Conferences on the Virtues
By Fr. Bruno Cocuzzi, ocd
Number 25
Justice in General –
Considered by Itself
The
“Concept” of Justice…
Like all the
moral virtues, Justice is a habit. It
inclines one “to do what is just”.
The primary
meaning of the word “just” implies what is adequate, i.e., commensurate
with, or adjusted to another.
Thus it implies a kind of “equality”.
Examples would be when we say: A
just measure, or a just price, or a just petition. The very notion of equality requires
“another” since we never speak of something or someone being “equal” to itself
or himself.
Thus, most
properly, the word Justice signifies “equality in a relationship” in
that it inclines the “just” person to render to another those things that are
owed him in a measure “exactly equal” to his “due”.
Nevertheless,
the word “justice” has also been applied metaphorically to the
individual person by considering the different principles of action of body and
soul as if they were different “agents”.
Insofar as the said faculties “obey” reason, which dictates that each
attribute to the other faculties what is fitting and proper, i.e., in the
measure equal to the “norms” that govern each one, there exists “due” order among
them. In this sense, “justice” includes
all the virtues. St. Thomas states that it is in this
metaphorical sense that St. Joseph is called a “just” man. He also attributes that same metaphorical
meaning to its use in the Beatitude:
Blessed are they who hunger and thirst after “justice” (i.e.,
holiness). This is also what is meant
by the word when it is asserted that Adam and Eve were created in the state
of original justice.
The
Definition of Justice…
One simple
definition would be: The constant and
perpetual “willingness” to give to each and every other his “due”. St. Thomas prefers to define it more exactly
as the habit pursuant to which one has the constant and perpetual
inclination of the will to grant to each and every other exactly what the other
has a right to.
As you recall
from many of the earlier conferences, a habit is a firm and permanent
disposition which inclines a faculty of the soul to act in a specific manner,
whether for good or for evil.
The faculty in
question here is the WILL, and the particular “habitual disposition” is willingness. This willingness, to be a virtue, must
extend to all other persons, to all times, and must include all
matters and circumstances.
The specific
manner of acting (in this case doing good) is to render to every other person
exactly what he or she “has a right to”. This means not only positively by deed or conduct, but
also negatively, by omission, that is, leaving others’ rights intact by
refraining from doing violence to them.
In view of all
that has been said, we may say that THREE conditions are required in order that
an act (of person A) be one of “justice” strictly speaking:
1. That
it be directed to and terminate in another (person B).
2. That
person B has a legal right to that conduct on the part of person A. (Examples would be: The Buyer pays the legal price and the
Seller delivers the goods; and, the Employee performs the work, and the
Employer pays the wages).
3. That
the deed or conduct correspond “exactly” to the “right” that exists in the other. (In the examples in (2), the money paid must
“equal” the value of the goods, and the wages paid must “equal” the value of
the work done.
As we saw
above, when an individual renders what is its “due” to any aspect of his own
“humanity”, that is not “justice” in the strict sense because condition (1) is
lacking.
When person A
gives to person B something that B does not have a “legal” right to, that
cannot be an act of justice, but it may be an act of some other virtue, or it
may even be an act of vice. For
example, B is a pauper, and A gives him alms.
However, B does have a “moral right” to receive an alms from A,
who has a surplus of this world’s goods.
Person A would have performed an act of the virtue of Liberality in that
instance.
Other “moral rights”
(as compared to “legal” rights) in say, person D, might require conduct
on the part of person C that would be acts of Fidelity or Gratitude. These could only “metaphorically” be called
“just” deeds.
When the third
condition is lacking, namely, that what is rendered does not measure up to the
conduct the other “has a right to”, the act could still be labeled “just”, but
not entirely;’ it would be “defective”.
Nevertheless,
acts not properly “just” could be instances of other virtues. For example, Religion, Piety and Observance
are virtues that incline us to give to God and to our parents what is their
“due”. But though we cannot make an
“adequate return” to God for what He has done for us, nor to our parents, acts
of Religion, Piety and Observance are metaphorically “just” when we render to
God and our parents a return that is commensurate with our capability.
The fact that
we cannot speak of “justice” except in regard to relationships between
“distinct” individuals requires that the two “individual” persons be totally
distinct persons. That is why,
many, many years ago; it was impossible for a woman to “sue” her husband in a
Court of Law. It was likewise
impossible for a child to “sue” his/her father. (Centuries ago it was impossible to “sue” the King, and a current
holdover of that is the fact that it is impossible to “sue” the various
“governments” under which one is living, except to the extent that the
government in question, by statute, permits itself to be sued).
The reasoning
behind it was that Husband and Wife are ONE, and that in some sense, the child
is “a part of” his/her father. In other
words, husband and wife were considered “parts” of the quasi-personal “entity”
which is the One Flesh brought into being through marriage, and the children
along with the individual parents were considered “part” of the quasi-personal
entity which is The Family. We can see
in that kind of thinking an analogy to the Oneness of our “Humanity” (the Body
with its distinct part and faculties and the Soul with its faculties), which is
identified with the “person” who acts in and through that humanity.
Because it is
true that we do not attribute the acts or “doings” of a particular part
or faculty of our humanity to that particular part or faculty as agent,
but to the “person” identified with that particular humanity, likewise,
the “acts” of any of the distinct members of the “Family” (including the wife)
was always attributed to the [husband and] Father of the family. For example, we don’t say, “My hand did this
or that,” we say, “I did it.”
Thus we don’t think of the “excessive corpulence” of our bodies as being
upset with what our “appetite” for food has done to it, we are upset with
ourselves.
The very same
notion certainly influenced St. Paul when he wrote in I Cor. 6, 1, “Dare any of
you, having a matter against another, bring your case to be judged before the
unjust (read: not inserted into the
Body of Christ through Baptism) and not before the saints?” He was not, of course, suggesting that it was
no longer possible to speak of “justice” in the dealings of “one member” of
God’s household with “another member”.
He says in v.4 of I Cor. 6, “If therefore you have cases about worldly
matters…,” indicating that Believers are in the world, but of course,
they are not to be of the world.
To get back to
the fact that once upon a time wives could not sue their husbands and children
could not sue their fathers (the purpose of the suit being to “get
justice”): Is the fact that they can
now do so to be considered as an advance in human
relationships? From the Christian point
of view, I say “definitely not”.
Whatever causes
division and separation, and particularly whatever disrupts inner unity cannot
be considered “of Christ”. As Jesus
Himself says: “A house (or kingdom)
divided against itself cannot stand (cf. Mk. 3, 24,25)” We have already seen
what devastation the evil of divorce has done in our society, especially to the
innocent children of divorced parents.
It is the tactic of Satan to “divide and conquer.”
Am I saying
that there are no “evils” perpetrated within “families” (or within the
body of Christ) that need to be addressed and removed? Of course not! (Recall that Pope Paul VI states in his Credo of the People of
God, “The Church is holy, though she has sinners in her bosom.” We could say the same of Christian Marriage
and Family). What I am saying, (and I
believe St. Paul is suggesting the same thing) is: These matters are to be dealt with within a different “framework”
than that of mere civil society, namely within the “framework” of unity
of Christians with one another in Christ.
Thus it is Charity that should govern “disputes” between
Christians, not “strict justice” (which is based upon “separateness”), even in
those cases where one of the members of Christ’s Body should withdraw from His
Body”. The Law of Charity is
based upon the union between the lover and the beloved, each of whom sees the
“other” as “another self”. Charity
renders to the loved one, the person identified with the lover, not what is
owed, but what is best for the beloved.
Because of all
that we have said, it follows that we cannot attribute to God “strict justice”
in His dealings with us. God is the
LORD of all creation; He has absolute dominion over all creatures. Thus He “owes us” nothing. We cannot say that we have “rights”
which He must observe.
But what about
the fact that God created His Human Family “to know Him, to love Him and to
serve Him in this life, and to be happy with Him forever in the next?” Doesn’t He “owe us” the means and the
opportunity “freely” to attain that end?
No, what it means that, in the metaphorical sense, God owes it to
Himself to provide each one of us with those means and opportunities, but
even in that case, it is a matter, not of “commutative justice” (between
peers), but of “distributive justice” (between superior and subject).
Neither is it
possible for us to do “strict justice” in our relationship with God. That is because we cannot be considered
either “distinct” from Him or be considered His “peers”. We are “of God” either because we are His adopted
children and/or His servants.
But in so far as He has given us “free will” and a modicum of “dominion”
over the gifts He has bestowed upon us, we can speak of doing Him “a kind of
justice” in that we “owe it to Him” to exercise our limited dominion according
to the rules and within the limits He Himself has provided. Also, because He is infinite and we are
finite, we can never adequately “acknowledge” the TRUTH of our relationship
to Him as His creatures and His adopted children, nor can we ever adequately
“thank Him” for His free gifts (the terms free and gift are
redundant). We “owe it to Him” to do
both (acknowledge and thank) but by means of the virtues of Religion and
Gratitude, respectively. (That is one
reason why we unite ourselves to the Redemptive Sacrifice of Jesus, which is
renewed sacramentally at every Mass. He
alone adequately as accomplished both, along with atonement and
efficacious petition).
But though we
cannot do God perfect and complete “justice” in a positive way, as is evident
from the previous paragraph, we can do Him “complete” justice from the
“negative point of view”, namely by refraining from doing the least injury to
His absolute rights over us and over all human life. Thus it is possible to speak of doing “injustice” in the strict
sense to God, and, of course, the offense done to Him is “infinite” because God
Himself is “infinite”. (Again, that
is why we needed – and still do need – Jesus, the Incarnate Son of God to
“undo” the injuries inflicted upon God by our sins. He IS our JUSTICE).
The
Object of Justice and How it Differs from the Other Virtues…
The proper
object of the Cardinal Virtue of Justice is that “special goodness” that inheres
in rendering to another exactly what is “owed” to him, that is what he
“has a right to”.
Traditionally,
moralists have distinguished material “things” which are, or can be, “owed to”,
“exchanged with” or “distributed to” another, and which they call the “remote,
material object” of an act of the virtue of Justice.
The “proximate
material object” would include those deeds or actions by means of which the
“remote” material objects are surrendered to the other.
They then speak
of the “formal object” of the virtue of Justice, which is that “equality” or
“perfect conformity” between what is given and what is “owed”. This is what is achieved by an act of
Justice. Finally they speak of the
“motive” or “power of attraction” which inclines one “to perform” of an act of
justice, and that is the “special goodness” we spoke of above.
Every “other
person”, who “possesses the right” to receive what is rendered to him in
justice, is considered to be the “indirect object” of the act of Justice, in
that the act is performed to him or for him as its beneficiary.
With regard to
the “other” to whom or for whom acts of justice are performed, the author of my
textbook notes that what we “owe” him directly are external deeds and conduct,
not “interior states” of soul, e.g., passions and sentiments. But indirectly, these are also to be
moderated by Justice through the instrumentality of other virtues, since
passions and sentiments may stand in the way of “doing justice” to that other
person. In the example of the buyer paying
the “just price” and the seller surrendering the “equivalent value” in goods
and services, there is no “strict obligation in justice” for each of them also
to be cordial and kind and pleasant and respectful toward one another, nor to
do whatever else makes the transaction a joy.
But there would incumbent upon them a “moral obligation” to conduct
themselves with those very qualities of soul, but that obligation is founded
upon “charity”.
Similarly, in
order to render another exactly what another has a right to, one might also be
obliged to bring to bear upon the transaction acts of other virtues such as
Prudence, Temperance and Fortitude.
However, the “measure” of these last named cardinal virtues is to be
found NOT in the person to whom the act of “justice” is owed, but in the person
“doing” the act, that is, taking into consideration his own powers and
capabilities.
We said in
previous conferences that virtue lies exactly on the dividing line between “too
much” and “too little.” The Latin
proverb is: In medio stat virtus. (Virtue stands in the middle). With the other virtues, we can only speak of
the “middle of reason”. With regard to
justice we can speak both of the “middle of reason” and the “material
middle”. But that is only because “things”
as well as “exterior conduct” constitute the “material object” of the acts of
justice.
And although we
have said it above, or at least implied it, the virtue (habit) of justice resides
in the Will. We are in kind of
“uncharted waters” when we speak about the human will, because it happens to be
a “blind” faculty, and a very mysterious one as well. It depends almost entirely upon the influence of the senses and
the intellect, which combine to “suggest” to the will wherein lies the
“goodness” that is its proper object.
In that sense, the will is something “passive”.
Thus it would
be necessary to think of the Will as having distinct capacities. One would be the capacity to “be attracted”
by something represented to it as “good”, another would be the capacity to
“command” the faculties of body and soul to do those things which result in the
Will’s “apprehending” the good presented.
As we saw in a previous conference, the intellect, in virtue of
Prudence, is able to suggest to the Will wherein lies the “good” of the
material component of our “humanity” as well as the “good” of its spiritual
component.
But the will is
also subject to other influences as well, namely, to that “information” that is
presented to it by Faith, a supernatural virtue, and to the influence of
“Pride”, which also presents information (almost always false) to the
Will. Because of Faith and Pride, there
has to be something about the Will that makes it “trainable”.
When the Will
accepts the testimony of Faith as to where its True and Supreme Good lies, then
the virtue of Charity begins to reside in the Will. Were the Will to accept the testimony of Pride in its entirety,
then neither Charity or Justice would be able to reside in the Will.
Thus there must
be some capacity of the Will that enables it to “reject” what it “does not
want” and it must also have the capacity to “want” evil as well as
goodness. (Apparently, it is the
“freedom” conferred upon it by God). It
would have to be Pride that causes the Will to “want” evil insofar as it is
Pride that would “want” the “self” OVER AND ABOVE THE “OTHER”. In order for Justice to begin to reside in
the Will it would be necessary that the Will has “chosen” to “want” the “other”
in preference to “self”. Then only
could one be said to be a person of “good will”, and be able to respond to the
“special goodness” that lies in being “well ordered in its relationships”.
As we have
already seen, it is by means of the Will that one “relates” to others both in
Justice and in Charity.
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