Conference 51 - Contempt

Conferences on the Virtues

By Fr. Bruno Cocuzzi, ocd

Number 51

Contempt

As I sat down to prepare this first conference of 1995, the thought crossed by mind: I wonder if I will be able to finish the series on the Virtues during this year? So to get a general idea, I decided to take a look at the outline of the Treatise on Justice in the Index of my textbook. From what remains of the text, it seems to me that even if we only “touch lightly upon” the rest of the material, it will easily be the end of 1996 before we finish. (*Editor’s note: Fr. Bruno completed these conferences in February 1998.)

We now come to Question Three of this Section and Chapter of the Treatise on Justice: Contempt (Latin: Contumelia). Some background notions:

Just as one’s good name is damaged by Detraction, so also one’s honor is damaged by Contempt.

Honor is the bearing witness to the excellence of another by means of the spoken word or by equivalent signs and deeds.

It is accomplished by laudatory words, i.e., which bespeak the excellence of another, such as in calling one “My Lord”, “O Exalted One”, “O Most Wise:”, etc. It may also be accomplished by certain gestures, such as by “bowing”, “making way for”, “surrendering one’s place to”, etc.

Again, it may be done by exterior works, such as by “giving gifts”, “commissioning a portrait for having a statue made for setting up in a public place”, etc.

By the term excellence, of course, is meant “superiority” to the majority of others in society in one or another important respects.

The “foundation” of honor (or the “right to receive” honor) consists of gifts, talents and good qualities of whatever kind: internal and external, natural and supernatural, by means of which one is “outstanding”. The highest and most important “title” to honor, however, is virtue, by means of which one attains the highest possible excellence, namely perfection both as a human being and as a child of God.

My author makes this interesting comment about honor:

“Honor originates in the ‘awe’ that derives from experience of the outstanding attributes of another, and it tends toward and is completed by an external act of ‘reverence’ directed to that person. When directed to the honoree in the presence of others, the effect of rendering due honor is glory, which is the ‘clear knowledge among others of the honoree’s excellence’.

Honor differs from a Good Name:

a) A Good Name resides principally in the internal opinion of other people; Honor is the external expression thereof.

b) A Good Name exists even in the absence of its possessor; Honor requires that the deserving person be somehow present, whether personally or by someone or something closely allied with him.

c) A Good Name is based upon some good quality considered in itself and by itself; Honor is based upon the superiority of one’s good quality when compared to the same attribute in others.

With all that as preamble, we are able to define Contempt, since it is directly opposed to Honor:

Contempt is unjust “dishonor” directed toward a person who is somehow present.

1. Dishonor – Not merely the absence of honor, but a positive, external act of irreverence (expressive of scorn or disdain).

2. Unjust – that is, not merited. The author speaks of the possibility that “dishonor-ment” may be lawfully inflicted as punishment for a crime.

3. Of a person who is somehow present - the notion of contempt, as it comes down to us in Catholic moral theology, requires that the object thereof have personal knowledge of the dishonor. This condition is clearly verified when the object of the contempt is personally present to experience it.

When directed toward someone closely allied with the object of the contempt, that “personal representative” ordinarily informs the person he represents.

Generally, contempt is committed in the presence of the victim or his personal representative by means of Insulting Words or Gestures.

In the case of some thing closely allied with the object of contempt, say, an image or some personal possession it must be one that the person dishonored regularly sees. Thus it is that vandalism upon one’s home, and hateful, spiteful insults scrawled upon it, clearly qualify as sins of contempt.

St. Thomas observes that whoever expresses disdain or scorn toward another “in secret”, is really not wanting in respect for the other, since he does not “dare” to dishonor him in his presence.

He also points out that, from the definition, others do not have to be present to witness the sin of contempt. It suffices that only the object of the contempt is present.

What distinguishes the sin of contempt from other closely related sins is the fact that the intention to dishonor is uppermost in the mind of the offender.

From what has been said we understand how Contempt differs from detraction. Detraction is directed toward destroying the Good Name of an absent person, whereas contempt is directed toward violating the honor due a person who is present.

Nevertheless, a sin of detraction or calumny may also be conjoined to a sin of contempt, when, in the presence of others, either a true or false allegation of crime or serious defect is cited as the “reason” for the contempt.

The other sins related to contempt are Derision (with its practical equivalents Mockery and Ridicule), and Reproach.

The purpose of Derision and its equivalents is to provide shame, embarrassment and confusion in another by laughing at (making sport of) that person's defects and faults.

The purpose of Reproach is also to provoke shame and embarrassment in another, but by means of calling to his attention all his various and sundry defects and faults, and “blaming him” for them.

According to my textbook, Contempt is a grave sin by its very nature (considered in the abstract). That is because it deprives one of a notable Good which is generally valued more than wealth. That notable Good is, of course, one’s Honor.

Although Our Lord, in the Sermon on the Mount, did not speak of Contempt in specific terms, He did teach certain things which are related to it and which indicate its gravity:

“You have heard it said to men of old ‘Thou shalt do no murder’… But I tell you that any man… who says ‘Raca’ [empty headed, idiot] to his brother must answer for it before the Council; and any man who says to his brother, ‘Thou fool’ [the fool says in his heart there is no God], must answer for it in hell fire.” (Matt. 5:21a, 22).

And although the Apostle Paul does not explicitly advise Christians to avoid sins of Contempt, he does so implicitly by advising them to show “honor” to one another: “Be affectionate toward each other as the love of brothers demands, eager to give one another precedence”. (Romans 10:10). And: “…each of you must have the humility to think others better than himself”. (Philippians 2:3b). Both quotes are from the Knox translations.

As with most sins that are serious when considered in the abstract, the sin of Contempt admits of “parvity [littleness] of matter” and of other mitigating circumstances when considered in concrete situations. By parvity of matter is meant that the contemptuous act only makes a slight dent in another’s honor, it does not injure it.

Even when the “matter” may be grave, a sin of contempt could still be “venial” when it is committed I) inadvertently, ii) without sufficient reflection, iii) out of a sudden, unpremeditated burst of anger, or iv) with the intention of only slightly dishonoring another.

But there are also other circumstances to be considered. For example:

a) The dignity of the person dishonored. What would be a slight sin of Contempt when directed to an equal, could be serious when directed toward, say a Bishop, or someone holding a high and sensitive public office.

b) The motivation of the offender. Contempt would be more serious if it proceeds from hatred, or envy, or spite, than if it proceeds from sudden emotion or from levity.

c) The dignity of the offender. The same sin of contempt committed by a person of high status and authority is more serious than when committed by an ordinary citizen.

d) The amount of harm done. The same sin of contempt committed in the presence of many witnesses is graver than when committed with no witnesses present. Similarly, as we saw in the case of detraction, it is more serious when committed in the presence of people who are gossipers or people who are easily scandalized, than when committed in the presence of prudent and reserved people.

Also, the same sin of Contempt is more serious in those instances where it is the cause of enmity, bitterness and division among others, than when such effects are lacking.

Pretty much the same circumstances that enable us to determine the gravity of Contempt must also be considered in order to determine the gravity of Derision, Ridicule and Mockery.

Of special interest is Ridicule (and the equivalents just mentioned).

It is a very serious sin to mock or ridicule God and those things that are of God. This would be Blasphemy, a sin opposed to the Virtue of Religion.

Next in gravity would be to mock and deride one’s parents, which is the sin of impiety.

In the third place stands derision and ridicule of good, holy people. Its gravity is due to the fact that when good people are publicly mocked and scorned, others are deterred from doing good, or at least from doing so openly. This latter instance must certainly be considered a type of scandal against which Our Lord pronounced one of His “woes”.

My textbook also mentions a form of ridicule that we would call “teasing”. The verb “to tease” has many meanings; here I take it to mean “playful, good-natured jocose comments concerning the slight faults, defects or foibles of another, usually a friend”. My textbook has this to say about teasing:

When the teasing concerns only very slight faults and undesirable characteristics, and it is done NOT to sadden or embarrass, BUT to amuse and delight, it could be without sin, i.e., provided due circumspection is observed.

Another reason for “teasing” could be to motivate the friend to overcome the fault or defect in question.

If, however, one foresees that his “teasing” would certainly embarrass the one to whom it is directed, but is done anyway for the purpose of making other people laugh he would clearly be committing a sin of ridicule.

Before going into the matter of Restitution owed for “damage” done to another by Detraction, Calumny, Contempt and Ridicule, we must say something about Cursing.

The Latin words for “cursing” is Maledictio, and it means, literally, to “speak ill” of another. Thus “maledictio” means more in Latin than does our English words “cursing”. The Latin word embraces the notion of just simply “naming” the bad qualities of another, as well as “commanding” a servant or subordinate to do harm to another person.

Of the many qualified meanings of the Latin word, only “maledictio optativa” corresponds to our English word “Cursing” which is defined as follows:

Cursing is that form of “contempt” by means of which someone, with evil intent, invokes evil upon another.

By evil in the philosophical sense, we mean, of course the “lack” of a due perfection (good quality). Something (or someone) lacking a good quality it (he/she) “ought” to possess, therefore, is “harmed”.

As it is meant in this definition, “to invoke evil” includes not only invoking that someone be deprived of a due perfection or good quality it has hitherto possessed, but also that in the process the individual experience pain and suffering as a result of the deprivation.

Furthermore, the notion of invoking evil, as it is intended in the definition, also includes “invoking” some tragic happening or event to occur in the life of the person cursed which will cause him great pain or suffering.

It is the two preceding paragraphs which explain the meaning of the phrase “with evil intent” in the definition.

We can imagine situations where one might wish certain kinds of “evil” to befall another, but without evil intent, but rather for a good purpose.

One might desire that an offender be “justly” punished so that he will repent of his offense and amend his life.

Or one could desire that a braggart suffer reversals and defeat so that he will learn to be humble.

For a son or daughter to pray for (invoke) the death of a just and honorable father who is suffering grievously, for no other reason than that he may soon enjoy the eternal reward of a good life, would NOT be the sin or cursing. It would be a sin of cursing, however, if the over-riding motive were to get at the inheritance.

Cursing is, by its very nature, a very serious sin. It is not only against Justice, which has to do with goods that are “due” to the human person, but it is particularly a sin against Charity, that is, that form of charity we call benevolence. It is out of benevolence that we pronounce “benedictions”, that is, we “invoke” GOOD upon another. But here, too, the actual sin of cursing may be venial (slight) because of parvity [littleness] of matter and other circumstances. Hence:

1) Most grievous of all is to curse God. As our Creator (by nature) and Our Father (by grace) He is deserving of all gratitude and love and praise. He is above all; Subsistent GOOD. To curse God would be the equivalent to asking Him to put Himself out of existence, which is an impossibility.

2) The next most grievous would be to curse one’s parents. It is they who are the collaborators of God and the first and most important “agents” of God in communicating to us a share in God’s gifts of Life and Love.

3) Third most grievous would be to curse one’s lawful superiors, who to a lesser extent are God’s collaborators and agents in radiating to us God’s good gifts of the natural and supernatural order as social beings.

4) The gravity of cursing a neighbor (one not related by ties of blood or authority) would depend upon the nature of the evil invoked and upon the status and dignity of that individual among the people of God and in civil society.

5) As to cursing irrational creatures:

a) In itself, this is not a serious sin because such creatures are not true “subjects” of rights. But to do so is idle and vain, and would be a slight sin.

b) Insofar as they may be the cause of evil in one’s life (e.g., a flu virus), it would not be a sin (according to my author) to curse them because it is desirable that evil “cease to be”.

c) However, to “curse” irrational creatures because they are creatures of God would be to utter a blasphemy against God, Who “looked upon all the things He had made and found them good.”

d) To curse such creatures because they are useful/helpful to human beings would be the equivalent of cursing human life.

Finally, a reflection upon patience in tolerating detraction, calumny, contempt, ridicule and the like taken from St. Thomas:

“There is a precept of the Lord: If someone strikes you on one cheek, offer him the other as well, such that we should be disposed at all times to do so, if necessary. But we are not always obliged to do so in fact, because Jesus Himself did not always do so, for when He had been struck on the face said: Why do you strike me?… There are times, then, when we must oppose an injury to our honor, and for two reasons: 1) for the good of the one who inflicted it so that his audacity be rebuked and so that others do not attempt to do the same. 2) For the good of the many others whose progress in good would be hindered by our want of a good name and honor. Hence St. Gregory says: Those who are so situated that their life is to be an example to others must, if they can, give the lie to the words of their detractors.

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