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Conferences on the Virtues
By Fr. Bruno Cocuzzi, ocd
Number 48
Occult Compensation
So much of this
treatise on Justice has had to do with Injustice, or Sins against
Justice. We are supposed to be treating
of the Virtue of Justice, that is, just deeds. Why spend so much time on Sin?
I think St.
Teresa provides the justification, since, on more than one occasion in her
writings, when speaking about certain virtues, she interrupted her discourse to
explain why it was that she could talk about them with sure confidence. She stated that it was because she saw in
herself the very opposite of the virtues she had been speaking about,
that she knew what constituted that virtue. So in the same way, by getting to know quite specifically what is
not Justice, we can acquire quite accurate knowledge of what kind
of conduct is just and does Justice.
Having barely
managed to include in last month’s conference the material under Article I of Question
3 of the current Part, Section and Chapter in the Treatise on Justice, we go on
to:
Article
II – Occult Compensation…
The word compensation
as used in this article is not to be understood in its proper, or legal
sense, by means of which an acknowledged and agreed upon debt is paid and
extinguished, but in an improper or extra-legal sense, by means
of which a creditor withholds or takes from the goods of the debtor something
that is “owed” him. It is something the
“creditor” has recourse to, secretly, when the “debtor” will not
acknowledge and satisfy the debt.
Concerning this, there are the following Principles:
Principle
I – Generally
speaking, Occult Compensation is unlawful (illicit), and
therefore a sin.
This principle
is based on the fact that, given our fallen human nature, we very easily tend
to magnify and exaggerate our own personal rights, and to diminish and
extenuate the rights of others.
Therefore, if it were always permissible to vindicate one’s rights (in
regard to the payment of debts) on one’s own authority, without having recourse
to the judicial system, the doors would be thrown wide open to thievery and
other disorders in human society. Thus
generally speaking, one is obliged to have recourse to a court of law in order
to obtain satisfaction from a recalcitrant debtor.
Principle
II – By way of exception, Occult Compensation is permissible
in some circumstances and subject to certain conditions.
One such
circumstance would occur when it is “morally impossible” to have recourse to a
judge. Clearly, this would happen so
infrequently that it could not bring about the public disorder mentioned
above. The expression “when morally
impossible” also translates into “when there is no lawful alternative available”.
These
are certain conditions that on those rare occasions justify the
use of Occult Compensation.
1.
That the “debt” to be satisfied be one that is owed
in strict justice. It cannot be a
debt that has its origin in charity, gratitude, religion, fidelity to a
promise, or some other “moral obligation”, such as friendship, blood
relationship, and (non-extreme) poverty.
2. The
creditor must be ”morally certain” that the debt exists. When we say “morally certain” we mean the
kind of certainty that is required to convince a “just and prudent”
person of the existence of the debt.
That is, the certainty must be based upon evidence and reasoning that suffice
to remove doubt from such a person.
3. The
value of the “compensation” must strictly “equal” the amount of the debt. Or, in the case of material things, the “goods”
taken are to be of the same nature, kind and quantity.
4. There
must be no other lawful way of satisfying the debt that does not entail grave
inconvenience.
Grave
inconvenience is present when other lawful means:
(a) Would
require a disproportionately great expense;
(b) Would
result in interpersonal quarrels;
(c) Would
destroy friendships; or,
(d) Are
clearly foreseen to be useless.
Among
(d) is included the situation wherein a debt has not ripened, but it is
foreseen that, when it does, there is moral certainty that the debt will not be
paid.
5. Care
must be taken that spiritual or temporal harm does not befall either the debtor
or some innocent third person as a result of the Occult Compensation.
Examples
of the possible harm would be:
Temporal
(or material): Suddenly the debtor awakens to his obligation and pays the debt,
resulting in his having paid twice.
Spiritual: the debtor may be guilty of bad faith
in not acknowledging the debt, and if he were unaware that it has been
extinguished through occult compensation, he would continue in that bad
faith.
Harm
to a third party:
As a result of the occult compensation, suspicion may be thrown upon a
servant or employee of the debtor; or, upon someone to whom the goods in
question had been entrusted or consigned.
Of
the five conditions enumerated above, the first three arise out of commutative
justice, the fourth out of legal justice, and the fifth arises, most
often, out of charity.
Chapter IV – Concerning
Injuries (Injustices) to the Goods of Good Name and Honor that are inflicted
verbally.
Question
1 – Rash Judgment and Suspicion…
My
author says that in general rash judgment occurs when someone makes a
statement concerning the secret affairs of a particular person, or concerning a
vaguely known subject, based on reasons that are dubious and conjectural. As it applies to the virtue of Justice, it is
attributing evil to another (judging another to be guilty of something
sinful) on the basis of insufficient evidence.
He
goes on to say that one may rise to the making of a rash judgment through
various “steps” or degrees of suspicion:
First,
when one entertains a doubt about the honesty or moral integrity of
another, that is, when for inadequate reasons, one “suspends” making the
internal judgment that this is a good person.
As
used here, the doubt is not a true one, that is, the mere absence of
drawing a conclusion, realizing that there is insufficient evidence to support
a conclusion one way or the other.
Rather, as used here, doubt means something positive, the actual wanting
to be uncertain about the good character of another. It is an “uncertainty” that is deliberately
fostered.
Second,
when one harbors a suspicion, namely, when for slight reasons and with a
large possibility of being in error, one is strongly inclined to judge
that another has done something evil.
Third,
when one forms the opinion that another has committed an evil deed, that
is, even though one knows that the insufficient evidence does not honestly
support the making of a judgment of wrongdoing.
Fourth,
the rash judgment finally occurs when, still without sufficient
evidence, one transforms the “opinion” into a firm and certain conviction,
that the person in question is guilty of sin.
The
author asks the question: How can
one possibly arrive at certainty in judging based on “insufficient” evidence?
He
responds by saying that this certitude is not that based upon
objectively sufficient evidence, that is, one that is a product of the intellect
alone. Rather, it is a certainty
that is commanded by the will.
It is an act of the will, or the desire, to attribute evil to
another, that causes the objectively insufficient grounds to become subjectively
sufficient.
He
goes on to say that the influence of the will can be even greater than that
just mentioned. It is possible for the
will even to command that the “intellect” refuse (i) to consider
other evidence that would require the retraction of the rash judgment, or (ii) to
acknowledge the weight or persuasive power of that other evidence.
Clearly,
then, rash judgment not only is a violation of “commutative justice”, it is
also a sin of “imprudence”.
St.
Thomas Aquinas has speculated upon the phenomenon of rash judgment seeking to
discover what it is about a person that might cause him to tend to fall into
this sin. He comes up with the
following “possibilities”:
(a) It
could be that such a person knows himself to be evil, and
therefore finds it easy to attribute an evil conscience to others as well. As the old saying goes: We judge others by ourselves!
(b) It
could be, too, that one harbors animosity (bad will) toward someone who has
angered him or whom he envies, and therefore is “eager” to cling to anything
that might justify his attributing evil to that person.
(c) It
could be the result of long experience that led Aristotle to assert: “the
elderly are the ones who most tend to be suspicious [of the goodness] of
others, since, over many years, they have had many, many personal experiences
of the faults of others”.
St.
Thomas continues: The first two
possibilities pertain to perversity in one’s affections. The third diminishes the degree of rashness
(temerity) because experience really does help one to judge aright.
What then, can
we say about the sinfulness of Rash Judgment?
According to my
textbook, strictly speaking, it is a sin against Justice, and, considered in
the abstract, is a serious sin.
1. Strictly
speaking. The
judgment must be firm and “certain” (4th step in the series listed
above). Anything less would not be
seriously sinful.
2. Rash. The judgment must be knowingly and deliberately
formed and adhered to, that is, with awareness of the objective insufficiency
of the evidence.
3. A
sin against [commutative] Justice. It does unwarranted harm to one’s neighbor. Even internal acts of intellect and will can
do harm to one’s peers, since they normally lead to external manifestation in speech
and conduct.
4. Considered
in the abstract, a serious sin. One of the most precious goods a
human being can possess is a good name, and the honor and respect that go with
it.
Everyone
has a strict right to a good name, that is, to be thought well of by others,
unless and until he has been “proved” to be unworthy of respect and
esteem. (Of course, as Christians, we
are obliged to treat every human being with honor, esteem and
manifest good will because of the dignity of each one as made in the “natural”
image and likeness of God, and because Jesus has shed His Blood for all human
beings without exception. Of course,
this “obligation” proceeds from Charity, not from considerations of commutative
Justice).
Also,
mutual respect and esteem among peers is absolutely essential for that tranquil
order in human relationships without which we could not live in peace and enjoy
the “climate” within which we are able to tend toward perfection as human
beings and as children of God.
Thus,
as we saw earlier, “gravity” is equated with “value”, and that is why,
considered in itself, rash judgment is something grievous. However since it may be committed with
slight or imperfect deliberation and awareness, or when the degree of “rashness”
is slight, it is very often only a venial sin.
To sum up, rash
judgment is a serious sin only when the following three conditions are
verified:
(a) Perfect
deliberation: there must be full
awareness of both the gravity of the matter and the objective insufficiency
of the evidence upon which the judgment is based.
(b) The
degree of rashness must be grave:
there must be a notable insufficiency of the evidence to support
the judgment. Also, the harm done to
the victim’s name must also be notably great.
(c) The
gravity of harm to the victim’s good name depends upon the status of the
“victim”. To judge rashly that a “shady
character” is guilty of perjury is not nearly as grievous as it would be rashly
to conclude that a “Bishop” is guilty of perjury.
What then, is
required in order to prevent a judgment from being rash?
Why, those
things that go to make up a just judgment! According to St. Thomas, they are:
(1) Authority
in the one who judges;
(2) The
proper exercise of prudence (reaching a logical and fair conclusion
based upon an accurate and complete understanding of the situation); and
(3) Uprightness
in the one making the judgment. All
three of these are lacking in the one guilty of a rash judgment:
Authority
would be lacking because a private individual is not entrusted with the office
of judge, and because the judgment is carried out (i) without the necessity of
making a judgment, and (ii) improperly (without “due process”).
Accurate
and complete knowledge of the facts would be lacking because, by hypothesis,
the judgment is reached without a proper knowledge or consideration of all the
relevant evidence (i.e., based on insufficient evidence).
Uprightness
(moral integrity) would be lacking because the judgment is subjective,
and very often “inspired” by prejudice, envy, hostility (if not hatred), or
even perversity (personal malice).
No
wonder Holy Scripture warns so frequently against judging one’s neighbor, implying
that all such judging is unfounded and rash (Matt. 7:1,2; Luke 6:37; Romans
2:1; James 4:11).
Some
practical advice:
We ought never forget that the human intellect is so constituted [by
God] that it spontaneously and automatically processes data that is
presented to it and comes up with a conclusion or judgment. We simply cannot prevent it from doing
so. Thus, the mere fact that
judgments arise in our minds does not mean that we have made a rash
judgment. For such a judgment to
become rash would require the intervention of the will, that is, one
would have to accept the judgment and assent to it (as stated above). Therefore, the best thing to do at all times
is to reject those judgments, reminding ourselves that ONLY GOD knows the whole
story, and besides we are not so good and holy that we can presume to sit in
judgment on others.
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