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Conferences on the Virtues

By Fr. Bruno Cocuzzi, ocd

Number 49

Detraction

Continuing with Chapter IV of Sec. B of Part III of the treatise on the Cardinal virtue of Justice, we come to the

Second Question – Detraction…

The complete thought is “detraction from the good name of another”. In other words, defamation of character. It is the unjust and secret “blackening” of the name of another by word of mouth.

Unjust: that is, when the one speaking is not obliged “in justice” to reveal certain truths about the person in question. Were that the case, the blackening of that person’s name would then be merely an unintended by-product of the true facts “justly” revealed.

Secret: that is, spoken in the absence of the person in question.

Blackening: that is, just as the knowledge of a person’s good qualities, when made known to others, gives “luster” to his name, causing him to be considered “illustrious”, so also, the knowledge in others of one’s defects or bad qualities casts a “shadow” upon, or blackens, his name.

The Name: that is, to distinguish detraction from contempt, which deprives one of due honor and respect, and from theft, which deprives one of his material goods.

Of Another: that is, no one is forbidden to tell the truth about himself, even though it may serve to bring about the “blackening” of his reputation.

It is probably only with the last element of the definition that we might find a bit of difficulty, namely, that it is never “unjust” for a person to tell the “awful” truth about himself.

My own personal opinion is that there may be times that “telling the awful truth” about oneself may cause scandal to the young and to the weak, and thus would be an occasion of sin for them.

Also, telling the “awful truth” about ourselves very often reflects upon our families and relatives, with the result that their “names” are “blackened” in virtue of their being identified with us.

In the first case, however, it is charity and not justice that is offended, whereas in the second instance, it does seem that justice is violated, since everyone, including our relatives, is “entitled” to a good name.

There is simple detraction, when the bad quality or vice of the victim is true, but unjustly (without a justifying reason) revealed; and there is calumny, when the vice or bad quality is falsely attributed to the victim. Thus, calumny adds the sin of lying to the sin of detraction.

There are also several ways in which the sin of detraction and calumny may be committed. It is done directly when the sinful defect is clearly and openly stated. It is committed indirectly when one does not state it openly, but does so by “insinuation”, “by denying” that the person possesses the opposite virtue or good quality, and “by diminishing” the degree, the intensity, or the “firmly rootedness” (so to speak) of the good quality in question.

St. Thomas Aquinas enumerates four direct ways to commit this sin, and four indirect.

Direct: (1) To falsely impute a sin to another, (2) To exaggerate the sin of another, (3) To reveal heretofore-unknown sins of another, and (4) To allege that a person’s good deeds are performed for evil purposes.

Indirect: (1) To deny that a person possesses a good quality, (2) To maliciously withhold knowledge of a person’s good qualities, (3) Diminishing the good qualities, and (4) Reluctantly acknowledging them.

And he goes further by giving explicit examples of how the indirect detraction can be achieved, which he states is often more harmful and malicious than direct calumny and detraction, e.g.:

“I’m not telling all that I know…”

“Some things are better left unsaid…”

“Yes, those things were well done. Would that that were true of everything he does…”

“It is better to forget about the past. It is a closed book…”

“Yes, he is pious, but…”

“I could say things that would make him blush…”

Finally, the detraction could be formal or material. It is formal when one deliberately says things to harm the reputation of another. It is material when, though not explicitly intended, one foresees that what he says will do harm to another’s reputation, but says them anyway: whether out of levity, loquacity, or lack of reflection on the part of the speaker.

My author alleges that simple detraction and calumny are both sins against justice that by their very nature are serious, although, of course, the degree of harm done could run from very slight to very grave. Though less serious in essence than murder and adultery, they are more serious than theft. This is clearly true when they are formal sins, but it is true also when they are material, and committed with full and sufficient awareness.

They violate commutative justice because they amount to taking from one’s neighbor a good of great value. The good in question, a good name or reputation is much more valuable than riches. [Here we have in mind the ordinary, good Christian. Certainly there are greedy, avaricious people who prefer money to a good name. Nevertheless, being spiritual in nature, a good name is objectively more valuable than a material entity].

Because we are “social” beings, we need to rely on one another in so many ways and for so many things in order to lead decent, ordered, fruitful and happy lives. But this would be impossible if all citizens (or at least the far greater majority) did not enjoy a good name and reputation. Surely this “proves” that a good name is more valuable than material goods.

Someone might object that it is O.K. to divulge the secret, serious sins of others, because that is what makes a person “disreputable” and thus “unreliable”. And must we not ALL be on guard when dealing with such individuals?

The problem with that is that, though we are all sinners, the vast majority of folks we deal with ARE decent people trying to lead good lives. They deplore their sinfulness and try to overcome it. Besides, most of us fall into sin not out of deliberate malice, but because of the woundedness of our human nature. Generally speaking, then, we must deem EVERYONE “reliable” and worthy of our trust.

The truth is, it pertains first to God to judge concerning sins and the punishments they deserve, and next to those who are lawfully constituted judges in civil society. Thus, to judge another to be so wicked as to have lost his right to a good name, and to punish him by causing others to be distrustful of him, is the same as having usurped the rights of God the Just Judge, and the rights of duly and lawfully constituted judges in society.

These same sins also violate legal justice. Practical considerations show that if it were permissible to tell the secret sins of others, this would bring about great harm to the common good. Disagreements, physical quarrels, envy and hatred would become commonplace, and the common good would be non-existent.

St. Thomas says that these sins also violate Charity, since the “goodness” of others, (i.e., their having a good name) is the basis of every friendship.

Friendship (benevolence) is considered the purest form of love, and our need to be loved for our own sake and not for the gratification we can give to others is perhaps the greatest need we have. Yes, that need is satisfied because God loves with an infinitely pure love, but God has constituted us in such a way that we need to experience that same kind of love from others (as well as to give it). Besides, it is Faith, which is based on hearing, that assures us of God’s infinite love for us. In His wisdom, God wants us to have at least some tangible evidence of His Love for us, and he chooses other human beings, our friends, to mediate that Love to us.

Thus Sacred Scripture enumerates detractors and those who speak evil of others as among those who are hateful to God and to men, and who are excluded from the Kingdom of Heaven (Romans 1:29,30; I Corinthians 6:10). My author asserts that the Fathers of the Church have called detraction and calumny abominations and the work of the devil.

And he reminds us that St. Bernard of Clairvaux, a Latin Father and Doctor of the Church, has said that the detractor [and calumniator] fatally wounds three persons with one breath: himself, his listener, and the object of the detraction [and calumny].

Although he seems to have given us quite enough already concerning these serious sins of injustice, the author of my textbook makes some observations for the purpose of helping us better to understand:

(1) The right to a good name

(2) The evil of detraction and calumny

(3) What are the reasons that “excuse” those who reveal the hidden sins and defects of others.

A. Everyone has the right to be thought well of by others, that is, the right to an ordinary Good Name.

What this means is that everyone may rightfully expect to be treated humanely by others in interpersonal exchanges, to wit, as one who possess the virtues and good qualities of decent, upright human beings. Until one has done something evil in public, he has the right to be considered an “ordinary” good person.

This right embraces not only a true good name, which is founded upon actual existing good qualities, but also a false one, which is founded upon good qualities that are ordinarily “presumed” to exist in each person, but which, unknown to others, do not exist in a particular individual.

One might possess this right directly and of himself in virtue of good deeds accomplished and witnessed by those with whom he has daily personal relationships. When the evidence of good qualities is perceived in this way, the right becomes absolute and universal in the sense that EVERY OTHER person is obliged to hold such a one in ordinary good esteem.

The right to a false good name clearly IS NOT something direct and of oneself, is indirect, in so far as one’s want of good qualities IS NOT PUBLICLY KNOWN, but upon the fact that one “apparently” is an ordinary good person, and upon the fact that the common good would be seriously harmed if everyone were obliged to “demonstrate” good qualities in order to be treated humanely and with ordinary esteem.

We may say, then that the right to a good name is really grounded upon a public as well as a private necessity.

Public: Otherwise, (that is, if one’s lack of good qualities were publicly known), such a person would not be able to function well in society; he would lose all credibility and respect and he would be lacking normal, friendly relations with others. In addition, those close to him would share in the shame of a bad reputation.

Private: Because whoever has a bad reputation is deprived of one of the best and most effective means of avoiding evil. Often the very fear of losing one’s reputation is sufficient to keep one from straying from the path of goodness. Again, while one’s secret sins remain unknown, a person finds it easier to repent and return to a good life.

As St. Thomas states: “it is a serious evil to take from another his good name, because among all the good things that can be enjoyed in this earthly life, it is most precious. The want of a good name also discourages one from trying to do good. For which reason we read in Sirach, 41:12: ‘Have a care for your [good] name, for it will stand by you better than precious treasures…’ And so, in and of itself, detraction [and calumny] is a mortal sin.”

Therefore, the right to a “false” good name IS NOT absolute and universal, but is rather conditional for the sake of the public and private good, and limited thereby. It ceases to exist whenever some very notable good of the revealer, of the delinquent himself, of some innocent third party, or of society itself requires that the secret sins be made public.

In other words, it is a sin to deprive another of his false good name unless failure to do so results in harm to society or to an innocent third party that outweighs the value of a good reputation.

B. No one has the right to an extraordinary good name (reputation), which is founded upon singular (out of the ordinary) gifts and talents, for example, as an outstanding theologian, homilist, medical doctor, etc.

To enjoy a reputation of this sort, one must REALLY AND TRULY possess the extraordinary qualities. Therefore it is not a sin against justice to reveal that the “above and beyond the ordinary” is lacking in specific instances. Neither would it be a violation of charity, provided there is a proportionately grave reason to do so.

C. What has just been said about private persons is also true for moral persons and for pretty much the same reasons.

Furthermore, it is especially true of the deceased. The reason being that the immortal soul continues to live on after separation from the body, and so continues as a subject of those rights that are not founded upon the needs of bodily life. Because a good name is one such good and valuable entity, everyone may rightly desire [and may rightfully do those things to insure] that his good name will be retained after his death.

But with regard to the deceased, a good name is of less value to them than to the living, and one may suppose that the deceased are less unwilling to see their good reputation harmed. Therefore, to calumniate a deceased person is not as serious a sin as to calumniate someone who is still alive.

In regard to simple detraction (merely making known true sins and faults), the right to a good name (for the deceased) must yield to the common right to know the historical truth. But again, with the proviso that the reputation of living persons and existing institutions ARE NOT notably injured thereby.

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