Conferences on the Virtues
By Fr. Bruno Cocuzzi, ocd
Number 65
Justice and Injustice in
the Distribution of Benefits…
Distributive
Justice directly and by its very nature has to do with the distribution of
benefits, that is, to give to others, rather than to demand for
oneself. To see why this is so, we
remember that we do not usually consider the imposition of a burden, as
a giving, or gift, but as demanding something.
The benefits in
question are good things that belong to the community as a whole. Thus,
A. Chiefly
and generally, the good things of the community are peaceful
and prosperous social circumstances or conditions.
Distributive
Justice concerns not so much the dividing up of material goods owned in common,
such as money, goods or services, but the distribution of a share in
peaceful and prosperous circumstances and conditions, such that each of the
members of a society is enabled to enjoy stability and security in regard to
the economy, human and civil rights, public safety and the like. Without these, the members of a society
could not attain a quality of life consistent with their human nature and
dignity.
B. In
particular Distributive Justice is concerned with
establishing and conferring upon certain individuals the various public offices
and functions that are required to bring about and oversee the equitable
sharing in the good things or circumstances just enumerated by each of the
citizens of the society or community.
Although
those various public offices are established primarily to serve the common good
they also serve to confer personal and private benefits upon the ones holding
those offices and fulfilling those functions, such as special honor and
prestige as well as material privileges and remuneration.
The
manner in which these public offices and functions are conferred upon certain
individuals differs according to the kind of government that prevails in a
particular nation or state. But even
where there are public elections for public offices, there still remain many,
many roles and functions that are distributed by appointment on the part
of those who hold the highest offices in the government. Some of these appointments are based upon
the personal merit and expertise of the appointees; still others are granted as
rewards for special services to the nation or to the appointing
official.
Secondarily
and by happenstance distributive justice may also be concerned with the
distribution of material goods. This is
true when certain members of a society stand in need of public aid and subsidy
as a means of sharing in the peace and prosperity of the nation.
The
Distribution of Public Offices…
In elections
for public office, that candidate is to be voted for whom the voter honestly
believes is the most worthy, that is, who appears better endowed with the
qualities required for the office, such as knowledge, uprightness and
dedication.
The same holds
for public officials when it comes to appointing others for lesser public
offices.
Therefore,
1. Each
voter owes it to the nation as a matter of commutative justice to
vote for someone who is truly qualified.
2. Each
appointing official owes it to the nation as a matter of commutative
justice to do the same, when the authority to appoint springs from the very
nature of the office he holds. He is
bound to appoint the most qualified as a matter of legal justice when
the authority to appoint springs from a mere privilege associated with his
office.
The
difference in the two is that commutative justice envisions the nation as a single
collective entity. Legal justice
envisions the nation as a multitude of individuals.
The
Distribution of other Goods…
Other good
things belonging to the community which primarily have to do with the welfare
of individuals are either merited rewards or subsidies based upon need or
indigence.
These consist,
for example, of monies for the establishment and maintenance of public schools
and like institutions to benefit the arts, science or industry or to address
various similar needs of the citizenry.
In the distribution of these kinds of material goods a three-fold rule
is to be observed:
1. First
and foremost, they are to be distributed in the manner that best promotes the common
good.
2. Funds
and material goods, which are intended for the support of institutions that
promote civic virtues such as sobriety, thrift, patriotism, etc., are to be
given in proportion to the merit and the good they achieve.
3. Funds
and material support to relieve the want of the indigent are to be given in
proportion to their need.
To
the extent these rules are not observed in the distribution of those material
goods, in addition to a sin committed against the nation as an entity, there is
a violation of distributive justice (acceptance of persons) against the
individuals who deserve to be, but are not, benefited.
The
Distribution of Honors…
According to
St. Thomas, should anyone be honored for qualities that are not worthy of
honor, that is called acceptance of persons.
Honor is nothing else than a kind of testimony to a person’s virtue,
which is the only thing that of itself deserves to receive honor.
However, it can
happen that someone may receive honor not because he is the virtuous person
that he ought to be, but because of the virtue of another person whom he
represents. Heads of State and
prelates of the Church receive honor because they stand in the place of the
Community or of Jesus, respectively, even though of themselves they may be
fools.
For the same
reason, parents and masters (lawful superiors) are to be honored. They participate in the dignity of
God, Who is Father and Lord of all.
In ancient
times Old Age was considered deserving of honor because it was thought
that, with progressing years, the elderly acquired virtue. Though that is not necessarily the case, for
other reasons the aged remain worthy of respect and reverence, which, when
manifested, does indeed look like honor.
My textbook
states that the wealthy are deserving of honor because of the higher
place they have attained in society.
Perhaps what is behind this is the fact that wealth and success usually
go together, and of course, success of itself is dependent upon virtue. If, however, the wealthy are honored only
because they have money, that would be, again, acceptance of persons.
Distribution
of Ecclesiastical Offices…
What has been
said about elections and appointments to civil offices applies even more so to
the elections and appointments to offices in the Church. Any sin in the former is an even graver sin
in the latter because it has to deal with far more important matters, namely
the eternal welfare of the people.
But in this
regard, St. Thomas has some interesting comments:
It
can happen every so often that someone who is less holy and less learned in
spiritual matters is able to do more for the common good of souls than one more
holy and learned, whether because of his energy and capacity for work or some
other like reason. That is because God
dispenses His graces and blessings through Church ministers principally for the
good of the Christian people, who receive them as graces freely given (gratiae
gratis datae). Thus they are not
dependent upon the personal merit of the minister.
According to my
textbook, some Catholic moral theologians have endeavored to apply the comment
of St. Thomas completely across the board with regard to all
ecclesiastical offices. They allege
that those who elect or make such appointments never have to be concerned about
the worthiness of the appointees.
That, it states, is not according to the express thought of St. Thomas:
As
to the obligation in conscience of the appointers, they are required to select
the person who is better qualified (read:
more holy and learned) either in the abstract or in view of the common
good. In order to appoint someone less
qualified, there would have to be some proportionate good reason. That sufficient reason is the greater
ability to carry out the business (duties and obligations) of the office. To appoint someone less qualified for any
other reason would clearly be acceptance of persons.
As we have
intimated, acceptance of persons is a violation of distributive justice.
What would be
some other insufficient reason? It used
to be blood relationship (nepotism) or some other social bond. Again St. Thomas has something to say about
this:
Concerning
the appointment of blood relatives of the appointing Prelate, we have to
distinguish carefully. Sometimes these
are less worthy considered in the abstract and in view of the common good. Should the Prelate appoint them
nevertheless, he has committed the sin of “acceptance of person” as dispenser
of spiritual benefits.
Sometimes
the blood relatives are equally worthy or more worthy than other
candidates. In such circumstances there
is no “acceptance of persons”, and even the additional good reason that his
blood relative would cooperate better with the appointing Prelate in carrying
our their official duties.
In
spite of that, it would be better not to select a qualified blood relative,
lest someone be scandalized thereby, or the custom of appointing a relative
apart from consideration of worthiness gain acceptance.
Restitution
for Electing or Appointing Unworthy Candidates…
To the extent
someone has knowingly and willingly committed a sin of commutative
justice in the election or appointment of an unqualified person to public
office, to that same extent he is held to make restitution to the person or persons
directly harmed thereby. How this is
done is not spelled out in my textbook.
Is the
unqualified person under any obligation to the qualified persons passed
over? YES, if he was a party to some
plan to exclude the better qualified.
Otherwise, NO because he did not appoint himself.
Is he under any
obligation to the community when he becomes aware that he is unqualified? YES for whatever harm he has done which has
served to make him aware of his unworthiness.
Is he obliged
to resign that office? YES, unless
within a short time he can acquire the necessary qualifications.
The
Third Question: Justice and the Want
thereof in the Distribution of Burdens…
The parceling
out of burdens indirectly concerns Distributive Justice by
considering Immunity from burdens as a kind of good. Thus an equitable distribution of the one
can also be envisioned as an equitable distribution of the other.
The burdens in
question include any and all kinds of offering to which monetary value
can be assigned. Among them are
physical labors or contributions to pay for physical labors, contributions in
kind (produce, farm animals), taxes, fines and fees. In the distribution of these, commutative justice can also be
violated.
Distributive
justice is violated when an offering is demanded of an individual that
is not in proportion to his ability to pay, vis-à-vis all the other members of
the society. Once that due proportion
is known, to demand more would violate commutative justice as well.
With regard to
fines for wrongdoing, distributive justice requires a just proportion between
the crime and the monetary penalty to be paid.
Once that is established, to demand more would be a sin against
commutative justice as well.
Nowadays, taxes
of all kinds, fees, and fines and, in some countries, military service are the
principal burdens imposed upon citizens.
Article
One – Taxes…
Since olden
times there have existed two well-known kinds of taxes. The one was levied upon citizens of a state
or nation for the purpose of supporting the apparatus of government and its
civil servants. The other was a tax
or duty levied upon the transportation of goods from one nation to
another, or for the transfer of money or goods from one person to
another. These persist into our own
times, and show up in many and varied ways.
There are three
conditions to be satisfied for a tax to be just:
1. That
it be imposed by the competent national, state or municipal authority.
2. For
a just cause, to wit, for the sake of providing what is either necessary or
clearly useful for the common good.
3. And
in proportion to each citizen’s ability to contribute.
Thus, is would
be a violation of distributive, legal and even commutative justice to
(a) knowingly
impose taxes without need or public
usefulness (legislators)
(b) to
waste public funds (overseers of public works and other forms of government
spending), and
(c) fail
to take into account the individual citizen’s ability to pay (the authors of
the Internal revenue Code).
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