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Conferences on the Virtues

By Fr. Bruno Cocuzzi, ocd

 

Number 47

 

Concerning Theft

 

 

Question 2 – Concerning Theft…

 

By the word Theft we generally mean unjustly taking something from its rightful possessor, against his reasonable will, for personal gain.

 

The taking can be by using and consuming, by willfully “keeping” (i.e., not restoring), or by physically removing from the custody of the possessor.

 

Within the meaning of willful, “keeping” is also included to default in paying a bill, to "cheat” others out of what is rightfully theirs, and for a “finder” to fail to return to its rightful owner his lost property.

 

By rightful possessor is meant not only the outright owner, but also someone who is in lawful possession of what belongs to another.

 

For personal gain means intending to use the goods in question to reap the benefits or profits they normally provide or yield.  This is to distinguish theft from the mere “unlawful acceptance or possession” which we spoke of in a previous conference in reference to Restitution.

 

Against the reasonable will of the rightful possessor.  The word reasonable excludes those situations wherein the owner or possessor should not be opposed to the taking, but should rather surrender the goods or thing in question because obliged in charity or equity or even strict justice.

 

What we have been speaking of thus far can apply to two distinct kinds of injustice.  When the deed we have described is done in secret, that is, when the possessor is absent or without his awareness of the taking, it is called “simple theft” or stealing.

 

When the taking is accomplished using violence or by threatening to inflict bodily harm upon the rightful possessor to force him to relinquish possession, then we call it robbery.

 

In addition to the “qualifying elements” of violence or threat to inflict bodily harm, my textbook mentions other elements or “circumstances” which notably aggravate both theft and robbery.

 

If the theft or robbery is of a sacred object, then we have the element of sacrilege added to the underlying sin of injustice.

 

Taking what belongs to the public by theft or robbery is another such aggravating element, though I am aware of no word in English to correspond to the Latin term assigned to this:  furtum (theft) peculatum.  But one example of a crime in this category, according to my author, would be to counterfeit money.

 

He gives also two other examples of sins of aggravated theft:  plagiarism and cattle rustling.

 

Now that we know what the deed is, here are the Moral Principles governing the injustice we call Theft:

 

Of its very nature (that is, considered in the abstract), theft is a serious sin.  As my author explains it:

 

1.       In itself it is directly contrary to Natural Law and Commutative Justice.  It is found listed among the grave precepts of the Decalogue (Exodus 20:15; Matt. 19:18). 

 

The right of ownership of private property is derived from the Natural Law and is legitimate because it is necessary for the good of the individual and of society.  It is this (fundamental) right which theft violates.

 

2.       Indirectly and secondarily, theft is opposed to:

 

(a)    Charity, because it takes away something “good” from a person and inflicts “sorrow”.  Theft also engenders quarrels, strife and hatred, all of which are the enemy of peace between individual human beings.

 

(b)    The Common Good and Legal Justice, because it tends gravely to upset the public order and tranquility, which are most necessary to the maintenance of the Common Good.  Without tranquility and order, says St. Thomas, human society perishes.  Hence the Apostle:  Neither thieves…nor robbers shall possess this Kingdom of God”.  (1 Cor. 6:10).

 

Of course, theft is not always a grave injustice, because it admits of levity (or paucity) of matter, and because of other mitigating circumstances.

 

Theft is a grave sin when the quantity or the value of the “good” taken is such as generally to inflict grave harm or damage.  (That is, so gravely violative of the possessor’s reasonable will that it engenders in him grievous pain and indignation).  And for this same reason theft is, in itself, gravely violative of the “will” of society, whose “peace” is grievously disturbed thereby.

 

Reputable moral theologians differ as to what that quantity or value is, which of its very nature, suffices to make theft a serious sin of injustice. 

 

Some say that, regardless of whether the victim is poor or rich, the equivalent of a day’s wages, or of what it takes to support him for a single day, constitutes that grave amount.

 

Others say, with St. Alphonsus, that NOT ONLY the value of the goods must be considered, BUT ALSO the condition and the circumstances of the person from whom they were taken.

 

Hence, those who take the latter view would say that it is impossible to arrive at an objective threshold value or quantity that makes theft a serious sin of injustice, but rather, that the threshold value would differ from situation to situation.

 

Of course, there are quantities or values that, in everybody’s estimation would constitute an “immense” amount, the theft of which would, indeed, constitute a mortal sin of injustice.  Hence:

 

Theft of goods of little value is per se (in itself) a slight sin of injustice.  Per accidens (in view of the damage it inflicts), however it may constitute a grave injustice.

 

Vice versa, a theft that in itself is generally considered a grave injustice, may, in view of circumstances (disposition of the person from whom it is taken, the relationship between the victim and the thief, etc.), constitute a slight sin of injustice.

 

As to relationships, my author mentions theft from a spouse, theft by a minor child from his parents, and theft by workers or servants from their employers.

 

Many thefts of small amounts, or of objects of slight value, could easily coalesce (morally or physically unite) to inflict great harm, and so constitute one single grave violation of justice.

 

Could easily coalesce:  Even though the person stealing does not have the intention of accumulating the things stolen, and even though they are of a nature that they are used up, nevertheless, if the thefts are committed often enough, and without a notable interval of time between them, the value of the goods stolen could easily and quickly add up to a considerable sum.  Once that objectively grave amount is reached, why, every next successive slight theft automatically becomes another grave sin of injustice.

 

What would prevent a series of small thefts from so coalescing?

 

As one can infer from the expression notable interval above, if the time elapsed between the individual small thefts is great enough, the coalescence ceases.

 

Similarly, if one repents and confesses and has obtained forgiveness, the process terminates, even though the penitent may again soon fall into the same slight sins of theft.

 

What we have said above clearly is true when the things of little value are stolen from the same victim.

 

But what if the small thefts are from many, many victims and being small, none of the thefts would gravely injure any of the individual victims?  Can we say that, in this case, even though the value of the accumulated goods is quite large, coalescence to constitute a grave sin on the part of the thief does not occur?

 

The answer to that is NO, because it is a “grave disorder” for one greatly to enrich himself through sinful conduct.  The authority for this answer is a proposition condemned by Pope Innocent XI:

 

One is not obliged under pain of mortal sin to make restitution for what he has stolen by a series of small thefts, even though the total sum [or value] of the goods stolen is very large.

 

Question 3 – Reasons Permitting the Taking of Another’s Private Property…

 

An essential element in the definition (or description) of theft above is that it be an unjust taking.  As already suggested above, there are times when the owner of goods cannot, in conscience, be opposed to someone taking his property because of considerations of Charity, Equity or even Justice.

 

Those reasons, which reputable moral theologians agree upon, are: Urgent necessity and Occult Compensation.

 

Article I  - Urgent Necessity

 

My author here cites three paragraphs from his Treatise on Charity to define (describe) for us the three degrees of “necessity”:

 

1.       Common necessity is that which the poor experience.  Though they are able to provide for themselves the most basic necessities of life, their lives are burdensome and “rough” (painful to human sensibilities).  They lack what is needed to give themselves and their families a modicum of dignity and status in the community, as well as a modicum of ordinary comforts and conveniences.

 

2.       Grave Necessity is present in two kinds of situations:

 

(a)    When a person is in imminent danger of losing those external goods that had enabled him to obtain for himself and his family a measure of dignity and status, and the means to lead an ordinary, “comfortable” life.

 

Those external goods would include not only material resources (money and employment or a profession) but also a good reputation.

 

(b)    When a person finds himself in “danger” of losing his life, which though NOT imminent, is real and probable.

 

Equated to “life” are those faculties, or the use thereof, without which the life of a person would not be worthy of the name “human”:  health, use of reason, freedom, bodily integrity, full use of one’s members, the five senses, etc.

 

3.       Extreme Necessity is that in which the most basic necessities of life are either lacking or there is certain and imminent danger of losing them forever.  Again equated to “life” are the faculties listed under (2) above.

 

Obviously there are degrees (or nuances) shading gradually from one to the other of the three degrees of necessities, and they are of such a nature to require a “judgment call” (as they say in sports).

 

Thus we see that a great deal of subjectivity enters into the use and application of the following Principles concerning these degrees of necessity and the “taking” of what belongs to another.

 

1.       Whoever finds himself in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity may, and indeed should, take for himself (and for his family) from the goods of another, even against the will of the owner, only as much as is needed minimally to satisfy his (and his family’s) need, PROVIDED that the owner is not also suffering the same kind of need.

 

The foregoing principle flows from the fact that God our Creator intended PIMARILY (and thus it is natural law) that all the temporal goods He placed here on earth be used to support and sustain the lives of His human creatures.

           

SECONARILY, He has ordained that certain of these temporal goods be divided up and be held by individuals as their private possessions, so that in a better, more efficient and more peaceable way those goods may subserve, support and sustain the lives of His human children.

 

HOWEVER, the fulfillment of His secondary intention (by the exercise of the right to own private property) must never be allowed to derogate from or preclude fulfillment of God’s primary intention.

 

Thus in those situations where the owners and administrators of the temporal goods of this world are not diverting enough of them to the work of alleviating urgent human necessity, the sufferers thereof are entitled to “appropriate” what they need, so that the primary intention of God may not be frustrated.  In other words:

 

(a)   The RIGHTS of life, bodily integrity, use of reason and freedom are STRONGER than the RIGHT to private possessions, and must prevail, whenever (which is very rare) they come into conflict.

 

(b)   In times of widespread urgent necessity, therefore, the RIGHT TO TAKE AND USE temporal goods necessary to sustain human life (and only those) is HELD IN COMMON.  (Note:  the RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP of those life-sustaining goods is not held in common in this situation).

 

(c)   Thus, an owner of private property may not prevent those suffering urgent necessity from helping themselves from out of his possessions to what they REALLY NEED.  If he tries to use force to prevent them, he becomes the unjust aggressor.

 

(d)   Of course, when the owner of some of those life sustaining goods is himself suffering the same urgent necessity, then one MAY NOT appropriate from among the goods in his possession.  (Remember, ownership includes the RIGHTS (i) to exercise dominion over goods, (ii) to keep them in one’s possession and control and (iii) to use them).

 

In cases of simply GRAVE, as well as in cases of COMMON, necessity, it is always illicit and unjust to take the property of another for the purposes of obtaining relief.

 

This principle is corroborated by the same Pope Innocent XI, who condemned this other proposition:

 

“It is permissible to steal (really, appropriate the goods of another) not only in extreme necessity but also in grave necessity.”

 

However, even though taking from another against his reasonable will is not justified by grave necessity, grave necessity does diminish the gravity of the injustice.

 

Worthy of note are some observations made by the author of my textbook:

 

(a)    A Poor person, who is able to overcome his want by begging, is bound to do so, because such a one can never consider himself to be in extreme or grave necessity if he can obtain relief through begging.

 

(b)    The indigent who experience grave necessity are to be helped, in all charity by those who have a surplus of means.

 

Indeed, the obligation to help can also be grounded upon the notion of legal justice, which is the virtue that safeguards the common good.

 

Surely Departments of Public Welfare were created precisely because the Common Good requires that all citizens receive the means to live a minimally decent life.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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