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Conferences on the Virtues

By Fr. Bruno Cocuzzi, ocd

 

Number 33

 

The Kinds of Injustice

 

The Kinds of Injustice…

 

By reason of its object, Injustice is divided into various moral species in accordance with the different kinds of Justice and various kinds of Rights that can be violated.  These are:

 

1.       Legal Injustice, which is opposed to Legal Justice in so far as it “violates” the common good of human society.

 

2.       Particular Injustice, which inflicts harm upon an individual person; and this is further divided into

 

a.       Injustice with respect to the distribution of goods, and this is called acceptance of persons, a relative of the dreaded “human respect”, and

b.       Injustice with respect to personal exchanges between individuals, and this is called commutative injustice.  Because, in these “exchanges” individual “rights” are violated, these acts of injustice are more properly called Injuries  (Latin:  Injuria).

 

(Before going further, allow me to state what is meant by the term “human respect” mentioned in 2(a) above.  The phrase Human Respect has a very special meaning in moral theology, since, clearly, it is something very good and laudable to be “respectful” of other human beings.  The dread evil called human respect springs from the vices of Pride and Vanity, such that it causes a person to be so afraid of what people might think of him/her, that he will do anything regardless of how seriously sinful it may be, rather than to expose himself to the ridicule and the contempt of others.  What makes human respect so dreadful is that the person who is the slave of this sin isn’t even sure that ridicule and contempt will fall upon him in a particular instance, but only “suspects” that it might.  I tell you this because I used the expression “human respect” in a homily recently, and I detected “incomprehension” on a few faces when I spoke of it as something reprehensible).

 

To be guilty of a specific act of LEGAL INJUSTICE, a person would have to have contempt for the common good and also would have to intend to act contrary to the common good. 

 

It happens often that we, as individuals, act contrary to the overall good of the communities to which we belong, but these are not always specific sins of legal injustice.  Most often we are unaware that what we intend to do is, at times, harmful to the general good of our “community”.  In those (hopefully rare) instances where we have unknowingly and unintentionally harmed the common good by conduct that IS sinful, our specific “intention” was to gratify some disorderly appetite, and thus we would have committed a specific sin against Prudence, or Temperance, or Fortitude or against some other kind of Justice, and therefore NOT a specific sin of legal injustice.  Nevertheless, since every sin not specifically “legal injustice” always damages the common good, every such sin IS, generally, a sin of legal injustice as well, but would not be imputed as such.

 

On the other hand, contempt for the common good (the mind-set that is the VICE of legal injustice) is capable of leading to every other sin.  The common good is always assured by the observance of all the precepts of divine Natural and Positive Law, and by the observance of all just, human Positive Law.  Most of them have to do with “commutative” justice, that is, what we “owe” to others who together with us comprise the society and the communities of which we are members.  That is to say, it is such precepts that safeguard the rights of everyone.  If, in principle, we have contempt for the common good of society and of our “community”, all the more certain it is that we will have contempt for the individual good of the members who comprise it.  One who really loves, and sincerely desires to promote, the common good would be restrained thereby from violating all those precepts which safeguard the rights of others.  One lacking that love and sincere desire would have nothing to restrain him from doing violence to individual, personal rights.  And getting down to basics, it is ONLY love for God, the Creator and Sustainer of human society, that gives rise to and undergirds love for the common good.

 

PARTICULAR INJUSTICE has to do with “inequalities” (or inequities) in our dealings with others with regards to various kinds of “goods”. 

 

It is part of our “wounded” human condition for us to WANT MORE than we have a right to of “good” things (honors and riches, privileges, success, satisfaction, etc.), and to EXPECT LESS than we deserve of “evil” things (disesteem, poverty, responsibilities, failures and disappointments, etc.), which inordinate attitudes cannot fail to “show up” in all our relationships.

 

There is great variety in the kinds of commutative particular injustice that are distinguished by reason of the different kinds of “goods” and the “rights thereto” that are involved:  Internal Goods of Soul and Body, Conjugal (Marital) Goods, External Goods, Goods of Honor and Good Name, etc.

 

Similarly, sins of commutative, particular injustice are distinguished according to the “manner” in which one’s rights in various goods are violated:  Robbery, theft, embezzlement, fraud, would be examples of the different ways individuals are injured in their external goods of fortune.

 

Objectively speaking, that is, prescinding from the subjective states of mind, will and sensory appetite of a guilty party, there is a great difference in the “seriousness” or “gravity” of the many kinds of sins of legal injustice. 

 

The more “noble” or “precious” the good or the right violated, the more serious the sin.

 

The greater the degree of “harm” or “violence” done to the “good” or the “right” of another, the more serious the sin.

 

Finally, depending upon whether the person whose rights or goods are “damaged” is a “public person” or “private person”, and depending upon whether the importance or necessity of that person’s role in society is greater or lesser, the sin is greater or lesser.

 

We now turn our attention to the “Third Question”.

 

The General Principles by which Injuries and Injustices are discerned…

 

The first and foremost Principle is:  No fraud or injustice is done to an individual who is fully aware of what is happening to him or his goods and who consents to (neither objects to nor opposes) what is happening to him or to his goods!  St. Thomas explains:

 

Just as no one can be formally accused of an unjust deed unless he willfully commits it, neither can one be said formally to suffer an injustice unless he willfully opposes it.  An action originates in the agent himself; a sufferance [being acted upon] originates in another.  Hence, one cannot be both agent and “sufferer” of the same, identical act.

 

Now the proper source of activity in the human person is the Will; therefore, properly speaking, a man does only what he wills to do. Otherwise, he is not the “agent” of any deed performed by him.

 

And, properly speaking, he “suffers” only what he does not will to endure; otherwise it would be possible to say that an individual person is BOTH the agent who inflicts an injury, and the sufferer who endures that same injury, which is repugnant to logic and right reason.

 

Therefore, properly speaking, by the very nature of things, and formally, no one can do an injustice unless he wills to, nor can he “suffer” an injustice unless he does not consent to it.

 

But improperly and “materially” speaking, one can do an unjust deed without willing to, i.e., when he does not “intend” the injustice; and one can suffer an injustice willingly, e.g., as Jesus did when He, the Divine Innocent One, took our punishment upon Himself, that we might be spared.

 

Having quoted St. Thomas, the author of my textbook then asserts that it is possible to misunderstand his reasoning, and states that not every consent on the part of a holder of rights suffices to prevent a material violation of his rights from being an injustice or injury!  Therefore:

 

a)      The “awareness needs to be free of error, in the absence of which error, the “consent” would not have been given.

 

For example, people usually “are willing” to pay an inflated price for a good and useful object, if they know that the proceeds of the sale are earmarked for a charitable work they wish to support.  But if it turns out that it is not true that the proceeds will go to further that charitable endeavor, then despite their willing payment of the “unjust” price, they have indeed been done an injustice.

 

b)      The “consent” must be complete in every respect.  That is,

(i)                  Voluntary and free.  If the consent is given under the influence of fear or moral pressure, and would not have been given in their absence, the consent would not suffice to nullify an injustice on the part of the one to whom the consent is given.  A workman may consent to a wage that is less than just because he is coerced by economic need; or a borrower may, for the same reason, consent to an unjust rate of interest on a loan.  In neither case however, is the employer or lender free of the guilt of an injustice.

(ii)                The consent must be given with one’s positive will.  One’s “permissive will” does not suffice. 

There are situations where one may have to “tolerate” an injury or an injustice, because to oppose it physically might be illicit, or to oppose it verbally might lead to greater or more extensive injury.  This kind of consent does not suffice to nullify the injustice on the part of the one inflicting it.

(iii)               The person consenting to the injustice must have total and complete rights in the “goods” that are violated.

 

Once upon a time the “winner” of a duel was deemed to be not guilty of murder because it was thought that both loser and winner, by freely entering into the duel, were freely relinquishing their right to life.  But the complete right to everyone’s life is vested in God, our Creator; we are only the stewards or trustees of our individual lives.

 

Also, a person holding high public office cannot relinquish his rights to a good name.  (i.e., to be “respected” by others) because the right to his “good name: is vested in the public, or in the “government” he represents.  Therefore he cannot “consent” to be treated with contempt or to be dishonored in any fashion.

 

The same would be true of a Bishop or a Priest (or anyone) who represents Jesus Christ and His Church.  Although the appropriate response by the representative of Jesus and His Church to one who vilifies him is “forgiveness”, the guilt of the offender is removed not by “consent to the injury”, but by an act of charity and mercy.

 

And in both instances, although the representatives of the Church or of the civil state cannot renounce the right they have to a good name in virtue of their office, they can renounce their right to a good name that flows from their strictly personal attributes and from what they have achieved by dint of personal industry.  But practically speaking, it would be impossible for them to jeopardize the latter without also jeopardizing the former.

 

The Second Principle:  No injury is done to a holder of rights who cannot reasonably object to their being injured.

 

Before trying to “explain” what this principle means, let me reiterate that the virtue of “justice” has to do with rendering to another in the exact measure what it is the other has a “right” to receive.  Thus, when we say “do injury to” or “violate” a right, we really mean that we fail to render the “due” measure” that is consistent with the right.  Therefore the principle assets that there are instances when it is “unreasonable” for the holder of a right to demand that it be respected in full and exact measure.

 

An obvious illustration is the fact that it is impossible for a starving man to “steal” a loaf of bread.  Rather, it is impossible for the owner of that bread to say that an injustice was done him [unless he, too, is a starving man] because his loaf of bread was “stolen”.  (I almost wrote, “stollen”, a very bad joke!).  In other words, the owner of a loaf of bread is “obliged very strictly in charity” to use it to feed any starving person who comes to him.  Thus he would very unreasonably (and dangerously, from a spiritual point of view) withhold his consent to its being taken without being paid for.

 

With regard to this, my author suggests that the owner of the loaf might be “reasonably” upset because the starving man did not notify him of his need, and thus “deprive the owner” of the opportunity to freely give him the bread.

 

The Third Principle:  An unjust intention does not, of itself alone, constitute an injustice (injury).

 

The notion of “due measure” that is constitutive of all acts of the virtue of justice requires that the “harm” or damage done to goods or to rights of any kind be “perceptible” (measurable) in order that one may speak of either “justice” or “injustice”.  Since “intentions” reside in the mind and will only, some external effect must be produced before we can say that justice is done, or that an injustice is perpetrated.  Still, harm IS done by an “intention” to act unjustly, not to the one who would suffer the injustice if the intention were carried out, of course, but to the person who forms the unjust intention, since it harms him in his very person and in his relationship with God, to Whom he owes it to remain true to his humanity, made in His image and likeness.

 

Intentions need to be taken into account when the “deeds” one proposes to carry out are objectively harmful to the rights of another (unjust), and even, strangely enough, when they are objectively “not harmful” to another’s rights (just or neutral).

 

When intentions carried out combine to produce an overall effect, it is the bottom line that determines the “justice” or “injustice” of the individual actions in the series.  (Caveat:  this is NOT the same as saying that the end justifies the means).

 

For example, it is objectively harmful to the rightful owner’s “rights” to buy his known stolen object from the thief.  But if one intends (proposes) to return the object to its rightful owner, and actually does so, the “purchase” of the stolen object ceases to be objectively harmful and turns out to have been beneficial to the rightful owner.

 

On the other hand, it is possible that an individual may perform an act that is objectively just, but which at the same time inflicts “harm” upon another. 

 

It is considered “just” to defend against an “unjust aggressor”, and to inflict as much (but no more than necessary) physical harm or injury upon the aggressor as is required to ward off physical harm to oneself.  Now it may happen that in the process, the “defender” may conceive a hatred for the aggressor and “intend to hurt” the unjust aggressor.  If it turns out that the infliction of just the right amount of injury proceeds more from the intention to “hurt” than to “defend”, the just act of self-defense becomes a sin, but not a sin of injustice; it becomes a sin or hatred.

 

Instances may also arise wherein a person may choose to conduct himself in a way that in itself does no injustice to another precisely because be “intends” that harm come to that other person.

 

The example is given of an individual who discovers that property belonging to an adversary is burning, yet he does nothing, he makes no effort to notify the adversary or the proper authorities because he intends harm upon his adversary.  He has sinned, of course, but he has not committed a sin or “injustice”, since as a private person, he is under no obligation, in strict justice, to do anything about the fire.  (Unless, of course, the fire also threatens to do damage to the common good).

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Thus far, Chapter III of Part I of the Treatise on Justice.  The next Chapter (IV), the Division of Justice, considers the various “parts” of Justice.  Recall that in treating of the other Cardinal virtues we spoke of their various parts:  Integral, Subjective, and Potential parts.

 

Integral in this context has the meaning of Constitutive.  All the Integral Parts have to be present in order for an act of Justice to be perfect and complete.  Thus they are the conditions, the dispositions, and the individual deeds that are required in order to achieve and act of the virtue of Justice.

 

We have already mentioned the names of the Subjective parts of Justice:  Legal Justice, Distributive Justice and Commutative Justice.  These will be dealt with in detail.

 

Finally, the Potential parts of the Cardinal Virtue of Justice are those other “affiliated Virtues” which closely resemble the Virtue of Justice, but which lack some characteristic element (inability to achieve “due measure”; a response to a “quasi-right”, etc.) of Justice.  Some of these virtues are:  Religion, Piety, Observance, Obedience, Truthfulness, gratitude, Affability, Liberality, fairness.

 

We’ll continue next time, hopefully from my room in our Monastery in Brighton, with the Integral Parts of Justice.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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