MAJOR DOUGLAS V. N. PARSONS
Maj. Parson's return to the U.S. was well earned with 236 combat missions, 580 combat hours and 28 months spent in this theatre. He holds the enviable record of never having lost a teammate on a mission, and wears the D.F.C. with 1 Cluster and A.M. with 2. |
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Fighter tactics in general have basic principles which hold true no matter the theatre. These principles stem from the nine Principles of War, but in the air over here I would stress the Offensive, Economy of Force, Surprise, and Simplicity angles.
Having served 28 months in this area, I have seen the V Fighter Command tactics change through progressive stages. In the early days at, Port Moresby, we were still on the defensive, seeking to protect our lone remaining New Guinea air base. We had just started to spread out as we closed on Buna, and worked out of Wau towards Salamaua and Lae. Then we were equipped with P-39D's and P-40's, hopelessly out-classed by the Jap Zekes, Oscars, and Hamps, except in diving, pilot protection, and fire-power. Accordingly, as did General Chennault, we adopted tactics of diving into, or breaking down from any attack, carrying through with speed, climbing, turning, and attacking again. This meant many head-on passes, but we had the Nip on that score with our cannon. Dog-fighting or turning of course were out. Scrambles over Moresby meant maximum altitude, and with sufficient time we managed to get up to 26,000 feet. By keeping speed up, and by boldness and good feinting, our squadron managed to shoot down some bombers.
Of course we were better off below 10,000 feet, but then we often had no choice. The premium was on good formation and teamwork, alertness and aggressiveness. Can you do better today? The two ship element was never split, a form of life insurance that any fighter pilot who lived learned to appreciate. It called for real discipline. We eventually got P-39N's, with more speed and climb, and we could advance our tactics a notch. It was then, in August of '43 that our men destroyed twelve out of twelve Helens over Tsili Tsili in less than one and one half minutes. We no longer needed to break down, because by keeping our airspeed up we could now out-climb our honorable opponent. But we were still cagey and cautious. To my knowledge our tactics cost us only one pilot, and he was off by himself. Unfortunately, I had yet to join combat.
KNOWLEDGE
gives you more of a safety factor than is often realized, particularly
when actual experience is lacking, or yet to be gained. A pilot should
constantly be teaching himself. Lying around at night, or while on the
alert, he does well to pour through every bit of intelligence material
that comes his way. He should read every account of air fights between
Nip and Allied planes or of escort tactics, analyzing the techniques used
by both sides - and then practice them in the air whenever possible. He
should read technical data on the enemy planes, and learn their defensive
arcs of fire as well as our effective fields of fire. He should learn
terrain, to help when the compass goes out, or weather makes the return
to base a little tougher. He should learn escape routes, etc. He should
know the Intelligence and Operations file as well as their officers do.
He should dream of situations in a theoretical fight, and figure his plan
of attack or evasion. He should know his plane. He should have chats with
his crew chief, the line chief and the Engineering Officer. All are glad
to help. He should learn all about his R/T equipment, and he should plan
his conversation for every little situation. He should know about his
emergency equipment, Mae West, life raft, and jungle kit keeping all up
to date and in 100% working order. All may help him fly another day. He
must learn patience. |
As
the Allied ground situation improved, so did our air equipment, for we
changed over to P-47's. This gave us added range, and of course potential
altitude advantage. We hated to give up our 39's, but we were beginning
to reach out. Lae had fallen, and Wewak was our target. Here we ran fighter
sweeps and escorted B-24's. We started going over at 25,000 to 30,000
feet, (How good it was to know we could look down for a change) but the
Nip never came up. So we came down, and ironically enough, in our first
five engagements, in March '44, we never shot a Jap down over 12000 feet.
In fact, we were shooting them down on the deck! We found we could out-run
him on the deck, we knew we could out-dive him, but of course the pull-out
and turning factors were still his. But we felt with confidence that we
could meet the Nip now on more even terms, and we let our tactics out
another notch, for more of the sky was ours. The Nip was still a wily
opponent, but I felt that his caliber of pilot was deteriorating. When
actually engaged and you got on his tail, he seemed resigned to his fate,
which he got. But he would try to lure you into his ack-ack, or try to
bait you with single "ducks". We were not often caught, for
lessons had been learned. Though he still had a turning advantage and
steeper climb, he chose less and less to fight us. |
With our increasing superiority in the air, and our bombers now neutralizing the nearer bases, we were forced to reach out further and further with our fighters. Whereas my first two engagements were over Wewak 250 miles from home, we now began going out 350 - 150 miles on fighter sweeps. Operating out of Noemfoor, we concentrated on the Vogelkop and Ceram areas. The enemy could not or would not come up so we resorted to dive bombing and strafing.
It was at this time that our B-24's found a target whose protection warranted stiff Jap fighter opposition, and the Libs clamored for cover. Staging from Morotai, and working mostly on carefully planned theories, we flew our new long-range P-47D28's to Balikpapen, 835 statute miles away. These were offensive sweeps to precede the bombers into the area. Tactics involved going in high (20,000 - 30,000 feet), and then boiling down into any enemy fighter formations in the air. After a few passes, everyone headed for home. It was pretty much of a rat-race, but the tactics worked for we shot down over fifteen Nips each of the two times the mission was pulled. Two pilots are missing, one of whom ran short of gas less than two hours from base. History was made for single engine fighters on these two missions in October, 1944.
Shortly after this, operating from Morotai in the Halmahera, we began milk-run missions with the B-25's and B-24's up to the Philippines. Their job was to neutralise the Negros strips, and the Nip rose to the occasion with unusual vigor for awhile. The "milk-runs" were 700 miles out to the heart of the Jap island air net! But we had some interesting scraps. The Nips were usually in the area in strength up to 30 - 40 airplanes, but they were never in one organized formation. As close cover, we wanted to give the bombers their protection, but we wanted to make the most of our numbers and opportunities, and work some sort of attrition against Nip fighter strength. We usually put up 12 - 16 P-47's to cover a group of 24's. We adopted tactics which we called "Offensive defense". We stayed in relatively close squadron formation, and right on the bombers. When a Nip (or Nips) was sighted, I immediately started one flight climbing. The remaining flights were then free to chase down any enemy sighted, yet be able to return again and again to the Libs - in other words, don't go too far astray. It was found that the flights off chasing usually scored, while flights with the bombers likewise had fun. The Nip definitely wanted to shoot down our bombers. In one fight I chased off an initial "scent", then returned to the bombers in time to see a Jap plane making a hurried pass on the bombers. I waited on the side and as he pulled up I sat on his tail and shot him down after a very mild chase.
Returning again to the bombers, I found another Jap making a hurried pass. (Our aggressive area tactics had broken up any organized or leisurely sort of attack). Waiting again on the other side, I found myself on his tail and dispatched him too. If gas had permitted this could have gone on indefinitely. The other flights were keeping the Nips chopped down to site, and although we had only 10 P-47's covering 24 B-24's, with 25 - 30 Nips in the area, we scored 7 kills, 2 probables, 1 damaged, and not one bomber was hit. This offensive defense paid dividends as long as the Nip chose to come anywhere close. We fought at attitudes ranging from 5,000 feet to 15,000 feet, and the P-47 really was beautiful.
This concluded my combat. After living on theories and "dreaming" my fights, when action took place I felt reasonably satisfied. Knowledge, like altitude, was money in the bank. I have always felt that if every man in a formation was doing his job, you would never be jumped or find yourself in an inextricable defensive position. The old adage of "the one you don't see gets you" kept my head on a swivel. I demanded and tried to give air and radio discipline. I tried to keep learning about my plane, about now friendly and enemy tactics, etc., even though I was now considered a "veteran". As squadron CO I found that operational accidents were often caused by lack of knowledge of the plane or poor flying habits. I tried to develop teamwork and cooperation. We never had two ships shot down, but we lost a few stragglers or wingmen who didn't stick to their job. I learned and tried to teach the importance of sun, both for offensive and defensive positioning. I always placed planes or flights into the sun at a lower level, and those away from the sun were stepped above the leader's flight. We never flew with our backs to the sun. I allowed planes full freedom to weave when in the target area, because with fewer planes to work with it gave us better visual coverage.
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Often a kill is missed by a pilot rushing in before he plans his attack. In my first fight I headed for the nearest Nip by the shortest route and got only snap shots with nil results. Later I learned to take a longer course, which surprisingly usually led up to the Nip's tail! Then just drive up close, and brother, with those 50's you can't miss.
