in the Lutzow it was
eight out of twenty-four. For surviving British capital
ships the equivalent figures were seven out of
sixty-eight, but none of the seven forward was important.
The two shells which burst in or near the broadside
torpedo flat were the prime cause of the loss of the
Lutzow, and their effect was increased by two other shells
below water and, as her draught grew deeper, by the four
hits on the weather deck or upper part of the side
plating.
Most of the Seydlitz's troubles were due to the effect, as
her draught increased, of four hits on the forecastle
deck, and one on the upper edge of the forward side
armour. Serious flooding was also caused in the Grosser
Kurfurst by a shell striking the side armour well forward,
and in the Derfflinger by the combined effect of two
shells on the side armour near the bows, and a third on
the forecastle side plating further aft.
The damage to the midships part of the above ships in both
navies emphasised the importance of the torpedo bulkhead
(not continuous between end barbettes in the Marlborough)
which was only seriously damaged by the shell hit on the
Konig and by the combined effect of a mine and too sharp a
turn in the Ostfriesland, and also of good subdivision and
a large pumping capacity. The armour belt should be taken
to the main deck at full thickness, and to as great a
distance as possible below water. In the forward part the
only practicable measures were to make the subdivision and
drainage and pumping systems as complete and efficient as
could be achieved both above and below the armour deck,
unless the displacement was large enough to allow the
heavy side armour to be taken near the ends of the ship,
as in German 1916-18 designs. Torpedo nets, carried by
German ships at Jutland, proved to be a danger in action
because of the risk of fouling the propellers if damaged
by shells, as pieces of the stowed net trailed in the
water. In the British fleet the Lion and Princess Royal,
and it is believed the Queen Mary, still had nets at
Jutland, but there is no record of their causing trouble.
In the Lutzow it was considered that the large broadside
torpedo flat, which ran across the ship, should have been
divided into two, that the ventilation of this flat was
unnecessary and dangerous to the ship, and that the
forward water-tight door to the flat was of an entirely
inadequate and dangerous pattern, while other water-tight
doors and hatches below the armour deck should be capable
of being more firmly secured. Ventilation ducts should not
be led through the principal transverse bulkheads.
Compartments above the armour deck in the forward part of
the ship should be sub-divided by water-tight bulkheads
and doors, and ventilation ducts in the forward part must
be water-tight and in all, even the smallest, water-tight
compartments, safeguarded by valves sited at the
bulkheads, and not in the compartments. Voice-pipes also
should have cocks at the bulkheads, and should be
seamless. It would appear that the detailed arrangements
for water-tightness in the forward part of the Lutzow were
defective, and in post-Jutland World War I German capital
ship designs the broadside torpedo tubes, if fitted, were
either located amidships or above water.
Other such improvements were mentioned in the Seydlitz's
report, and would have applied to most if not all of the
German ships. It was considered in the Seydlitz that
bulkheads should be carried as high as the battery deck
without breaks, particularly in the fore part of the ship,
and that each section of which there were seventeen,
should have a separate ventilation system. Additional
reliable fool-proof stationary and portable pumps should
be provided, and adequate drainage and pumping systems
installed for compartments above the armour deck, and for
small compartments below, such as the ship's control room,
transmitting stations and switchboard rooms. In the
machinery spaces, steam pipes and electrical cables should
not be laid along or near the torpedo bulkhead, and
attention should be paid to the water-tightness of the
5.9in casemates which should have drainage and pumping
systems. The coal-shoot hatches in the casemates should be
more firmly secured as they frequently sprang open and
dense coal dust caused much inconvenience. The most
important defect in the Seydlitz appears to have been lack
of drainage and pumping for compartments above the armour
deck.
The Derfflinger's report also emphasized the need for
adequate drainage from compartments above the armour deck
in the forward and after parts of the ship, and called for
better and more reliable portable pumps. Leakage from
voice-pipes and ventilation trunks does not appear to have
been troublesome in this ship. Heat from the steering
engines and their steam pipes made conditions very
difficult in the after part, and it was suggested that
electric or hydraulic steering machinery should be used in
new construction. The Derfflinger's mainmast was also
excessively heated by gases from the after funnel.
The less detailed British reports emphasise the risks from
ventilation trunks, and the importance of water-tight
doors being properly secured. All decks particularly the
middle deck must be kept water-tight, and it is remarked
that 90% of the troubles take place between main and
middle deck levels, while the waterline should be
considered as at least 6ft above lwl and measures taken
accordingly.
Although horizontal protection was weak in all or nearly
all capital ships in both fleets, there is no instance of
a complete shell penetrating the armour deck in surviving
ships, and there are not many of fragments from a burst
doing so.
The instances of the latter were: one each in the Barham,
Warspite, Tiger and von der Tann and one, or possibly two,
in the Lutzow. In the Barham, where the armour deck was at
middle deck level, a fragment went on through the lower
deck into the forward 6in magazine, but no harm was done,
and in the Tiger the base of the shell penetrated the web
of the main steam pipe.
Armour gratings gave good service in stopping splinters
and debris from reaching boiler and engine rooms, and in
the Lion the engine room gratings were reinforced with
fire bars and wire netting. In the Marlborough one boiler
room was put out of action by the torpedo hit, and in the
Malaya oil fuel gradually leaking in, as a result of one
of the under-water hits, put a boiler room out of action
by the evening of 1 June. In the Warspite, the port feed
tank was wrecked by the shell which pierced the upper edge
of the main belt, and this allowed a considerable amount
of sea water to enter the port wing engine room via the
fan flat. Similarly, water entered the middle engine room
from the main deck
