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Conferences on the Virtues

By Fr. Bruno Cocuzzi, ocd

 

Number 52

 

Restitution

 

The final question in the chapter on Injuries (injustices) inflicted upon others by Detraction, Calumny and Contempt has to do with Restitution.

 

That there arises an obligation to make restitution for unjustly “blackening” the good name of and for “dishonoring” another is quite understandable.  A good name and honor are far more valuable than external goods and property; so since everyone acknowledges the duty in justice to make restitution for external goods unjustly taken or damaged, it follows that an analogous duty arises in regards to injuries done to another’s good name and honor.

 

However, the very nature of a good name and honor presents special difficulties when it comes to restitution.  It is not always easy to find the appropriate way to do so, if indeed, an appropriate way exists.  Restitution in the form of money almost always suffices for external goods unjustly taken away or damaged.  Sometimes all the money in the world cannot “restore” someone’s good name or honor that have been unjustly damaged or destroyed.  And so there are a couple of principles that are to be applied, usually by one’s confessor, to help him decide what kind of “restitution” to enjoin upon a penitent who has done considerable harm to another by sins of Detraction, Calumny or Contempt.  These principles attempt to answer the questions:

 

(i)                 Who is required to make this kind of restitution?

(ii)                What constitutes that restitution?

(iii)              When is it to be made?

(iv)              To whom is it made?

(v)               How is it to be made?

(vi)              Among whom is it to be made?  And

(vii)            What reasons (or circumstances) would “excuse” from the obligation to make restitution?

 

The first Principle addresses the matter of Restitution for unjust harm done to another’s good name and its “reach”:

 

            Whoever unjustly damages the good name of another in any way, is obliged in justice to make restitution as soon as possible, including restitution for all material damage that was at least vaguely foreseen, and which directly and culpably was caused by the unjust harm.

 

(a)    Unjustly – Where there is no injustice, there is no obligation to restore.  Whoever, in virtue of a higher obligation in justice (or charity) is obliged to reveal the secret sins and defects of another would not be bound to restitution.

 

(b)    In any way – whether only in one’s own mind by an unjust judgment; by voicing the unjust judgment in the presence of others; by either simple detraction or calumny; by cooperating in the detraction either “positively” (doing some blameworthy deed) or “negatively” (culpable failure to act).

 

(c)    To restore the good name – The “good and valuable asset” to be restored is always the same thing that has been unjustly taken away or damaged.  This is a personal obligation binding only the one who has done (or cooperated) in the unjust harm.  This is to distinguish it from a “real” obligation to restore that would fall to the “estate” of the one bound to make restitution for material goods taken or damaged.

 

(d)    As soon as possible – the longer the good name goes “un-restored” the greater likelihood of additional resulting harm befalling the victim.

 

(e)    And to repair all the “material” damage directly and culpably resulting –

 

By way of example, the author cites a list of possibilities: - ruins profitable business or professional prospects, - ruins one’s chances to be elected to public office, - ruins prospects of entering into a happy marriage; - causes one to be dismissed from public office; - causes one to be dismissed from desirable employment; - etc.

 

The “obligation” to restore is as grave or serious as the gravity of the culpable act of defamation.

 

The notion of the seriousness of the “blame” contracted by the defamer is important in regard to the “inconvenience” or “difficulty” he must be prepared to undergo in making the necessary restitution.  Thus:

 

1.       Whoever commits a serious sin of detraction or calumny is obliged to make restitution even if it means he himself must suffer a serious inconvenience or suffering.

 

2.       Whoever commits a slight sin of defamation, whether because of inadvertence or minor imprudence and negligence is obliged to make restitution, but not to the extent of undergoing grave inconvenience.  Among other things, he must also make efforts to forestall any further and future damage resulting from his unjust words.

 

3.       In the event one’s words indirectly cause damage to another’s reputation, that is, because the words have been misunderstood by one’s listeners or given an evil interpretation by them, and the damage done is directly attributable to the listeners, then there is no obligation in justice on the part of the speaker to make restitution, but he would have an obligation in charity to make good faith efforts to do so, but without, of course, having to experience inconvenience in the process.

 

4.       In the event a minor sin of calumny (detraction based upon a lie) causes serious damage, as when a defamer represents a secretary in a “sensitive” position to be a “big mouth” and he/she is dismissed on the basis of that calumny, then the obligation to make restitution is itself grave, in proportion to the harm done.

 

5.       When the damage done to a reputation remains only in the mind of one who had made a rash (unfounded) judgment or who entertains a rash suspicion, the obligation to make restitution consists in acknowledging the inadequacy of the “reasons” leading to the rash conclusion or suspicion, and to make good faith efforts to think well of the person in question.

 

The Manner of repairing the Damaged Reputation.

 

Generally speaking, the manner of repairing the damage to a reputation is the same as that by which it was caused.  Thus the unjust defamer is obliged to use that method which, in view of the circumstances, is the most effective.  Practically speaking, then, he must take into consideration whether the harm is the result of [simple] detraction or of calumny, whether the harm remains “private” or has become “public”.  Therefore:

 

A.     In the case of a calumny, the false statements are to be “specifically” retracted, even at the risk of damage to the defamer’s own reputation, or to some other valuable personal good of his.

 

This rule is justified by the principle, when equivalent harm must fall upon one of two “equal” parties (here the defamer and his victim), the cause of the innocent party is to be preferred to that of the guilty one.  Thus, if the only way effectively to undo the harm, the defamer must “admit” that he lied, the above principle requires him to do so.  Ordinarily, though, it suffices for him to state merely that he had made a mistake or was somehow “deceived”.

 

In the event the “retraction” requires a “sworn statement” to make it effective, this must also be done, since ordinarily it is not difficult or costly to do so.

 

To further assist us (really, assist a confessor) to understand this rule, the author of my textbook gives the example of a “defamer” who is a public figure, such as a magistrate or a judge in a court of law.  It could happen that for the public official to admit to being guilty of detraction or calumny would cause much greater harm to the common or public good than the harm done to a private person.  In such a case, he would be “excused” from the obligation to retract [at least publicly].

 

Similarly, as between “private” persons, if the retraction would bring far greater harm to the defamer than was done to the victim, that also, would excuse the guilty party from the duty to make restitution.

 

B.     In cases of simple defamation, where there has been an “unjust” disclosure of a past true crime or serious defect of an individual, it is more difficult to state a general rule.

 

Obviously, one cannot retract by saying one has lied, or is mistaken, or has been deceived, and so in certain circumstances it would be impossible to restore the good reputation of the person harmed in the minds of those who previously did not know of his crime or fault.  About the best one can do in such instances is to acknowledge that it would have been better not to have divulged the damaging information, or that it was an error of judgment to have done so; that we all have things in our past we are ashamed of, have repented of, and either have overcome them, or are making sincere efforts to correct; that we should bury the past and base our opinion of and dealings with others upon their current public behavior and performance only; and statements to that effect.

 

Also, very helpful toward making restitution is to make known the individual’s good qualities and accomplishments, and other information deserving of praise that will overcome the damage done by the truthful but harmful disclosures.

 

C.     When the defamation becomes “public” in virtue of knowledge of the damaging information becoming widely disseminated, in order to be effective, the restitution must also be done in such a way as also to become widely known.  Thus harm done by the printed word in newspapers and other widely read periodicals is to be repaired by retractions printed in those same publications.  The same is true of defamation disseminated by word of mouth on radio and television.

 

When the damaging statements are false, usually the injured party seeks restitution in a court of law.  When the statements are true, it is next to impossible to make restitution.

 

Circumstances that Excuse from Making Restitution for Damaged Reputations.

 

1.       The absence of harm.  – This would be so in those situations in which the defamer “intended” to harm, and therefore is really guilty of sin, but where for one reason or another, the harm did not occur.  This could be because the listeners didn’t grasp the import of the disclosures, or because they did not believe what the speaker was relating; or because they already knew from some other source what he was telling them, etc.

 

2.       The damage is repaired in some other way.  – It could be that knowledge of very good and praiseworthy conduct of the injured party subsequently becomes known which overcomes the “blackening” of his name; or because it becomes widely known that the defamer was lying; or because the defamatory disclosures are simply forgotten by those who heard them.

 

3.       Impossibility – When it is physically or morally impossible to make restitution.

 

This could be because all the people who heard the defamatory remarks are not known to the speaker or there is no way to reach them all; or because the faults or crimes “privately” disclosed by the defamer becomes public knowledge some other way (physical impossibility).

 

It could happen, too, that the reputation of the defamed cannot be restored without far greater harm befalling the defamer (moral impossibility).

 

4.       Pardon and forgiveness – for this to take place, certain conditions must be satisfied,

 namely, the injured party must have the “power and authority” to forgive the defamer.  That is, when the public good would NOT be harmed by the forgiveness,            NOR WOULD some third party be hurt or scandalized by the forgiveness.  For it could happen that condonation by a public official would bring about “contempt” for his authority and other forms of insubordinations.

 

The second principle has to do with harm done to a person’s “honor” by the sin of Contempt.

 

Whoever has unjustly damaged the honor due another is obliged in justice to restore that honor and to repair all the material harm he has effectively and culpably caused.

 

Since everyone has a strict right to be accorded the honor befitting a human person, the notion of Justice requires that all unjust violations of that honor be repaired, whether they be public or private.

 

The manner chosen to undo the dishonor (insult) must take into consideration not only whether the sin of contempt was private or public, but also the gravity of the harm, the condition of the persons involved, and other local circumstances and usages.  It must necessarily include evidence of “esteem” at least equal in weight to the dis-esteem” expressed by the contemptuous deed.  Also to be considered is whether the restitution is made to a superior (in authority), an equal or to a subject (in authority).

 

1.       Public insults are to be repaired within the same context in which they occurred, that is, with the same people present who witnessed the insult.  And if that is not possible, in a way that causes the “satisfaction made” to become known to them.

 

2.       When the contempt is purely private, known only to the offender and the person offended, it suffices for the offender to express his sorrow and repentance to the injured party, and to ask his forgiveness.

 

3.       When the offender is a superior and the offended party his subject, very often the damage is adequately repaired by the superior showing signs of special friendliness and benevolence toward the subject, without the need of a form apology; “lest”, according to St. Augustine, “by being too attentive to humility, his authority to govern will be broken down.”

 

Once in awhile it is useful for a superior to apologize and ask pardon, my author comments, when to do so edifies.

 

4.      I quote my textbook: To an equal who has been offended [by the sin of contempt], signs of greater than usual honor are to be extended:  yielding the place of honor to him, inviting him to dinner, drinking to his health, obtaining favors for him.  Or, if the injury is quite grave, by asking pardon.  In certain regions, however, or among people of a certain condition, pardon is not asked.

 

5.      If a subject has offended his superior, often a direct or indirect humble apology (begging pardon) is necessary.

 

For all of the above, when it has happened that the injured party has taken revenge, either by a reciprocal insult or act of contempt, for example, by striking or wounding the offender, the latter is thereby excused from further restitution, since it is to be assumed that the former does so precisely for the purpose of “exacting” satisfaction for the insult.  Indeed, the author of my text suggests that among “common folk”, reciprocating in kind is the ordinary way of “getting back” (vindicating) honor.

 

Next month we go on to consider Justice and Injustice in “voluntary exchanges”, that is, in Contracts. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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