CHAPTER 17

Bringing in the Seydlitz: damage to the Ostf riesland

Repair of the capital ships

IT REMAINS TO take up the story of the Seydlitz's return to Wilhelmshaven. She had taken station astern of the 2nd Squadron at 0605 1 June but could not maintain the fleet's speed of 15kts and had to reduce to 10 and then 7kts. By this time the Seydlitz was low enough forward for large amounts of water to enter the compartments above the armour deck between the forward citadel and foremost boiler room bulkheads via the battery deck, which had been badly damaged on the starboard side by the first shell to strike the ship. This shell had done much other damage, and all compartments in this section above the armour deck soon filled. Water then poured into `A' barbette on the battery and main decks and spread below so that first the shell rooms and then the magazines of `A' turret flooded. At the same time other water from `A' barbette entered the broadside torpedo flat through the emergency escape, and though it was possible to keep the water down in the flat, the personnel were evacuated.

Leakage now increased into the torpedo transmitting station and into the ship's control room, neither of which had any effective drainage, and in consequence of the foremost boiler-room bulkhead yielding slightly, the torpedo transmitting station was abandoned at 0605 and the ship's control room at 0710. This made navigation of the Seydlitz still more difficult, as orders to the engine rooms had to be passed by a chain of messengers and voice pipes, and the nearby 2nd SG were asked for help. The Pillau was detached to pilot the Seydlitz at 0830 and at the same time Wilhelmshaven was asked to send out two pumping steamers and leak-stopping material. The Pillau took station ahead at 0845 steaming 7kts, but just after 0900 the Seydlitz grounded off Hornum at the southern end of Sylt. Soundings forward gave 43 - 44ft, the first certain indication of the ship's draught. The port and midships after trimming tanks, and the port after wings for a length of 57ft were counter-flooded, and at 0930 the Seydlitz came off an hour and 40 minutes before high water.

The 1st Minesweeping Division arrived at this time, and as it appeared doubtful if the channel to the east of the Amrum Bank could be passed owing to the Seydlitz's great draught, it was decided to turn back and make for Heligoland Bight by the route to the west of Amrum Bank and of the big British minefield laid on 10/11 September 1915. One group of the 1st M/S Division led with their sweeps out, and the second group replaced the four destroyers of the 7th Flotilla as an anti­submarine screen. A 10° course was steered for the Lister Deep until 1025, when the Pillau passed on Neumunster's 0910 signal, that at 0845 the enemy battlefleet had been in 100 a (c55° 27'N, 6° 45E) only 20 or 25 miles WSW of Horns Reef lightship, and it was evident that the eastward channel would have to be attempted after all.

The 1st M / S Division formed line abreast ahead of the Pillau and Seydlitz, sounding and signalling the depth of water by flags while the S36, which had temporarily joined to screen the Pillau, assisted, and the Seydlitz felt her way through the deepest channel. Occasionally there was no water quite deep enough, and the Seydlitz then drove through with increased engine revolutions, sliding just above the ground. The narrows to the westward of Hornum at the beginning of the Amrum Bank channel were passed at 1230, and 2 hours later the Seydlitz reached the Vortrapp Deep bell-buoy, and completed the passage.

Meanwhile the ship had continued to sink slowly deeper. In the forward part only the broadside torpedo flat had any buoyancy left as the other last remaining unflooded compartments below the armour deck in this part of the ship had filled. This was probably to some extent due to water from above, entering through the inevitable leaks of the torpedo striking-down hatch, while the foremost trimming tanks below the bow torpedo tube had sprung a leak from the groundings. Although the undamaged ship's metacentric height was c l Oft, the water plane had considerably diminished, and the reduced stability was evident in the slow heeling over under rudder action at her very low speed.

Water also gradually spread from the port outer bunkers that had been affected by shell hits, into other bunkers through leaky partitions and bunker doors, and water that was now entering the port forward and No 4 casemates flowed down through coal shoots in spite of all efforts to make these and the casemates water-tight. The list to starboard had disappeared through the counter-flooding when aground off Hornum, and through the gradual equalisation of the flooding forward, and the water entering the port bunkers produced an increasing list to port, which further endangered the port casemates.

At first the water was drained to the stokeholds and pumped out, but the drainage system here was already heavily loaded and in no event could the stokeholds be endangered by flooding, so that the casemates were continuously bailed by bucket gangs. In spite of all efforts the port outer and protective bunkers gradually filled except for the protective bunker of the aftermost boiler room. The three fishes of the bow escutcheon were now in the water and served as a draught mark, while the list to port increased quickly to 8°, and it could not be predicted whether the remaining stability could resist the further slow but persistent increase and whether the caulking of the port casemates could prevent further water breaking in.

Additional signals requesting the urgent despatch of pumping steamers were sent by the Pillau at 1100 and at noon Scheer and Hipper were informed of the Seydlitz's progress. Just before 1600 a message came from Hipper that if necessary the ship should be beached in a suitable position in the Amrum Bank channel, but she was already in the Schmal Deep some miles to the southward of the Vortrapp Deep buoy. The Seydlitz steered south-east for the Hever mouth to come inshore and then southwards along the coast in c50ft of water. Preliminary preparations were made for abandoning the ship, and to provide as much relief as possible, she went astern from now onwards instead of 85revs (slow speed) ahead. An attempt to tow the Seydlitz was made by one of the minesweepers but the latter was not powerful enough. Several attempts by the Pillau all failed because the line parted owing to the lack of suitable gear on the Seydlitz's stern for the load to be taken gradually.

The Seydlitz therefore continued astern under her own power, and fortunately the weather remained calm. At 1700 the starboard after wings were counter-flooded for a length of 57ft to combat the list to port, and at this time the Seydlitz's condition was probably at its worst with a calculated 5329 tons water aboard, giving a draught of 46ft lin forward and 24ft 4in aft. as against the pre-battle figures of 30ft 6in forward and 29ft Bin aft. The forward end of the keel line, where the draught was taken, was c65ft abaft the stem. The theoretical list to port was 2° 56', but the actual list was 8°.

At 1730 the pumping steamers Boreas and Kraft arrived and made fast to starboard and port. The Boreas pumped out the compartments above the armour deck between the forward citadel and foremost boiler room bulkheads, while the Kraft should have drained `A' turret magazines and shell rooms, but her centrifugal pump failed to produce suction, and the Kraft was thus useless to the Seydlitz except that both steamers now and then helped her rudder action.

During the night of 1 /2 June the Seydlitz's condition remained fairly constant and several tugs and lighters arrived to her aid, so that her progress was given some assistance by towing over the stern. Her course led towards the peace-time position of the Weser lightship, and owing to her draught of c46ft, the Seydlitz again grounded temporarily to the eastward of the Steingrund.

At daybreak on 2 June the weather deteriorated, with a north-west wind force 8, and an unpleasant sea began to rise. This particularly endangered the water-tightness of the port 5.9in casemates, and efforts were concentrated on caulking and draining them. The Pillau made a lee, while the Boreas pumped out the port forward casemates, and the Kraft went ahead to windward to lay an oil track. These measures proved successful.

The possibility of submarine attack to the southward of Heligoland was feared, and against this the Seydlitz was virtually defenceless as only one AA gun was usable on each side, and counter-manoeuvring impossible with the ship steaming astern at 3-5kts, so that anti-submarine protection lay entirely with the minesweeper screen and the Pillau. The latter piloted the Seydlitz towards the jade by continual signalling, as the battlecruiser's speed was too low and the current from the Jade mouth too strong, for her to steer in the Pillau's wake, but the difficult task of selecting a route with 50ft of water was accomplished, the Outer jade lightship was passed at 0730 and 20 minutes later the Seydlitz anchored off the bar as, to the general surprise, the starboard anchor, cable and cable­holder were still in order amid the wreckage of the forecastle.

The wounded were now taken off the ship, and at the next high water at noon, the Seydlitz again proceeded stern first, assisted by the sea-going tug Albatross, and crossed the bar. Sufficient water was found inside the bar and it was decided not to beach the Seydlitz for patching NW by N of the Minsener Sand lightship as originally intended. All went well until 1420 when the Seydlitz grounded outside the boom and her stern swung across in the very strong ebb. At 1930 her stern swung round on the flood tide and at 2000 she came off with her stern towards the boom. The Albatross could not bring her stern round, and was holed by the starboard outer propeller in an attempt to make fast alongside. The Seydlitz was virtually unmanageable in the strong flood tide, and it was impossible to point either her stern or bow towards the boom gate until about 2300 when she passed the gate going ahead, and at 0325 3 June anchored in the Vareler Deep.

It was now possible for divers to examine the under-water damage, and some patching work was done, while the Boreas, various other pumps supplied by the dockyard and the ship's own drainage system, pumped out the bunkers and other gradually filling compartments. The broadside torpedo flat could be kept drained, and endangered bulkheads, particularly that at the forward end of the foremost boiler room, were made secure. As much weight as possible was removed from the forward part of the ship, including both I 1 in guns, the roof and some of the armour plates of `A' turret.

Although the Seydlitz took the ground temporarily at low water and some of the under-water damage was thus accessible, the patching and draining work was hindered by the strong currents, and also by the Seydlitz often having to maintain her position with her engines as the anchor did not hold. It was thus decided to bring the ship into the South Lock of the Third Entrance, which measured 853 ft x 114ft loin with a depth at MHWS of 45ft at the outer sill and 36ft at the inner, and complete the patching in the shelter of the lock, so that the Seydlitz's draught could be reduced sufficiently for her to enter the dockyard.

Accordingly at high water 1430 6 June, the Seydlitz, assisted by a powerful tug fore and aft, entered the South Lock stern first, drawing 45ft 11 in forward and 2 3 ft 3in aft, and with a list to port of 5-8°. The patching now made rapid progress, and the compartments between the forward citadel and foremost boiler-room bulkheads, the bunkers, and finally the compartments in the forward part of the ship, below and above the armour deck, were gradually drained. The l lin guns were also removed from the port wing turret, and by the morning of 13 June draught figures were 34ft 3in forward and 28ft 1 in aft with very little if any list. At 0540 that day the Seydlitz was towed out of the lock, and at 0815 was in the large Wilhelmshaven floating dock.

Of capital ships, only the Ostfriesland was damaged by enemy weapons during the return to harbour, though the Malaya received minor damage below the water-line by striking wreckage. Unfortunately the Ostfriesland s full damage report has not survived, and many details are not known. The mine (charge probably 3001b wet gun-cotton) exploded below the starboard forward wing turret, and according to one account, the hole measured c40ft x 16ft, and photographs show that the external effect extended from the lower edge of the armour belt, which was apparently not distorted, to the bilge keel, the greatest damage being rather nearer the belt. The starboard protective bunkers, wings and one series of double-bottom compartments were flooded from a line just forward of the conning tower to the centre line of the middle funnel, a length of c 115ft. The torpedo bulkhead, which was 1.21n thick and c 14 - 15ft inboard, was only slightly damaged in one place, where it was bulged inwards and torn, so that water entered one of the magazines. Scheer states that the Ostfriesland shipped 400 tons of water. No details appear to have survived on the further damage to the torpedo bulkhead caused by the sudden turn at 1120.

As far as possible the damaged British battleships and battlecruisers were repaired on the north-east coast where the dockyard at Rosyth could now be used, though far from complete. The Warspite went straight into No 1 dry-dock at Rosyth on 1 June, and was undocked on 4 July but her repairs were not finished until 20 July, and she left for Scapa two days later to rejoin the 5th BS. The Tiger was in No 2 dry-dock at Rosyth from 3 June to 1 July and was ready on the following day. The Lion was in the basin at Rosyth from 5 to 26 June, initially at 4 hours' notice, and then at Armstrongs on the Tyne from 27 June to 8 July for `Q' turret to be removed and her armour repaired. She was in No 1 dock at Rosyth from 8 to 20 July when her repairs were completed as a 3-turret ship, but `Q'. turret was not replaced until a further visit to Armstrongs from 6 to 23 September. The Princess Royal was at Rosyth until 10 June when she went to Portsmouth and was repaired there from 13 June to 15 July, occupying No 14 dry-dock from 15 June to 10 July, and arrived back at Rosyth on 21 July.

The Malaya was docked in the floating dock at Invergordon on 4 June and undocked on 24 June when her repairs are said to have been completed, though she did not rejoin the 5th BS until 11 July. The Marlborough arrived in the Tyne from Immingham on 6 June, and was repaired by Armstrongs in the Admiralty floating dock at Jarrow. Her repairs were completed on 2 August and she arrived at Cromarty three days later.

The Barham was repaired at Devonport in No 8 dry-dock from 5 June to 4 July and left next day. She carried out full speed trials on 6 July in Bute Sound to determine the maximum speed of her class at their Jutland loading, and arrived at Scapa on 8 July.

Neither the Colossus nor the New Zealand had any special dockyard repairs.

The Germans largely relied on floating docks for the repair of their capital ships as neither Wilhelmshaven nor Kiel possessed a dry-dock that could take the Derfflinger or Seydlitz, and Kiel did not have one that could take the Moltke or Konig class.

The Seydlitz, as related above, was docked in the large floating dock at Wilhelmshaven, and her repairs were completed on 16 September. The Ostfriesland and von der Tann were accommodated in dry-docks at Wilhelmshaven, and their repairs completed on 26 July and 2 August respectively. The von der Tann appears to have been delayed by troubles in her fore turret which proved defective when fired.

The Moltke was for a short time in dry-dock at Wilhelmshaven and then went to Blohm and Voss at Hamburg where she was docked in a floating dock, and her repairs completed on 30 July. The Markgraf and Grosser Kurfurst were also accommodated in floating docks at Hamburg, and their repairs, by Blohm and Voss and Vulkan respectively, were completed on 20 and 16 July.

The Konig and Derfflinger went to Kiel, where there was only a single floating dock capable of taking ships of this size. The Konig was docked from 4 to 18 June and her repairs were then undertaken by Howaldt and completed on 21 July. The Derf flinger had been docked for preliminary repairs in the Wilhelmshaven floating dock, previous to the Seydlitz, and was in the Kiel floating dock from 22 June to 15 July, but her repairs in Kiel Dockyard were not completed until 15 October.

The less seriously damaged dreadnoughts, of which only the Helgoland required dry-docking, were all repaired at Wilhelmshaven, though in some cases the work was not at once taken in hand. No dates for the completion of repairs are recorded for the Kaiser and Oldenburg, and for the others the dates are: Helgoland 16 June, Nassau 10 July, Rheinland 10 June, Westfalen 17 June.