From the actual experience of the past three year's active service we know now that the glamorous times, so gaily phrased "A feather in your cap and a motor in your lap" are gone; for fighters especially in this theatre have been required to assume a multitude of responsibilities.

       Our Operations Boards, for example, during the past fifteen months have carried eight different types of missions, in addition to the traditional alert and intercept activities. Fighter missions are now de scribed as sweep, escort, strafe, glide-bomb, ship-bomb, reconnaissance, fire-bomb, and close-support.

       Fighter sweeps are designed to penetrate an area and clear it of all enemy planes. They are more or less cut and dried in planning and execution since their variations are governed by the known factors of terrain, enemy anti-aircraft positions, targets, with their expected opposition, and the nature of our own "strikes". Included of course, must be the free-lancing target-of-opportunity type which raises merry Hell with the Nip Air Force, not to mention its morale. Altitudes will vary from 5000 feet to 6000 for those looking for trouble, to 30,000 feet for those on the lookout for "Sitting Ducks".

      Escort missions are aimed at getting all planes being covered to the target and back by guarding them against successful attack. Close, support, and top-cover comprise the elements of the mission, with altitudes varying, depending upon that of the escorted airplanes.

      Strafing missions occupy a large percentage of our work, and include everything from harassing the Jap troops, trucks, trains, barges, tanks, gun positions, tankers, oilers, troop and cargo ships, planes on the ground, equipment and supplies, to attacking destroyers, cruisers and battlewagons both in the daytime and at night. Coupled with skip-bombing, to be discussed later, I believe that the largest percentage of our losses can be attributed to this type of mission.

       There is no doubt in my mind that the toughest and roughest mission in which I have ever participated was a strafing mission which took place on the night of 26 December 1944. We were ordered to attack and disperse a Jap Naval Task Force consisting of one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser and six destroyers attacking Mindoro Island in the Philippines. With nothing more than fifty caliber slugs and "guts", there having been insufficient time to bomb-up, we attacked with our P-47's. If it were possible to fly through an open blast furnace T don't believe it would compare to the gunfire which opened up on us from those eight boats. Twenty-nine from our group participated in the mission and how any of us came out alive is still a mystery to me. We did lose ten pilots and one badly injured, but five have since returned after bailing out all over a 300 mile area. The Nip force finally withdrew after a weak attempt at shelling the Mindoro strip and did little damage. Information received since revealed that the reason lay in the fact that not only were two destroyers sunk on the spot, but also that practically all aiming devices, guns, and crews o£ the remaining ships were damaged or knocked out. We did not claim that our P-47's inflicted all of the damage, for P-38's, P-40's, and B-25's were also in on the deal, but we definitely feel that our eight fifty calibers contributed greatly to the successful repulsion of the attack.

       The Nip in many ways is cagey. He places his anti-aircraft guns in some of the damnedest places, moves them frequently, and has accounted for many of our losses in just this manner. In concentrated areas their medium and light guns are wicked; however, we have experienced little difficulty with their heavy stuff. We have no trouble turning away from or under it.

       We believe that surprise, speed, cover of approach, timing, concentration upon a single target, and a slipping, skidding breakaway on the deck are the essential factors necessary for successful strafing. Spraying of a large area only wastes ammunition and pulling-up after the attack is suicidal. The Japanese always are full of surprises. One neat trick they have pulled on us is to plant land mines and when we come in on our strafing runs, set them off in our faces.

       Glide-bombing first entered the picture when it was discovered that dive-bombing with the P-47 was not entirely satisfactory because of the speed picked up in the dive. In order to minimize our losses from ack-ack we found it necessary to begin our dive not lower than 15,000 feet. We learned from practice that to achieve any degree of accuracy we had to use at least a sixty degree dive, and from that altitude and at that angle the P-47 picked up so much speed the pilot could not concentrate upon his diving for fear of an unsuccessful recovery. We also learned that at speeds in excess of 325 to 350 miles per hour an aileron buffeting was encountered when wing bombs (1,000 pounds) or wing tanks (165 gallon) were carried. At present we begin our glide, usually in twoship elements, at 15,000 feet, hold our airspeed down to 325 miles per hour, release our bombs between 7,000 and 5,000 feet, and either head for the deck or recover sharply up and to one side. Attacks are coordinated from different directions and our bomb load varies from one 500 pounder under the belly to one 1,000 pounder under each wing and a 500 pounder under the belly. With practice and practice alone we have attained accuracy for we have no sight designed for this bombing. The repeated practice of the same roll-in turn and speed, the same angle of attack, and the same method of releasing has improved our efficiency. To off-set lag in releasing our bombs we have wired our ships with electrical bomb releases.

       Though the basic method of execution is the same, there are just as many variations of glide-bombing as there are pilots bombing. I have found that by approaching the target from 900 at 170 miles per hour, placing the nose of the plane on the target by executing a sharp pullup wing-over turn, gradually reducing the angle of my dive as the speed increases, and releasing the bombs at 6,000 feet, I obtain my best results. Glide-bombing is only effective for area or strip coverage.

      Light and medium bombers were doing it successfully, so when someone said "Why not", we tried it, and another label was added - the P-47 skip-bomber. Since that time, dumping them out from masthead level and tree top height has become SOP. With the sheet of lead thrown out by our eight fifties preceding us to clear the way, we have been able upon several occasions to utilize this method extremely effectively. Against shipping it affords unlimited advantages, even to taking on the interference runners of the Jap Navy. When using a bomb load of only one 500 pounder slung under the belly, my approach is a shallow dive at about 370 miles per hour, leveling off around 50 feet and letting her go. From 1,000 yards on in I like plenty of lead coming from my guns, first to discourage, and as I close, to reduce their return fire. With a much heavier bomb load - we carry up to 2,500 pounds - I use the same procedure, but keep my speed down to 325 miles per hour to avoid buffeting. Recently one of our pilots dumped two 1,000 and one 500 pounders right at the East entrance to the large tunnel on Corregidor. The great blast blew the doors to the tunnel open, and the next man in dumped a thousand pounder slap-dab in the mouth of the tunnel. Using a 4 to 5 second delay fuse little or no ill effect from the blast has been encountered.

      On moonlight nights I believe gratifying results can be obtained, for I am certain that had we been lugging bombs the night of the Tokyo Express to Mindoro we could have sunk all destroyers and inflicted much crippling damage to the cruisers.

Keeping tab on the Nip in his movements is very difficult. He is more likely to pull the unpredictable than he is to follow a carefully laid out plan. Here again, the fighters have taken on added jobs. Reconnaissance is nothing more than covering an area with all eyes wide open, charting movements, shipping, locations of supplies, recording weather data, shadowing, and picking up bits of information that will piece together the overall picture.

Major H. M. Odren, CO of the 311th Squadron, has tackled everything from barges to battleships, day or night. He has 500 combat hours.

Major H. A. Tuman, CO of the 310th Squadron, has destroyed one Nip and is a champion on bombing and strafing missions. 500 combat hours.

Fire-bombing, or the dropping of Napalm bombs, which are wing tanks filled with a highly volatile mixture, is fairly new. Even so, in the short time we have been using them devastating damage has been delivered. They have definitely proved, through tests and results, to be a very effective weapon. Good results have been obtained against pill boxes, gun positions, caves, buildings, troop concentrations, and small boats, To me this method of warfare is only in its infancy. There is no limit to its utilization.

      Close-support missions can certainly be said to cover a multitude of activities. Everything in the book can be used - from strafing to Napalm bombing. The majority of our missions over Luzon were called upon at one time or another to support our Ground Forces. Beachhead cover flights are often required several times during one mission to clear out strong points in the enemy lines. These strong points may be dug-in fortifications, gun emplacements, pill-boxes, and sometimes even tanks. Close coordination and cooperation are necessary in order to eliminate the possibility of hitting our own forces.

      There can be little doubt in anyone's mind but that "Fighters are here to stay". As shortlegged as our "Jug" (P-47D21) is, we are capable of carrying one 500 pound bomb a greater distance than our light bombers carry their load. We possess more strafing power, more speed, and better maneuverability than the lights, and some of the mediums. We have tangled from everything from row-boats to heavy cruisers, training types to Zeros, wheel-barrows to tanks, twenty five calibers to 105's, and we have come out on top.