Conference 45 - Concerning Duels

Conferences on the Virtues

By Fr. Bruno Cocuzzi, ocd

Number 45

Concerning Duels…

The next Question treated in Chapter I on Injustices against the Internal Goods of Life and of the Body is the 4^th, namely:

CONCERNING DUELS…

At first I thought I would omit this Question, since we hardly hear of duels taking place any more, and one would hardly have occasion to wonder what the morality of fighting a duel might be, and even less frequently have to consider actually fighting a duel. But there are some interesting points of information that arise in the course of the brief treatment in my textbook, so I decided to touch upon it after all.

A Duel is defined as man-to-man combat between two or more individuals, according to a previous agreement freely entered into by the parties to the duel, using weapons that by their nature cause serious injury or death.

1. Man-to-man combat. Generally involving only two combatants. The reason for entering into the duel is not relevant. It could be for the sake of “repairing” damage done to one’s honor, or for the sake of getting revenge, or to vindicate a “right” or to “prove” the justice of one’s cause. Sometimes duels were entered into just for the sake of getting exercise, or just to discover who is more “macho” than anyone else.

2. According to an agreement freely entered into. The place, the time, other circumstances such as weapons, etc., must be designated ahead of time to the mutual satisfaction of the participants. Thus a sudden, unexpected attack by one party upon another, who then fights back to defend himself, cannot be called a duel.

3. Using weapons that by their nature are intended to cause serious injury or death. Thus, two disputants who agree to settle their differences in a fistfight or by means of a boxing match would not be fighting a duel, strictly speaking.

Duels can also be public as well as private. A duel is public if it is authorized by the competent authority for the sake of the common good. Private duels are those entered into by private individuals acting upon their own authority.

Apparently, there have been such things as public duels in the past, or my author would not have mentioned them. He says they are licit if the object is to put an end to a war between two nations with the least possible amount of bloodshed. (We have an example of this in Sacred Scripture, when Goliath the Philistine challenged someone from the army of King Saul to fight him). Among the ancients, all duels were “public”.

It was not until the Middle Ages (he tells us) that the Germans and the Lombard’s introduced “private” duels for the purpose of settling differences. It seems that the nobles and the military captains were the ones most likely to challenge their counterparts to a duel. Since they all wore swords in those days, they apparently thought that the mere fact of wearing them gave them the right to use them to vindicate their honor or to get revenge. Here in our own country, it seems that those who wore guns in the days of the wild, wild West felt and did the same. (As a matter of fact, it seems to be true today among gun-slinging teenagers who live in our inner cities).

As to the morality of duels, this principle governs: Private duels are always intrinsically (of their very nature) gravely evil and unjust (sinful). The gravity flows from the fact that for one of the combatants it is indirect suicide, and for the other it is direct murder. Therefore all the reasons why suicide and murder are gravely sinful, as stated in the previous conference, apply to duels.

Question 5 – Concerning injustices inflicted upon the members of the body.

Catholic moralists speak of three kinds of harm that can be inflicted upon the human body:

(1) Wounding, which includes a special case: mutilation. This violates a person's right to integrity of body.

(2) Beating or striking. This violates a person’s right to be free of externally imposed pain.

(3) Incarceration, i.e., corporal detention or restraint. This violates a person’s right to freedom of movement and the free use of one’s limbs.

With regard to wounding: It is so clear that surgical interventions, which are intended to restore health to the human body by removing or otherwise altering members or organs of the body that are diseased, are perfectly licit and good, that we never think of them in terms of wounding or mutilating the human body. Thus it seems that most folks have an innate understanding that the parts exists for the good of the entirety, the members and organs exist for the good of the entire body, and the individual members of a community or society exist for the common good (as we have pointed out in previous conferences).

We don’t often think that some kind of mutilation can also be licit (morally permissible) when the public authority makes use of it to punish malefactors, provided circumstances require it for the common good. Since capital punishment is allowable under certain conditions, it stands to reason that to inflict a harm that is less severe than death upon a malefactor, who is a danger to the common good, is also within the competence of the public authority charged with protecting it.

If we wanted to expressly set out the reasoning which supports both the rights of every human individual to be free of wounding or mutilation, and at the same time indicates how far we can go in “punishing” our bodies we would have to say something akin to what our author states:

“The body is the instrument of the soul, and therefore should be fully capable of serving the operations of the soul. For this, the body must be in a state of good health. Thus we humans are obliged to use ordinary means to preserve the health of our bodies and its members. That is why it is a sin to over-indulge in food or drink, or to tax immoderately one’s strength by excessive physical labors, vigils (going without sleep), or any other austerities that would injure one’s health or notably shorten one’s life.

However, moderate austerities are permissible for the sake of conquering inordinate inclinations of the sense appetites, or rendering the body and its faculties subject to the faculties of the soul.

With regard to striking or beating: If it is done in moderation, that is, without wounding or mutilating, and is inflicted for the sake of a merited correction or punishment, i.e., as a disciplinary measure,

(a) It is permissible for one to do so upon one’s own body, and also upon another, with the other’s permission.

(b) For those who are “unwilling” to submit to this kind of physical punishment, only the public authority may inflict it, in virtue of its coercive powers over the citizenry.

(c) Certain “private” authorities may also discipline and correct by means of corporal punishment in virtue of certain relationships to their “subjects”, e.g., a father with regard to his children, a teacher with regard to his students (we are speaking in terms of the Natural Law), or anyone who enjoys a “paternal or maternal” authority and responsibility over others.

With regard to incarceration:

Only the public authority is invested with the power licitly to impose it, and then only when it is necessary to do justice, either as a punishment or as a deterrent. Since, in general, anyone who abuses a power entrusted to him may justly be deprived of it, so also one who abuses his right of freedom of movement and of the free exercise of his limbs may justly be incarcerated. But that applies to adults. Parents or anyone functioning in the role of a parent may justly “ground” a minor for a limited time for disciplinary reasons.

Question 6 – Restitution for Homicide and for Wounding

In our society, litigation for the purpose of obtaining compensation for injuries suffered at the hands of another, whether the cause be deliberate or accidental, or even due to mere negligence, is quite commonplace. The reason litigation is necessary in the second two instances (accident or negligence) is that an obligation in justice to make restitution only arises when the harm is inflicted unjustly, that is, one’s rights to bodily health and integrity is deliberately and intentionally violated. And even in the latter instance, the public authority intervenes only to punish the malefactor for the harm done to the common good by the crime against another person; and if the injured person seeks to be indemnified for the damages resulting from the crime, he too is obliged to file a complaint therefore in the civil courts. In what follows, we are concerned only with the obligations to indemnify that which arises for unjustly taking the life or wounding of another.

Principle I – Whoever unjustly inflicts corporal harm or injury upon another probably is not obliged to make restitution for what cannot be equivalently restored.

The reason behind this is that no one can be obliged to do the impossible. Nevertheless, a judge [or a jury] may impose monetary compensation, and the restitution is to be made to the person harmed, not to his legal heirs or dependents, unless, again, a judge or jury determines otherwise.

But even if there is no compensation to be made, the guilty party, as a matter of charity, may freely do so indirectly that is, by giving alms or having masses said for the injured party. Indeed, his confessor would laudably “counsel” him to do so.

Principle II – Whoever Unjustly inflicts foreseen spiritual harm upon another is obliged to indemnify the injured party to the extent possible.

This may be done by offering prayers, masses or other spiritual good works. The confessor should certainly counsel this, and may even impose it as a penance.

Principle III – Whoever unjustly inflicts upon another real harm that, at least vaguely, is foreseen to result from the unjust deed, is obliged to indemnify for it in full.

As we saw in an earlier conference, the obligation arises when a particular damaging deed is unjust, culpable, and the efficacious cause of the harm.

These kinds of “real” damages would include medical expenses and loss of income directly resulting from the injury sustained. These would be paid either to the person harmed or to his legal heirs or dependants. There is no obligation to make restitution to “creditors”, or to the insurance companies who indemnify the creditors in the event of the death of the person injured.

Question 7 – The responsibilities of Medical Doctors and Surgeons

The reason why a “question” such as this appears in a Moral Theology textbook is so that priests hearing confessions would be able to be of real help to Catholic medical doctors who sincerely desire to exercise their profession in a manner that pleases and gives glory to God. i.e., with justice and charity. The confessor should be able to help them discern what is morally permissible and what is not in their medical practices and procedures, as well as to help them to discern the appropriate manner to make restitution if perchance they are guilty of transgressing the moral limits and have thereby harmed a patient.

Because medical doctors and surgeons have embraced their profession for the express purpose of preserving and restoring bodily life and health,

(a) They are bound in justice, in virtue of explicit or implicit contractual relationships with their patients, to cure sick or wounded bodies.

(b) While fulfilling their duties, they may, on occasion, be obliged to see to the spiritual and temporal welfare of their patients in virtue of charity.

Here are some principles that a doctor or surgeon should keep in mind.

1. As a matter of justice he is obliged to have the knowledge and skill successfully to treat ALL the maladies that are brought to him to be cured. Otherwise he exposes himself to the danger of doing irreparable harm, except, of course, in cases of urgent necessity.

Thus he is obliged to keep abreast of recent developments and expanding knowledge in the field of medicine

In more difficult cases, in which he has doubts about how best to proceed, he must bring in a doctor who is expert in the particular field, with the consent of the patient and his family, or at least refer him to known experts.

2. He is to proceed with diligence and care proportionate with the gravity of the illness of the patient. When an explicit or implicit contractual relationship exists between him and the patient, he is obliged to do so in justice.

In the event that such a relationship does not exist, and the case happens to come to his attention, and in addition, there is no other doctor available, then he would be bound in charity to treat the person, and the gravity of the duty in charity would be determined by the gravity of the illness. Then, once he does begin to treat the malady, he becomes obliged in justice to the same degree of care and diligence spoken of in the previous paragraph.

Included in the notion of proportionate care and diligence is the obligation to continue to treat the patient even though the illness turns out to be contagious, unless he can get another to take over the case.

For any further harm that befalls the patient as a result of lack of due care and diligence, the doctor is obliged in justice to make restitution.

3. The doctor is even obliged in justice to use the safest and most certain means to obtain a cure, if such means is known to exist. In the event of a new illness in which no certain cure exists, he may use those means that have the “likelihood” of obtaining the desired cure, and first among them, the least dangerous. But he is absolutely forbidden to use illicit (sinful) means, even though he knows that they will work.

4. Catholic doctors are obliged by Natural Law as well as by Charity, either personally or by another, to advise a person in grave danger of imminent death of that fact, so that he might be able to do what needs to be done for the good of his soul and to put his affairs in order.

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