Conferences on the Virtues
By Fr. Bruno Cocuzzi, ocd
Number 17
The Virtue of Continence
Related to Temperance…
It is now time to turn our attention to
the virtues affiliated with Temperance, and the first in order of importance is
what St. Thomas Aquinas, writing in Latin, calls Continentia. However, because the meaning the English
word obtained therefrom by transliteration, to wit, Continence, has a
special medical meaning, it seems to me that we can best translate the word as Restraint.
In a broad sense the virtue implies
“keeping a firm rein” upon the intellect and the will, lest either incline to
what is illicit. Thus in the altogether
general sense it is defined as the virtue which enables one to “refrain”
from evil. In a special sense it
is defined as the virtue, which enables one to keep from giving in to vehement
desires for pleasure of any kind. Properly,
it is defined as that disposition of will by which one is able to resist strong
desires for sinful pleasure of taste and touch. That is to say, the virtue of Restraint
(Continentia) pertains uniquely to passions governed by Temperance. Other virtues allied to Temperance fulfill
the same role as “Restraint” in regard to strong desires for “other kinds of
pleasure”. At times Perfect Restraint
is used as a synonym for perfect chastity and for voluntary
virginity, as well as for that disposition of soul, which causes a widow to
decide she will remain a widow till death.
The virtue we are calling Restraint
is a true virtue because it is an “habitual inclination” to do the right and
the good in specific circumstances, but at the same time it is not a virtue
in the fullest sense of the word because it does not “perfect” the person
possessing it. It is still a bit less
than “perfection” to resist evil desires, since “perfection” requires
that one have dominion over (dominari) evil desires. The “Sense Appetite” is perfectly subject to
reason when desires for unlawful pleasures of taste and touch that may arise
are neither frequent nor vehement.
From a consideration of the opposite of Restraint,
or Want of Restraint (called in Latin Incontinentia), we discover
that the “virtue” of Restraint resides in the higher, spiritual part of the
soul (the will) rather than in the lower part (sense appetite), as does the
virtue of Temperance. Although the
vehement desire for pleasure of sense is “registered” in the Sense Appetite, it
pertains to reason and the Will to resist and not “give in”.
When the “giving in” is immediate,
without the reason and will being brought to bear upon the situation, the
individual is guilty of Impetuosity or Impulsiveness (Praevolatio. Literally, flying ahead of). It is one of the ways Want of Restraint manifests
itself.
When the reason has intervened and judged
that the desire is to be resisted, but because of inconstancy, or want of
“firmness” of character, an individual does not resist, that is called Debility
(Debilitas).
With regard to Want of Restraint,
St. Thomas Aquinas says that it is less grievous a sin than Intemperance
because the latter is a “permanent bad habit”, while the former is occasioned
by a “transient desire”. In the person
who is Intemperate, the will is permanently inclined to evil as
the result of “passion” (read: sudden flare-up of a vehement desire). And because “passions” tend to “die out”
quickly, repentance tends to follow more quickly and easily, whereas the
intemperate person tends to “gloat” over his sin, insofar as sinning has become
“second nature” for him.
It follows, therefore, that the “vice” of
Intemperance is more difficult to overcome than the “sin” of
“non-restraint”. St. Thomas says that
this is so for two reasons: First, in
the Intemperate person the reason has been “corrupted” in regard to its
estimation (judgment) regarding the ultimate goal (good) of human life. Thus, whoever has erred in regard to basic
principles is only with great difficulty brought back to the truth. The Un-restrained person has his
reason temporarily “clouded over” by transient passion, and usually sees the
truth clearly again once the vehement desire has subsided.
Second, the “sense appetite” of the
intemperate person is “habitually” inclined toward evil, which “inclination” is
not easy to overcome. In the
unrestrained person, the sense appetite is caused to “incline” toward evil by
vehement desire. Because the
inclination is not “permanent” it is easier to resist and overcome.
From what has been said, one might
conclude that all that is necessary for one to be cured of the Want
of Restraint is to recognize that it was a vehement desire for
unlawful pleasure that occasioned sinful conduct, and that knowledge alone
would be sufficient to prevent a re-occurrence. But St. Thomas says that in addition, one must have the help of interior
grace as well as the external help of correction and admonition on
the part of another, both of which serve to mitigate the vehemence of illicit
desires.
Varieties of Restraint…
As we had occasion to mention in earlier
conferences, we have “appetites” for other “pleasures” besides those of taste
and touch, namely, the Irascible and the Rational. Each of them has more than one proper
object, yet there is one object (good) common to both wherein the likelihood of
exceeding right reason in the enjoyment of it is real and considerable. That common object is Vindication
(Vengeance). Our experience of fallen
human nature, both in ourselves and in others, clearly reveals that a person
can experience considerable “satisfaction” in being vindicated (obtaining
revenge), that is, in removing and/or compensating for an injury. The virtues, which moderate the “enjoyment”
of that pleasure in both the Irascible and Rational Appetites, are,
respectively, Mildness (Mansuetudo) and Clemency (Clementia).
We can best understand these virtues by
considering the evils or “sins” to which they are opposed. In the first instance we have Anger,
and in the other Cruelty. [When
we spoke of anger, in a previous conference, we treated it as one of the
“passions”, that is, those instinctive first movements of the soul which
are accompanied by some characteristic “changes” in the body. The “passions” of anger, because it is
spontaneous (triggered automatically by a “sense perception”), occurs before
the reason and the will have a chance to intervene. The Anger we speak of in this conference is based upon a
judgment of the intellect]. It is Mildness
that imposes restraint upon the appetite for the “satisfaction” (reparation)
called for by a personal injury, and Clemency that moderates the
desire for “reparation” (satisfaction or punishment) called for by an injury to
the common good. The virtue of Mildness
ought to exist in everyone, whereas the virtue of Clemency is proper to
Superiors, i.e., those vested with the authority to “vindicate” the common
good.
Actually, Mildness fulfills a dual
role. On the one hand it “represses”
(suppresses the judgment of) Anger when a just cause is wanting, and on
the other hand, when a just cause does exist, it prevents the reparation
“exacted” from exceeding the limits of right reason. Because we say that every virtue treads the fine line separating Too
Much from Not Enough, Mildness is the cure for both sinful
anger (Iracundia) and for that want of just anger (Inirascentia),
which amounts to condoning evil.
Correspondingly, Clemency is the cure for both Cruelty and
Excessive Leniency.
Some observations…
There is said to be a special “beauty” or
“goodness” associated with both Mildness and Clemency which makes
them desirable, and which can serve as a strong motive for acquiring them. The “beauty” of the former lies in not
allowing oneself to be governed by the “passion” of anger (read: causes its possessor to “radiate”
serenity, composure, and self-control.)
The “beauty of the Clemency proceeds from a certain benignity of soul
which causes one to have an “aversion” for whatever saddens another.
It is interesting to note that St. Thomas
does not consider Severity to be inconsistent with either Mildness nor Clemency. The reason for that, he says, is that all
three are in accord with right reason. Severity is “inflexible” in exacting the full measure of
punishment required by the “truth” of the matter, whereas Clemency has
to do with “diminishing” punishment when, regarding whom, and
under what circumstances it is “appropriate”. Mildness has to do with “inner control” and “external
manifestation” or anger, whereas severity has to do with the actual “infliction
of punishment” upon the culprit.
He says, also, that Mildness and Clemency
render their possessor pleasing and acceptable to God and others because they
produce an effect not unlike that produced by acts of Charity, namely,
preventing, removing or relieving the evil that afflicts another human being.
About “Anger” in
particular…
St. Thomas Aquinas has quite a bit to say
about Iracundia (the Vice we call Anger). He does so in answer to several
questions. I reproduce his teaching
here:
1. Is it okay (licitum to
get angry (irasci)?
The answer is YES. To get angry in conformity with right reason is even
laudable. Whatever evil is found in
anger proceeds NOT from the fact that it is a “natural passion”, but because,
being a desire (appetite) to be vindicated, it is subject to being
satisfied properly or improperly. The evil would lie in a degree of
anger that would exceed what is called for in the circumstances. Thus it is that St. Gregory says in his book
on Morals: The anger that arises
against evil (vice) is all the more robust when it is in the service of
(famulatur) reason.
2. Is Anger a sin?
If it exceeds the bounds
of reason, YES, Anger is a sin!
When the “passions” of
the Sensitive Appetite are regulated by Reason, they are GOOD.
It is to be noted that
two elements must be considered by reason with regard to anger. First, that the “good” to which it tends is
“vindication”. Here one could fall into
the sin of Anger by seeking to punish someone who does not deserve punishment,
or to punish beyond the just measure required, or for the wrong reason, that
is, for a reason other than the only lawful reason: to do justice and to correct a fault.
Second, although the very
first movements of anger are involuntary, and thus are neither
right nor wrong, once they are noted, the individual is bound in
conscience to bring them under the control of reason. Thus it is also possible to sin by allowing
the “feelings” of anger to “boil over”, whether harbored within or manifested
without.
3. Is every sin of Anger a
mortal sin?
The answer is NO. However, (a) insofar as it is a desire for
vindication (revenge/vengeance), if it is unjust, it belongs to the category of
sins grievous by their very nature (grievous matter). (b) Insofar as the movements or manifestations of anger are
concerned, it may or may not be mortal.
As to (a), whatever is
opposed to justice and charity is grievous matter. It could happen, though that the sin is venial (not grievous)
because of some defect in the act, for example, if the unjust revenge is
inflicted before the reason and the will have had a chance to intervene, or
because the revenge inflicted, though unjust, is too slight to cause any significant
harm to the culprit.
As to (b): It is possible for one to allow himself to
become so vehemently angry that he could easily lose all love for God and
Neighbor.
TO BE NOTED: With regard to the statement of Our Lord
(Matt. 5): “Whoever grows angry
with his brother is liable to judgment”, one must take into account that it
follows upon another statement of His:
“Whoever kills his brother is liable to judgment”. Thus Our Lord is speaking there of those
movements of anger by which one desires the death of his neighbor, or some
other grave injury; and if to this desire the consent of reason and will is
given, there is no doubt that that anger is a mortal sin.
4. Is anger the most
grievous of sins?
The answer is NO. That is to say: (a) On the part of the vengeance that is sought, anger is
numbered among those sins that desire to punish one’s neighbor, namely, hatred
and envy. Of these, it is the
least. (b) On the part of the “aspect
of good” under which the punishment is sought, anger is to be numbered among
the “signs of concupiscence”. Among
these, also, it is the least. (c) With
regard to the “degree” or “measure” of anger, the sin could be
among the most serious.
As to (a): Anger seeks to inflict punishment under
color of justice; Hatred seeks to inflict harm out of malice: and Envy seeks to inflict harm upon
another who “outshines” in talent and ability.
As to (b): It is less blameworthy to err in seeking the
“good of justice” through anger, than to err in seeking the “good of justice”
through anger, than to err in seeking the “useful good” or the
“enjoyable-to-sense good” through sins of concupiscence.
As to (c): In reference to the vehemence and suddenness
of the “flare-ups” of anger, Proverbs has this to say (27,4): “Anger has no mercy; neither does an
outbreak of fury: and who can endure
the impetus of a spirit inflamed?”
5. Does the Philosopher
(Aristotle) fittingly distinguish the kinds of Anger into the Acute, the Bitter
and the Difficult?
The answer is YES,
because one must consider the origin of the anger and its duration. Origin:
It is acute when it arises very quickly for the slightest
reasons. Duration: It is bitter when the memory of the
injury that occasioned the anger remains engraved in the soul, causing one to
suffer daily. It is difficult
when the injured person “obstinately” seeks vengeance, and cannot rest until it
is exacted.
6. Must anger be listed
among the Capital Sins?
The answer is YES. Many vices can grow out of anger because
“satisfaction” is sought under color of justice and honor, which
because of their worth and their importance can lead one to exceed reason. Also, an Irate individual can act so
impetuously and precipitously that he is capable of all kinds of inordinate
behavior.
7. Is it fitting and proper
to assign the following as “children” of Anger: Rixa (strife), Tumor Mentis (diseased mind), Contumelia
(slander), Clamor (verbal abuse), Indignatio (indignation) and Blasphemia
(blasphemy)?
The answer is YES,
insofar as the above appear in the heart, on the lips and in one’s conduct.
In the heart
there is Indignation, when the offended believes he does not deserve to
be made to suffer as he has, and a Diseased Mind when the offended
person harbors thoughts and desires of revenge.
On the lips there is Verbal
Abuse when the offended person resorts thereto in his attempt to “get back
at” the offender; Blasphemy, when the offended person says something
injurious against God; and Slander when he says something false and
injurious against the offender.
In behavior there is Strife,
when anger is the cause of the offended person’s doing harmful things to his
fellow human beings.
About Cruelty in
particular…
The nucleus of St. Thomas’ teaching on
this vice is contained in his answers to two questions:
1. Is Cruelty the vice that
is opposed to the virtue of Clemency?
The answer is YES. Clemency implies a certain gentleness
or sweetness of soul, by which one seeks to diminish suffering (punishment)
in others. Cruelty (Crudelitas,
from crudus: raw, crude) suggests what
is raw, horrible and harsh to the taste (or sensibilities). Thus, Cruelty is directly opposed to Clemency.
2. Does Cruelty differ from
savageness (Saevitia) or Ferocity (Feritate)?
The answer is YES. Cruelty differs from savageness and ferocity
the way human malice differs from beastliness.
Savageness or ferocity
is proper to beasts, which harm and kill their prey NOT because of any
considerations of “justice”, which is the work of reason, but out of “instinct”
in their quest for food. Similarly,
Savageness or Ferocity in human beings proceeds NOT from any consideration of
punishment due an offender, but SOLELY from a delight in seeing others
suffer. A delight of this kind is not
human, but beastly.
As we said above,
Cruelty, which inflicts excessive punishment when punishment is
required, is opposed to Clemency. Savageness
or Ferocity is opposed to Piety.
More observations…
The author of my
textbook, who himself, as a Dominican, adhered closely to the teaching of St.
Thomas, includes much of the above in three brief paragraphs:
Clemency stands midway between Cruelty
and Excessive Leniency. Cruelty
is a kind of abrasiveness of soul in exacting punishment that exceeds
the just measure. Excessive Leniency
also fails to observe the just measure by diminishing or remitting the
punishment.
Cruelty is the vice that, due
to “abrasiveness” of soul, inflicts punishments greater than are required. The excessive punishment is an “injustice”,
but the state of soul that is prompt to increase punishment is
“cruelty”. This presupposes authority
in the one who punishes and guilt in the one who is punished. If either of these conditions is lacking,
what we have is Ferocity or Savageness, which “intends” to
torture innocent people and “delights” in the sufferings and sorrows of others.
Excessive Leniency is a social vice
(vice of the Republic), equally as harmful as Cruelty. Because of such leniency, punishment is
diminished or remitted contrary to the dictates of reason. The good of the delinquent and the example
to others, however, require a just severity. Whatever “enervates” discipline (or injures
public morale) by allowing criminal behavior to go unpunished disturbs the
peace of the good citizens.
- - -
It appears that these
segments on virtues allied to Temperance are going to last at least one
conference longer. We still have to
consider the Virtue of Moderation (Modestia), and to my great
surprise, this includes Humility.
It also includes such things as Studiosity, and Moderation: in dress, bodily movement, recreation and
surroundings. We’ll also consider their
“opposites”. Who would have thought
that there are so many ways that we can be “out of control?”
* * * * * * * * * * *
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