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Conferences on the Virtues
By Fr. Bruno Cocuzzi, ocd
Number 54
Contracts entered into
with Fear…
In the last
conference we were speaking of the qualities of the consent required to
make a contract valid and binding in conscience. We stated, among other things that the consent had to be deliberate
and free. We saw that error
and fraud keep the consent from being truly deliberate. Now we continue by considering what keeps
the consent from being truly free.
The factors that destroy that freedom are Violence and fear.
Violence that
is physical and actual, that is, which literally forces a party to subscribe to
a contract against his will, clearly makes the signing involuntary, and thus
renders the contract null and void.
There can be
instances, however, when force is not physical and actual, but is nevertheless
real enough to violate the free will of a subscriber to a contract, and cause
the signing to be truly “involuntary”.
This kind of violence is given the name moral force, and the most
common type is called fear.
Fear
is that trepidation of mind that is brought about by the danger of
future, but imminent, harm.
Ordinarily,
fear seldom is so great that it takes away the use of reason, although that can
sometimes happen.
Thus, fear is grave
when the imminent harm threatening is grave, whether or not the harm is
absolutely grave or only relatively grave, that is “relative” to the person who
experiences it.
Fear is slight
when either the harm that is imminent is slight, or when the threatened harm is
grave, but not imminent.
Fear can be
engendered by natural causes or by free causes. In regard to the latter, the fear may be
either justly or unjustly inflicted.
Fear is
inflicted unjustly whenever its purpose is to extort either consent
to a contract or refusal to consent.
Nor does it make a difference whether the threat of harm is directed to
the one who would be a party to a contract or to a person closely conjoined to
that party.
Principles
concerning Contracts entered into with Fear…
1. A
fear great enough to impede the clear use of reason (the kind that excuses from
serious sin), renders a contract invalid because it destroys free consent.
2. A
fear that IS NOT unjustly caused does not render a contract invalid or
rescindable UNLESS it completely takes away the use of reason.
As
an example of this, my author cites the case of one who is in great fear of
losing his life in a fire or a shipwreck, and under the influence of this fear
offers to another a large sum of money to induce a rescuer to save his
life. If the offer is accepted and His
life is saved, he cannot then claim that the contract (offer accepted) is void
because of fear. The fear in this case
is not unjust because it is a natural fear.
3. Grave
fear that is unjustly inflicted (whether by a
third party or by the other party to a contract) for the purpose of extorting
consent suffices to render a gratuitous contract invalid because a
more perfect freedom is required in this kind of contract.
The
example of this given by my author is that of a grown son who threatens bodily
harm to his father to induce the father to write him a check for a large sum of
money. The father’s mere tendering of
the check to the son would constitute the offer of a gratuitous contract. Because the threat of harm to the father
renders the offer (and thus the acceptance) invalid, he could thereafter justly
stop payment on the check.
4. Grave
fear that does not completely take away free consent (whether inflicted
by a third party or by the other party to the contract for the purpose of
inducing consent) does not invalidate an onerous contract, but it
does render the contract rescindable.
That is because such a “consent” is the “fruit” of an unjust act.
Thus
a “contract” to pay money to a “blackmailer” would be valid, but “rescindable”
by lawful public authority.
However,
when this kind of fear induces a party to enter a contract that is by its
nature “indissoluble” (as in the case of a Sacramental Marriage), the contract
would, indeed, be null and void.
5. If
(objectively speaking) the fear inflicted to induce consent to a contract is
slight, the contract, whether gratuitous or onerous, remains valid. But if (subjectively speaking) the fear is
experienced as grave, AND the fear is the ONLY reason why the consent is
given, then very likely it suffices to render gratuitous contracts invalid and
onerous ones rescindable.
Question 3 –
The Object or the Matter of Contracts
The Matter
of a Contract is generally an object of rights. This would include anything that one
could acquire a right IN or a right TO, namely some thing,
some action or some omission.
However, the matter that is given, done or omitted is subject to certain
conditions. They must possess
the following attributes: 1. Possible; 2. Existing; 3. Have determinable
monetary value; 4. Be in the “stream” of commerce; 5. Determinate [specifiable and measurable]; 6. Belong (or pertain) to one of the parties;
7. Free of the interests or rights
of others; and 8. Decent (Latin: honestus)
and licit (lawful).
1. Possible
– Because no one can be bound in conscience to give or do what
is impossible, either absolutely (transcends all native human power) or
relatively (transcends the native power of a given person).
(I
find it somewhat amusing that my textbook cites, as an example of something
that is absolutely impossible, the crossing over to the moon).
2. Existing
– this means either actually in hope.
With regard to the latter, as in the case of business dealings in
“futures”, to exist in hope means that there is every reasonable expectation
that the items or items in question will come into being, or at least “ripen”
into being within the foreseeable future.
3. Capable
of being Priced – The price of course is determined by how
useful it is to people, and therefore based upon how great a demand
there is for it.
Therefore,
what is of no value cannot become the object or the matter of a
contract. Contracts about things that have
no value, whether gratuitous or onerous are thus null and void.
Similarly,
if something exceeds all estimable temporal value, as do spiritual
“things” and benefits, then contracts about these would also be null and void.
We
are all familiar with the example of Simon the Magician whom we meet in the
Acts of the Apostles. He wanted to buy
with money the spiritual power to work miracles and confer the Holy Spirit
possessed by St. Peter. The Prince of
Apostles vigorously denounced him.
Thus, actually to attempt to buy or sell spiritual blessings, powers or
graces is thus called the Sin of Simony.
There
is nothing wrong, however, with giving spiritual blessings (e.g., a spiritual
bouquet) to another as a gift, nor with exchanging gifts of spiritual blessings. The latter happens in the case of Mass
Stipends. The one who requests that a
Mass be offered for his intention makes a free gift of a certain sum of
money. The priest then, as a free
gift, offers Mass for the intention of the donor.
4. Placed
in the stream of commerce – This means that it is capable of being
owned, and for which there is always a demand for it, and, also, that someone
can always be found who is willing to sell or trade it.
My
author excludes from under this heading roads and parks and other things in the
public domain. He also excludes “air”
and the ocean.
But
there are such things as the “air rights” over a specific plot of ground, and
“rights” to grow and harvest in certain tracts of the ocean bed.
So
what this means is that no one can “possess and control” the atmosphere, nor
can one “possess and control an entire ocean.
5. Determinate
(specifiable and measurable) – By specifiable is
meant “identifiable”, since no one can buy or sell what cannot be specifically
designated. “Measurable” would be a
sub-class of “specifiable”. Contracts
about those things that can neither be identified nor quantified would be illusory
for being uncertain.
Some
things, though mathematically immeasurable (practically impossible to estimate
or calculate the quantity – to distinguish it from immeasurable or infinite),
are nevertheless morally measurable, such as this particular pile of
wood or all the apples in this orchard.
6. Belongs
or pertains to one of the parties – Since contracts are
concerned with transferring “rights in” and “rights to”, rights over the
objects and matter of the contract must be invested in one of the parties. In other words, I cannot sell what is not
mine, like the Brooklyn Bridge, nor can I buy it from somebody else.
7. Free
of any Rights or Interests of Others – For example, one of
the joint owners of property cannot sell it by himself alone. The other joint owner(s) must join in the
deed. Included under this heading is
the situation where goods or services are already “owed” to a specific
person: A merchant cannot sell to B the
goods that A has already paid for.
Included also are the performance of duties and functions “owed” in
virtue of an office held: A Judge, for
example, cannot enter into a contract to hand down, for a sum certain, a just
judgment or sentence.
8. Decent
and lawful – This means, of course, that no one can enter
into a contract to do or give something that is sinful or illegal for a sum of
money, nor contract with another to do or provide, for money, what is sinful or
illegal.
It
seems to me that such contracts occur quite often in human society (e.g., a
contract to provide illegal substances, or to buy and sell contraband, or a
contract made with a “hit-man”).
Because they are null and void, they are “rescindable” in a court of law
before fulfillment, and punishable in Criminal Court after the fact.
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