Conferences on the Virtues
By Fr. Bruno Cocuzzi, ocd
Number 29
The Subject of Rights
and of Dominion
The last
conference covered The Object of Rights and of Ownership (Dominion), namely things. Before moving on to the next topic, let me
share what the author of my textbook says in a section entitled:
The
division of good things and their various kinds…
First, some
good things are corporeal and others are incorporeal. The former are those which are perceived by
the sense and include such things as houses, fields, clothing, furniture,
money, etc. The latter are those which
are perceived only by the intellect, such as rights of every kind. These can be classed among “things” because
they can be acquired and disposed of in the same fashion as tangible goods,
that is, they are “objects” of ownership and of dominion.
Second, it is
possible to speak of movable and immovable goods. Interestingly, the author gives no direct
definition of “movable”. He says that
they are all those things that are not immovable. Immovable here means “cannot, in its present
state, be physically transferred to a different location.” Examples would be fields, mountains, forests,
growing crops, etc. Also included among
the immovable goods are such things as “mortgage rights” and “easements” that
inhere in immovable goods.
Movable goods
are further divided into consumable and non-consumable. Food, drink, writing paper, whole cloth,
other raw materials, and all those things which, when used or applied, are no
longer available to be used again in the same way, are “consumable”. Those things which can be used over and over
again until they eventually wear out, such as furniture, appliances, clothes,
etc., are considered non-consumable, even though, over the long haul,
they, too, are “used up”. Horses,
cattle, and other farm animals are included among the latter.
It is possible,
also, to think of goods as being interchangeable and non-interchangeable. Usually interchangeable goods of the same
kind, such as money, sugar, oil, firewood, are equivalent, that is, equally
serviceable in ordinary circumstances.
Some things of the same kind are not interchangeable, such as “this
race horse” or this painting of the Last Supper”. Obviously, such particular exemplars
of the same species are not equivalent.
What would be
the reason for mentioning this latter “division” of goods? We have already dealt with various kinds of
“goods” in the January conference! It
is because the “exercise” of the virtue of Justice has so much to do with
“paying one’s just debts”, and the manner of doing so could vary according to
whether goods are movable or immovable, corporeal or non-corporeal, consumable
or non-consumable, interchangeable or non-interchangeable.
Although for
the sake of orderliness it is necessary to distinguish and categorize
the many “things” that exist around us and influence our mutual relationships,
we must remember that these distinctions and categories are “constructs” of the
human mind, and there is nothing “sacred” about them. Any logical division will do, provided, of course, it is rooted
in reality.
Now we turn our
attention to the fourth topic or “question” of the Chapter on Rights, namely,
The
Subject of Rights and of Dominion…
The first,
foremost and supreme Subject of Rights and of ownership and dominion
(i.e., the person who possess them) is God Himself. His dominion over created things is universal, absolute,
independent and primary, insofar as He Himself is the Author of creation and
the One Who conserves all things in being.
As we read in Psalm 23 (24), 1: The
Lord’s are the earth and its fullness, the world and those who dwell in
it. For He founded it upon the seas and
established it upon the rivers. And
in Wisdom 12, 16: For your might is
the source of justice; your mastery over all things makes you spare them
all.
This dominion
God is unable to abdicate; nor can He communicate it to any mere
creature. (Of course, He has given all
things over to His Incarnate Son, the Divine Person, Jesus Christ: The Father loves the Son and has given all
things into his hand. John 3,
35). Neither can anyone withdraw any
creature from His dominion, because God’s “title” to ALL that He has created
cannot be taken from Him.
However, God
does grant to His intelligent creatures, fashioned in His image, particular
and relative dominion, subordinate to His universal
dominion. He shares that lesser
dominion in the same way that he grants to creatures the power to act,
subject to His own supreme causality.
The subordinate dominion granted to His Human creatures is ordered to
other humans only, not to God. That is
to say, we humans do not have to render an account to other human beings of how
we “dispose of” the particular things we own (unless of course we do so in such
a way that it injures the rights of others), but we will have to
render an account to God. In all
the earth, human beings alone are capable of having dominion.
We understand,
too, that “human beings” have the power to own not only as individuals,
but also collectively, as corporate entities, which then are considered “moral
persons”. (Moral here does not
mean the opposite of immoral, obviously, but conveys the notion that
corporate entities are “analogous” to (can act like) individual persons,
because they too, by human positive law, are subjects of rights and
ownership).
How can we
demonstrate that only intellectual beings (for our purposes, humans) are
capable of having rights and dominion?
This may be difficult, because it is something we just KNOW
instinctively. It seems to me that the
truth of the matter can be grasped if we just focus on the concept of
“dominion”. The word itself suggests
“authority over”, which in turn is related to “authorship“, and all authorship
has “purpose” or “finality”. Thus
reason and will are required because only an intelligent, free creature is
capable of envisioning a “future” goal or result (work product) and capable,
further, of using and disposing of “things he owns”, whether corporeal or
incorporeal, internal or external, in such a way as to achieve the desired
objective. Without reason, or
rationality, the exercise of dominion is utterly impossible; and God does not
grant “dominion” to an irrational creature, since an irrational creature is
incapable of “exercising” it.
With regard to
the brutes (living things that fly, swim or creep upon the earth (Genesis 1),
my textbook has this to say, in effect:
Brutes have
neither free will nor reason, both of which are required in order to use and
relate things one to another, which is the exercise of dominion. Dominion or ownership, as we stated in an
earlier conference, is a “bundle of rights” over certain “things” to use and
enjoy them to one’s own personal advantage, which “rights” one can compel (ask
lawful authority to compel) others to respect.
No dominion, no rights! Thus,
animals have no rights properly speaking.
Rather, animals were given by God to be used by humans as means to
attain their own proper end as human beings.
And although no “injustice” is done to an animal if it is injured or
destroyed by a human being, human beings are bound to respect their own nature
and the natural order (both authored by God) by refraining from doing injury to
animals without a reasonable and sufficient cause. And at all times, humans owe it to themselves and to
God not to be cruel to animals.
Someone may
have picked up on the statement that God does not grant dominion (rights) to living
things that cannot exercise dominion (or vindicate rights). What about those human beings who for some
reason do not enjoy the “use of reason” and therefore cannot exercise dominion? Well, it is obvious that such persons are
recognized as having dominion (and rights), e.g., infants, the insane, and
severely retarded people, because our courts appoint guardians and
administrators to mange the “property” of such persons. So the important thing to remember is that
anyone who has a “rational soul” is a proper subject of rights and dominion,
because the human soul has the “radical capacity” to act rationally, even
though physical or mental impairments may, practically speaking, prevent the
use of the faculties of reason and free will.
Now since
properly constituted human positive law does circumscribe and restrict the
exercise of rights, the author of my textbook turns our attention to those who,
traditionally, were deemed by law to be incapable of enjoying “full”
dominion or ownership. These are (a)
minor children, (b) wives, (c) authors and inventors, (d) secular clerics (e)
religious and (f) moral persons.
(a) Minor
children are defined as all those who are living under
parental or quasi-parental authority.
The laws governing the “dominion of minor children vary from nation to
nation throughout the world; nevertheless, it is possible to discern certain
basic principles that are valid almost everywhere.
1. Children
may own in their own names property that justly and lawfully accrues to
them. The author of my textbook calls
this “direct” dominion.
2. These
same children do not have the right to administer their property (which right
the law extracts from the bundle of rights we know as ownership) until they
reach maturity or are otherwise emancipated.
3. The
enjoyment of the property itself or of its earnings is usually “shared” by the
children and parents (or quasi-parental authority) according to the particular
needs of children and parents.
Of
course, the property” envisioned in these general principles usually consists
of “goods” that come to a child by reason of inheritance or which are received
from parents who seek to reduce their income tax liabilities by giving income
producing “assets” to their minor children.
Practically speaking, at least in the United States, it seems to me that
most parents generally allow their children to exercise full dominion over
(own, administer and enjoy) whatever they acquire as a result of their own
labor, and over whatever they give the children as an “allowance’.
How
and when is “justice” violated in regard to property of minor children? Most often civil law determines, but
certainly it would be unjust for parents to “exploit” the property of their own
children for their own selfish purposes, and it would be unjust for children to
divert to their own selfish use money given them by their parents to pay for
their education and other necessary expenses.
In both instances, the offender is bound by the law of restitution.
(b) The
Dominion of Wives.
This one is a “hot potato” in our present day and age of the Women’s
Movement”. Still, in the next
paragraph, I will state what Catholic Moral Theology continues to teach (based
on Scripture and Tradition) in this regard.
When
a man and a woman contract marriage, they form a society of which the husband
is the head, and the wife, though she is the heart, remains
subordinate to him. She is subject,
however, not as a slave or a servant-girl, but as an associate and
helpmate. According to the nature of
things and by divine law the wife is under the authority of her husband, and
does not enjoy the same freedom as her husband in the matter of disposing of
goods and in carrying on “business”.
St. Thomas Aquinas tells us that, although husband and wife are equal
as “terms” of the marital relationship, in those things that pertain to the
government of the family, the husband is the head of his wife. In addition, the Church recognizes the wise
and pervasive right of Civil authority to determine by law the nature and
extent of “rights of ownership” in husband and wife.
Nevertheless,
when a woman gets married, she does not lose her natural rights. Hence she remains capable of owning and
administering property. But when she
marries she assumes the obligation of sharing proportionately the burdens of
marriage and the common life, namely, supporting and educating the children
that will be born. And in the event the
husband becomes destitute, the obligation of supporting him falls to her, too. However, because the husband is generally
deemed to be more expert in managing affairs, and because by the natural law he
is the head of his wife, it is fitting that the wife be dependent upon him for
at least those things which pertain to the obligations of marriage and family.
With
regard to the “property” of wives, three types of goods or asset may be
distinguished.
(1) Goods
held in common, i.e., brought into the marriage by a nuptial agreement that is
either written or tacit, and goods acquired during the course of the marriage.
(2) The
dowry, i.e., property that remains in the name of the wife, but which by
agreement or custom or by civil law is administered by the husband for the good
of the marriage. (I’m not aware that
this is customary in the United States.
(3) Entirely
personal goods, reserved to her exclusive use.
These can be of three kinds also:
a. 1st,
whatever she acquires by her own effort once her daily domestic duties and
obligations are duly carried out,
b. 2nd,
whatever she takes from the household budget for her own personal physical
needs, including recreation, and
c. 3rd,
whatever is given to her on the condition that it is exclusively hers, that is,
on condition that the husband lay no claim to any part of the gift.
With
regard to the goods that are entirely personal, it is obvious that the wife has
complete dominion over them. She can
administer and enjoy them as she sees fit, whether they are movable or
immovable goods, as defined above.
As
stated above, a wife holds dowry-type assets in her own name, but she lacks the
right to administer them and she lacks also the right to enjoy them
directly. Whatever earnings they bring
in she enjoys indirectly because they are applied to the good of the entire
family.
In
regard to the “common assets”, they are held jointly by husband and
wife. Whether or not the wife can share
in the administration and enjoyment of jointly held property is usually
determined by civil law. But whatever
the case, it is out of the common property of the marriage that the wife and
children have the right to be properly supported and maintained according to
the family’s station in life. Proper
support and maintenance for a wife includes not only food, clothing and
shelter, but also a “discretionary allowance” to be spent on wholesome forms of
recreation, small gifts for friends and relatives, to give alms to needy
causes, and for whatever else she deems fit.
My
textbook lists some “practical conclusions” which can be drawn from the
doctrine just cited:
(1) In
the event a wife has parents who are in need, or children of a former marriage
who are in need, she is obliged to go to their aid. In doing so, she must first make use of whatever assets are
entirely hers. Lacking these, she may
take from the goods held in common, and should these be wanting, too, she may
use assets belonging exclusively to the husband, even against his will. The same can be said with regard to her gravely
needy brothers and sisters. During
this time, however, she may, and most probably should, discontinue making her
customary charitable contributions to other needy causes.
The
rational behind all that is that the husband, as administrator of family
property and head of his wife, is obliged to help her fulfill all her natural
obligations. And she is in no way
obliged to make restitution, even though what she takes may far exceed what the
family ordinarily gives in customary alms.
(2) Because
a wife is a partner, and not a slave or a servant-girl, she is not obliged to
ask her husband for the funds which are necessary for her own support and
maintenance and for that of the children.
She is allowed freely to take them.
And if the husband is unreasonably opposed, she may do so secretly. She may also take and use without asking for
those funds she knows her husband would consent to if she were to ask.
(3) If
for some reason the husband fails properly to care for and support the family,
the wife then can and should assume the role of head of the household. She may therefore, in order to avoid great
harm to the family, invade, use and dispose of any and all of the common
assets. If it turns out that the
husband is a spendthrift, she may even take and hide some of the common assets
against future necessities.
(4) Absent
any of the situations listed above, or analogous ones, a wife sins against
commutative justice when she uses common assets without her husband’s
consent. Likewise a husband sins
against commutative justice when he takes and uses any of his wife’s purely
personal goods, when he consumes or dissipates the wife’s dowry, and when he
alienates any part of the wife’s dowry without her permission.
(c). The
Dominion of Authors and Inventors…
Here
in the United States the dominion of authors and inventors id determined by
what we know as Copyrights and Patents.
Unfortunately, this writer knows little about them. But there are some general, basic principles
that apply everywhere:
(1) Everyone
is entitled to full dominion over the fruits or products of his genius until
they become part of the “public domain” Thus whoever publishes and/or sells
manuscripts, works of art and inventions without the author/inventor’s
permission commits a two-fold sin of injustice: he has violated the author/inventor’s personal right exclusively
to own, administer and enjoy the fruit of his genius, and second, he deprives
him of his lawful profit.
(2) Once
a Copyright or Patent is obtained, then, for a legally defined number of years
thereafter, the authors and inventors retain the rights to “dispose” of (own
and administer) the work in question, but, for a price, the share the
“use and enjoyment” thereof with others.
Once the stated number of years have passed, then, I do believe, anyone
may make use of the work as if it were his very own, including “repackaging”
and selling it.
A
question arises: What if an author, say
a College Professor or Preacher, were to give a series of lectures which he
plans eventually to gather into a copyrighted book. What are the rights of the listeners to what the speaker has
“declaimed in a public forum”?
Clearly,
the members of the audience would be forbidden from making audio or videotapes
of the lecture without the express permission of the lecturer. And if the permission were granted, the one
taping would sin against justice if he or she were to share the tape for a
profit. At best it could be shared with
close friends and acquaintances. This
would be so because it can be presumed that the author has no intention of
making and selling tapes for profit once permission to make a recording is
granted.
Similarly,
a person in the audience could take [non-stenographic] notes of the lectures,
and share the notes with friends and acquaintances, but of course, not for
profit. Even though the author intends
to publish the lectures in a book and earn a profit thereby, ordinary notes
taken by a listener are a far cry from the special, unique wording and manner
of expression that is protected by Copyright.
(3) There
is no “natural law” that determines the length of time that Copyrights and
patents should keep the work in question out of the public domain.
Because
there are instances where the common good, i.e., industry and the economy would
be greatly enhanced, Civil authorities may severely delimit the rights of
authors and inventors over the fruit of their genius. After all God, who desires the good of all, is the true author
of ALL talent and genius.
(By
the way, the reader should feel free to use these conferences in any way he/she
desires).
We will now
continue with the Dominion of Clerics, Religious and Moral Persons, and then go
on to treat of the Acquisition of Rights and of Dominion.
The
Dominion of Clerics…
As you all
know, the word “cleric” as used in the Church is related to the word
“Clergy”. Before Vatican II all
students for the Priesthood became clerics by submitting to the Rite of
Tonsure. During that rite the Bishop
would snip a bit of hair from the crown, front and sides of the heads of those
about to begin studies for the priesthood, all the while reciting part of Psalm
15 (16):
Oh
Lord, my allotted portion and my cup, you it is who holds fast my lot, for me
the measuring lines have fallen on pleasant sites: fair to me indeed is my inheritance.
What this meant
is that the cleric was to look to the Lord for everything. By committing himself totally to the Service
of the Altar, a “sacred work” the cleric was relieved of the obligation to
“support himself” and to acquire “goods” by engaging in some profane
work”. God Himself would see to it that
all the legitimate human needs of the priest would be properly and adequately
supplied. Not that the cleric would not
have material resources out of which, or the discretion with which, to provide
for himself, but that the resources and property in question were not to be
generated directly and exclusively by his own personal engagement in “profane” occupations. Thus good and resources would come into the
possession (the dominion) of clerics from three distinct possible sources:
(a) Patrimonial
or quasi-patrimonial goods.
These would come to them from their parents or others by inheritance or
by bequest. This category also includes
resources that could be considered the “fruit” of personal industry and effort
distinct from sacred ministry, yet not incompatible with sacred ministry, as in
writing books, doing artistic paintings, teaching philosophy, etc. Also considered a fruit of “industry” is the
money set aside or goods acquired by thrift and parsimony, i.e., by not using
all of the funds provided for the clerics support from ecclesiastical sources.
(b) Casual
goods. These
are the resources that fall to a cleric as a result of personal ministerial
services, given to him as outright “offerings” with no strings attached. These are not considered “payment”
for the ministerial services provided, but free will offerings out of
which, if need be, the cleric would be able to defray his travel and living
expenses in coming to provide the services.
These services would be to preach, hear confessions and to offer Mass,
mostly, but also for other exercises of a sacred ministry. Such offerings are often called “stipends”
and “stole fees”.
(c) Ecclesiastical
goods. This
category includes “income and revenue” that comes into the hands of a cleric
that is generated by “property and assets” owned not by himself, but by the
Church or parish which he serves.
Obviously, this money really belongs to the Church and Parish, and not
to the cleric.
What
rights of ownership does a cleric enjoy in regard to these three sources of
goods?
A
cleric has full dominion and rights of ownership over the first two categories
insofar as they are “given” to him as an individual person.
As
to the ecclesiastical goods, he has a right to take only what he needs for
his decent and honorable support.
What is over and above that he is obliged both by charity and the virtue
of religion to apply to “pious purposes”, which would include, of course, not
only works of charity strictly speaking, but also maintenance and repair of the
Church building, appropriately to furnish and decorate the Church, and to pay
the cost of fitting and seemly celebration of Church festivals and liturgies
(flowers, music, etc.).
In
the United States it is very rare to find Churches and Parishes that own income
producing properties and assets, whereas that is, or was, quite common in
Europe. Also common in Europe is, or
was, payment of the “salaries” of parish priests and the support and
maintenance of Church property by the civil government. Here in our country the “offertory
collection” takes the place of the ecclesiastical goods of category
(c).
What
then, sums up the obligation and duties of the Cleric in regard to material
resources?
A
cleric, just like any other private citizen, may freely use and dispose of all
goods and resources that belong to categories (a) and (b) above. However, in view of his status as one who is
to look to God for everything, he is to use and spend money and supply for his
personal needs with due “clerical moderation” and without any hint of
scandal. Also, in virtue of his state,
he is more strictly bound than the ordinary Christian to help the poor
and support pious causes.
The
Dominion of Religious…
As you all know
again, in the Catholic Church a Religious is one who has professed vows
of Poverty, Chastity and Obedience.
These vows, however, are either Solemn or Simple. By means of Solemn Vows a Religious
voluntarily relinquishes almost all human rights. In virtue of the solemn vow of Chastity, he/she relinquishes the
right to marry and raise a family. By
the solemn vow of Obedience, many rights concerning the use of internal
goods of body and soul are relinquished; and by the solemn vow of Poverty, the
right to own and acquire property is relinquished. Here we are concerned only with property “rights”.
Without
“ownership”, solemnly professed Religious have nothing to use or dispose
of. But since they can “own in common”,
they can and do use and, when appropriate, dispose of community goods and
property, but only subject to the permission, tacit or expressed, of the
religious superior. Whatever is
ordinarily “acquired” by dint of personal effort and industry, belongs to the
community (the Religious House of which he/she is a member). The same is true of “gifts” given to a
solemnly professed, unless the donor specifies that it be used
for a particular purpose.
Religious who
profess Simple Vows of Poverty, Chastity and Obedience do not relinquish
“radical” rights to marry, dispose of internal goods of body and soul, and to
own property. Their use only is
restricted by the simple vows. Again,
what interests us here is the vow of Poverty.
Thus, simply professed religious remain capable of owning property, but
cannot use or dispose of what they own without the express or tacit permission
of their religious superior, and only within the parameters established by the
constitutions of their Institute.
Thus, prior to
making simple profession of the vows (which can be either temporary and renewed
periodically, or perpetual) a religious is required to name an administrator or
trustee of his/her choice to manage the property and assets he/she continues to
own, and to this “administrator” instructions are given as to how to make use
of the said assets and their earnings.
In some
religious congregations, the Novice is required to make out a Will disposing of
currently owned property as well as property that might accrue to him/her in
the future. Once made, this will cannot
be changed without permission of the appropriate authority. Neither can the religious use the property
governed by the trust instrument or the Will to make outright gifts to other
living persons. And whatever “revenue”
or “property rights” the simply professed religious generates by dint of
personal effort or industry while “functioning as a member of his/her
Institute” is acquired by the Institute.
The
Dominion of Moral Persons…
By the term
“Moral Person”, we mean here a “gathering” of many individuals into a single
moral entity. The moral entity is such
that the repository of rights of ownership and other rights if the group
considered as a single distinct “unit” rather than the constituents considered
as sharing ownership jointly or in common.
In the event such a moral entity is recognized by lawful authority, it
becomes a “juridic person”, and has all the rights and obligations conceded to
it by the same authority.
Therefore,
depending upon the purposes for which they are formed, we have civil and
religious moral persons, depending upon whether the end sought is of a temporal
or of an eternal (or spiritual) nature.
The same may be public or private, depending upon whether
the end is of such a nature as to be common to all the people, or common only
to a sub-class of private individuals among them. Examples of civil, public moral persons are the Nation, the
State, or the Municipality. Examples of
civil, private moral persons would be a Labor Union or a Professional Society.
Our federal
government and the individual States do recognize and legislate concerning
religious moral persons, but in view of the plurality of Churches and Religions
that exist among us, the notion of a public religious moral person would
not apply to the general populace of the United States. And neither does current Canon Law speak of
public and private “moral” persons, but only of public and private “juridic”
persons.
Certain
Principles apply regarding the rights of ownership and dominion of all moral
persons:
1. Public
civil societies exist in virtue of the natural law itself and enjoy the rights
of ownership of goods, because without that ownership, they could not fulfill
the purpose intended for them by God. That is to say, all of us, by our very
nature, and therefore by the Will of God, require a public authority to help us
attain our destiny as human, temporal beings during this earthly phase of our
existence. As stated in a previous
conference, the civil states help us by preserving in society that modicum of
peace and security, that relatively harmonious and effective interchange and
delivery of goods and services, without which we could never hope to pursue and
attain happiness either temporal or eternal.
2. Private
civil societies may be formed by the free consent of private citizens who unite
to pursue a common goal. This, too,
proceeds from the natural law because the legitimate ends we are permitted to
strive after, but which are subordinate to our final end, often
exceed the unaided efforts of a single individual to attain, but which can be
attained by joint and common efforts.
If and when required in the accomplishment of its purposes, such private
civil societies (moral persons) may own and administer property.
3. The
Church exists not only in virtue of Natural Law but also by the Divine Positive
Right of its Founder, Jesus Christ. Its
Right to exist is utterly independent of any and all civil authority, and
includes the ancillary rights to possess and exercise dominion over temporal
goods.
According
to the current Code of Canon Law: “The
Catholic Church and the Holy See have the nature of a moral person…” (Canon
113, Section 1). To no other entity
does the Code apply the term “moral person”.
However, “Besides physical persons, there are also in the Church
juridic persons, that is, subjects in canon law of obligations and rights which
correspond to their nature.” (Canon
113 Section 2)
Canon
114, Section 1. Juridic persons are
constituted either by prescription of law or by special concession of the
competent authority given through a decree; they are aggregates of persons or
of things ordered towards a purpose congruent with the mission of the Church
and which transcends the purpose of the individuals that make them up.
Section
2. The purposes spoken of in Section 1
are understood as those which pertain to works of piety, of the apostolate or
of charity, whether spiritual or temporal.
Section
3. The competent ecclesiastical authority
is not to confer juridic personality except upon those aggregates of persons or
things which pursue a truly useful purpose and, all things considered, have
resources which are foreseen to be sufficient to achieve their designated end.
Canon
116, sec. 1. Public juridic persons are
aggregates of persons or things which are so constituted by the competent
ecclesiastical authority that, within the limits set for them in the name of
the Church, they fulfill a proper function entrusted to them in view of the
common good, in accord with the prescripts of law; other juridic persons are
private.
Since
a juridic person is of its nature perpetual;…(Canon 120 Section 1), and we are
dealing here with the “dominion” of these moral entities, whenever a “juridic
person” in the Church is suppressed or otherwise ceases to exist, Canon 123
applies:
Upon
the extinction of a public juridic person, the allocation of its goods,
patrimonial rights and obligations is ruled by law and by statute; if these
give no indication, they go to the juridic person immediately superior, with
due regard to the will of the founders or donors and for acquired rights; upon
the extinction of a private juridic person, the allocation of its goods and
obligations is regulated by its own statutes.
It
would be cumbersome to cite the applicable Canons here, but for those who might
be interested, our canonically established Communities of Lay Discalced
Carmelites are private juridic persons.
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